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Abstract 
This thesis provides an analysis of liberal internationalism at a critical point in its 
development, as manifested by the single-issue extra-parliamentary groups: the South 
Africa Conciliation Committee, the League of LiberalsAgainstAggression and Militarism, 
the Balkan Committee, the British Armenia Committee, the League of Nations Society 
and the League of Nations Union. They operated in a period of heightened international 
tension, beginning as it did with the capitalist inspired war in Southern Africa and 
culminating with the hopes for a new international order to supersede the `international 
anarchy' of the pre-1914 years. 
They advocated an ethical foreign policy where the individual could play an important 
part in its advancement. Consequently, the `scratch crowd' or `stage army of the good' 
attracted to such groups serve as an important indicator of public attitudes to British 
foreign policy and international relations. Enthused with a belief in a world united in 
peace and co-operation they were primarily a combination of radical parliamentarians, 
journalists, academics and lawyers such as Lord Bryce, Noel Buxton, Aneurin Williams, 
J. A. Hobson, H. N. Brailsford, and Arnold Toynbee. 
In studying these groups collectively, the development of liberal internationalism from 
a post-Gladstonian moralist attitude derived from an evangelical religious sentiment, 
to an institutionalism of an entirely secular character becomes apparent, as does the 
centrality of the Eastern Question to their understanding of the international system 
and the policies they advocated for the rights of oppressed peoples to self-determination 
and the league of Nations. The effective use of insider/outsider strategies enabled the 
liberal internationalists to manage the interaction of British public opinion, international 
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On 9 January 1913 the radical intellectual Leonard Hobhouse wrote to Noel Buxton, 
Liberal MP and chairman of the Balkan Committee (BC) objecting to the formation of 
a new extra-parliamentary group as he believed it would be little more than a `scratch 
crowd [... ] got together for the purpose. " The new body was the British Armenia 
Committee (BAC) and its able secretary A. G. Symonds' immediate retort was `We may 
be a `scratch crowd', but we have already done good work in securing [Sir Edward] 
Grey's attention to the [Armenian] Question. " He further observed that Hobhouse had 
frequently demonstrated an `Olympian contempt for the practical business-like working 
of any ordinary body of men. ' In reality, these were not an ordinary body of men, but a 
selection of radical parliamentarians, journalists, academics and lawyers who were all 
enthused with a liberal internationalist spirit. ' 
The BAC was but one such single-issue extra-parliamentary group established during 
the early twentieth century. This thesis will provide a critical analysis of the `good 
work' achieved by these liberal internationalist groups as well as the `scratch crowd' 
they attracted. This is not a study of liberal international theory per se but rather how 
liberal internationalism manifested itself in the early twentieth century. Approaching 
the study of liberal internationalism through the extra-parliamentary groups provides 
an alternative perspective to that advocated by International Relations scholars with 
1 L. T. Hobhouse to Noel Buxton, 8 January 1913, McGill University Rare Books and Special 
Collections: Noel Buxton Papers (henceforth NBP), MS951 c24/2; See Appendix 1 for 
biographical information. 
2 Symonds was also at this point Secretary to the BC and therefore well placed to comment on 
Hobhouse's criticisms; A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 9 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2; See 
Appendix I for biographical information. 
3 As those enthused with this spirit were not exclusively members of the Liberal Party, liberal 
internationalism will be referred to in lower case only. 
2 
their emphasis upon the theorists rather than the practitioners. Before the emergence of 
International Relations as a scholarly discipline in the years following the First World 
War, the leading liberal international theorists were rarely divorced from the practicalities 
of international relations. Many were actively engaged in the extra-parliamentary groups 
under consideration. 
The prime focus of this thesis then is upon the `practitioners' whose liberal internationalist 
zeal animated the extra-parliamentary groups. This thesis makes extensive use of the 
personal archives of Aneurin Williams and Noel Buxton, who together with James Bryce 
were key figures in the extra-parliamentary groups. " Williams' liberal internationalism 
is central to this study, which has developed from an earlier MA dissertation on the 
development of the British League of Nations movement and unfettered access to his 
personal archive, a source neglected by historians. ' Buxton's liberal internationalism 
provides a useful juxtaposition, and his papers while not totally neglected by other scholars 
have remained an under-utilised resource. In addition to the private papers of Williams, 
Buxton and Bryce, those of their colleagues have been scrutinised, including Charles 
Roden Buxton, Willoughby Dickinson, Gilbert Murray and Alexander MacCullum Scott 
amongst others. This thesis also examines the published material generated by both 
the practitioners and theorists closely associated with liberal internationalism during 
this period. Of the groups, only the League of Nations Union (LNU) has an extensive 
archive, but this unfortunately excludes all material relating to the League of Nations 
Society (LNS). Some minute books for the League of Liberals Against Aggression and 
Militarism (LLAAM) and BAC survive. ' Therefore, it is only possible to identify the 
groups' activities through consultation of the personal papers of the leading members, 
such as Bryce, the Buxtons, Dickinson, Macallum Scott and Williams. Also the papers 
of Boghos Nubar, the official representative of the Armenian Catholicos in Europe, and 
4 See Appendix 1 for biographical information. 
5 See Barry Dackombe, `Aneurin Williams and the Development of the League of Nations 
Movement in Britain, 1914-1919' (MA, University of Hertfordshire, 2003); the only known use 
of the archive was made by Akaby Nassibian in 1980. 
6 The BAC propaganda sub-committee minute book at Bristol University Archives was unavailable, 
as according to the archivists it has been missing for several years. The only published references 
to its contents are included in Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923 
(London: Croom Helm, 1984). 
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the Armenian National Delegation (AND) provide invaluable material relating to the 
BAC and the Armenians. ' This thesis therefore provides a comprehensive survey of 
liberal internationalism at the beginning of the last century, through a detailed analysis of 
the writings and utterances of the individuals and the actions of the extra-parliamentary 
groups. 
This thesis is divided into two parts; the first provides a theoretical background to liberal 
internationalism thereby enabling this research to be placed in context. It also introduces 
the extra-parliamentary groups and the involvement of the leading internationalists. 
Additionally, a comparative analysis of the methods utilised by the different groups 
and an examination of how they functioned is undertaken. The second part provides an 
in-depth study of liberal internationalism during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, through the action and occasionally inaction of the groups and their members, 
in response to a rapidly changing international system. The early twentieth century was a 
particularly tumultuous period for internationalists: beginning with Britain embroiled in 
an imperialist war with the Boer Republics of southern Africa, before rapidly entering a 
period of heightened international tension culminating in the outbreak of war first in the 
Balkans and then much closer to home in the heart of Europe. As a result, it is perhaps not 
surprising that this period should witness an increasing interest in international affairs 
both in theory and in concrete terms amongst liberals. 
The liberal internationalists demonstrated a particular interest in the active maintenance 
of peace and conflict resolution in international affairs. Consequently, the reduction of 
armaments and countering militarism was a crucial aspect of internationalism. Of equal 
importance was the character of -British foreign policy; in particular its imperialistic 
nature, the lack of popular control or influence in its formulation, and its role in the 
Eastern Question. This emphasis on foreign policy separates the liberal internationalists 
from the traditional peace activists and their blinkered attitude to peace and the abolition 
of war. Imbued with a progressive outlook the liberal internationalists argued that the 
7 See Appendix 1 for biographical information. 
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modification of the international system was possible through the growth of international 
co-operation and understanding between both sovereign states and their citizens (or 
subjects). 
At the end of the twentieth century, some of these issues were at the forefront of 
international thinking. In a speech to the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999, the then 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair exclaimed `we are all internationalists now, whether 
we like it or not. ' The speech was concerned with espousing the merits of internationalism 
following interventions in the former Yugoslavia. In line with liberal internationalists 
a century earlier, he explained that `We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the 
violation of human rights within other countries. '8 The violations he had in mind were 
`ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, [and] mass murder. '9 The answer was for the world to 
unite behind a new doctrine of universal human rights to ensure international security. 
Subsequent events of course would have a significant effect upon the acceptance of such 
attitudes. 
What is liberal internationalism? 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define liberal internationalism. This is not as 
straightforward as it would first appear, since there is no authoritative definition. Instead, 
various alternatives have been proposed, depending upon the situation being studied and 
the individual perspectives of their proponents. At its most basic, it is the application 
of liberal beliefs to relations between nations, or as Roland Paris concludes, it is the 
promotion of liberal policies abroad through international co-operation. " For the purposes 
of this study, the definition put forward by Michael Pugh is perhaps the most suitable. 
Pugh thus defines liberal internationalism as the `foreign policy of those who set the 
individual above the state and who supposed that the individual could reach across state 
boundaries with appeals to moral sensibility. " I 
8 Tony Blair, `Doctrine of the International Community', address delivered to Chicago Economic 
Club, 22 April 1999. Available at http: //www. numberl0. gov. uk/pagel297 and also at http: //www. 
fco. gov. uk [accessed 2007] 
9 Ibid. 
10 Roland Paris, `Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism', international Security, 22, 
no. 2 (Fall 1997), 59. 
11 Michael Pugh, `British Public Opinion and Collective Security 1926-1936' (PhD, University of 
East Anglia, 1975), 1. 
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With the resurgence of liberal internationalist policies during the last decade of the 
twentieth century, there has been a corresponding increase in academic interest in 
liberal internationalism during its first four decades. 12 In scrutinising modem liberal 
internationalism, Stanley Hoffman defines liberalism, as `the protection of individual 
freedom, the reduction of state power, and the conviction that power is legitimate only if 
it is based on consent and respects basic freedoms. "' This corresponds to the definition of 
liberalism offered by Aneurin Williams, one of the primary subjects of this study. In 1919, 
he stressed the importance of human freedom and reason, together with an innate faith in 
the human ability to resolve issues. " Jeremy Bentham first defined `international' in An 
Introduction to the Principles ofMorals and Legislation (1789), as a means of expressing 
what was then referred to as the law of nations. Only in the 1850s was `internationalism' 
used to refer to the international character or principle of action between different nations 
at either the individual or the state level. 
Inhis analysis ofinternationalrelations, Fred Halliday observes that within internationalism 
three broad themes can be ascertained: firstly, that it is promoted through economic 
processes and communication advances; secondly, it is reflected within the political 
process with politicians, campaigners and individuals collaborating to a greater degree 
than previously; thirdly, it is creating greater `understanding, prosperity, peace, freedom, 
tolerance, or whatever the particular advocate holds to be most dear. "' Examples of 
international co-operation are numerous, with the leading exponents of internationalism 
during the nineteenth century being the Anti-Slavery and Peace Societies. 16 
12 For example see Paris, `Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism', 58 ; Antonio 
Franceschet, Kant and Liberal Internationalism: Sovereignty, Justice, and Global Reform 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 68-71; Albert Marr in, Sir Norman Angell (Twayne Publishers, 
1979); Louis Bisceglia, Norman Angell and Liberal Internationalism in Britain 1931-1935 (New 
York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1982); J. D. B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of war: 
Peace and the Public Mind (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1986); D. Long, Towards a new liberal 
internationalism: The international theory ofJ. A. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1997). 
13 S. Hoffmann, `The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism', Foreign Policy, (1995), 160. 
14 Aneurin Williams, `The General Election and the Future of the Liberal Party', Contemporary 
Review, CXV (Feb. 1919), 139. 
15 Fred Halliday, `Three Concepts of Internationalism', International Affairs, 64, no. 2 (Spring 1988). 
16 For an in-depth study of the international movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
see F. S. L. Lyons, Internationalism in Europe, 1815-1914, European Aspects. Series C: Politics / 
College of Europe ; no. 14 (Leydon: A. W. Sythoff, 1963). 
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Internationalism is not necessarily synonymous with liberalism and Halliday identifies 
three distinct strands of internationalism. As well as liberal, he identifies hegemonic 
and revolutionary strands. " Hegemonie internationalism recognises that integration is 
taking place but not on the equal terms favoured by liberal internationalists. This is in 
many ways equivalent to the imperialistic policies condemned by many early twentieth- 
century liberals and has done much to shape the world through the subordination of other 
states to the power of the hegemonic state. For radical or revolutionary internationalism, 
Halliday has in mind the exporting of the principles that have radically reshaped one 
society to other societies. The format can vary, but the prime examples he has in mind are 
those advocated by Marxist theory and put into practice in Russia and China, but other 
examples would be the republicanism of the French Revolution and the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution. As far as Halliday is concerned liberal internationalism is the optimistic 
belief that through interaction and co-operation, individuals, groups and societies can 
develop a common purpose, such as peace and prosperity. 
Michael Doyle, who in addition to liberal internationalism, which he associates with 
Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795), identifies two further liberal variants: liberal 
pacifism and liberal imperialism. " Liberal pacifism he views as being founded upon the 
interaction of capitalism and democracy. Taking his cue from Joseph Schumpeter's 1919 
essay Sociology of Imperialisms, he contends that democratic capitalism is inherently 
unwarlike since democracies are unlikely to tolerate the high cost of `atavistic' imperialism 
from which only a militaristic minority would benefit. Similarly, free trade discourages 
forceful expansion as each nation has equal access to resources. In many ways this 
echoes Norman Angell's argument in The Great Illusion, first published in 1910, that 
wealth and prosperity in internationalised capitalism did not depend on military power 
and could not be acquired by conquest. 19 In contrast, liberal imperialism is characteristic 
of Machiavellian polities where expansion is viewed as the best way of guaranteeing 
17 Halliday, `Three Concepts of Internationalism', 192-5. 
18 Michael Doyle, `Liberalism in World Politics', American Political Science Review, 80, no. 4 (1986), 
1152-1157. 
19 See chapter 2, where Angell and The Great Illusion is discussed in more depth; Norman Angell, The 
Great Illusion: A study of the relation of military power to their economic and social advantage 
(London: William Heinemann, 1910). 
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survival. Expansion as a measure of a state's strength, he argues, `results from the way 
liberty encourages increased population and property, which grow when the citizens 
know their lives and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure. "' While such a state would 
be characterised by social equality, popular liberty and political participation, it would 
not constitute a true democracy. 
Such beliefs differ from the classical economic liberalism as expounded by John Stuart 
Mill in Principles of Political Economy (1848). Although recognising that international 
trade fostered economic growth by extending the market and raising productivity, 
Mill was emphatic that its `intellectual and moral' advantages surpassed its economic 
benefits. The `improvement of human beings' came about through their awareness of 
human difference and their being brought into contact with unfamiliar modes of thought 
and action. By encouraging communication between nations, international trade had 
become `one of the primary sources of progress. ' It had also banished the national egoism 
of mercantilism: `Before the patriot wished all countries weak, poor, and ill governed, 
but his own: he now sees in their wealth and progress a direct source of wealth and 
progress to his own country. ' The rapid increase of international trade was `the principal 
guarantee of the peace of the world [and ensured] the uninterrupted progress of the 
ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race. '21 Despite the late nineteenth- 
early twentieth-century fashion for envisaging the international economic system as an 
incessant Darwinian `struggle for life', Mill's optimistic and irenic `take' on it remained 
central to the liberal `world view'. Principles of Political Economy also provides an 
important analysis of economics and social concerns. Mill's concern for the moral 
impact of industrialisation was instrumental in his advocacy of `industrial co-operatives', 
whereby the workers shared in the profitability of their employers either through a profit- 
sharing system or a share of the ownership of capital. A belief shared by many of the 
liberal internationalists. " 
20 Doyle, `Liberalism in World Politics', 1155. 
21 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (London: G. Routledge & Sons Ltd, 1892), 394- 
5. 
22 Williams was Honorary Secretary of the Labour Co-Partnership Association and editor of its 
journal Co-Partnership. Amongst the other members of the Association, who can be seen in 
Appendix 2, was Lord Robert Cecil who became its president after the war. 
8 
The liberal internationalist groups 
The extra-parliamentary groups symbolise the different strands of liberal internationalism 
during this important period. As such, they are representative of those advocating a 
British ethical foreign policy, which reflected liberal values as subjected to the rational 
critique of `civil society'. It is now evident that they demonstrate the transition from 
Gladstonian moralism, which was derived from an evangelical religious sentiment, to an 
institutionalism of an entirely secular character. The first step towards institutionalism in 
this period, The Hague Peace Conferences, saw the establishment of the International Court 
of Arbitration; however, the outbreak of total war greatly accelerated its development. 
Within months of the first Hague Peace Conference, Britain was engaged in a war with 
the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, a conflict driven by imperialistic 
capitalism according to its leading critic, J. A. Hobson 23 The main groups demonstrating 
a liberal internationalist ethos during this period were the South Africa Conciliation 
Committee (SACC), and the LLAAM. As Peter Clarke points out, the South African and 
First World Wars were but two examples when `the Gladstonian principles of international 
morality, law and public right were put to the test. '24 For many liberal internationalists a 
prior example was the Ottoman Empire's oppression of its Christian subject races. Such 
concerns predate the twentieth century and form an essential part of what was termed the 
`Eastern Question', namely the future of the Ottoman Empire. Historians can now see 
the years between the South African War and 1914 as an `inter-war' period of heightened 
international tension: especially in the Balkans where nationalism within the Ottoman 
Empire repeatedly attracted international attention. Gladstonian moralism was by no 
means passe; during this period two groups emerged (the BC and the BAC) which argued 
that Britain had a moral responsibility for the Macedonian and Armenian peoples, using 
the same terms and rhetoric as Gladstone's during the Midlothian campaign. Nonetheless, 
23 See Appendix 1 for biographical information. 
24 Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 289. 
9 
the BAC would also later espouse institutionalism in its calls for an Armenian Mandate 
under the newly formed League of Nations. 
Historians have tended to focus on peace and the abhorrence of war, rather than the full 
gamut ofearly twentieth-century liberal internationalism, with its emphasis on co-operation 
between individuals and nations, anti-imperialism, support for oppressed peoples and 
the principle of self-determination. The extra-parliamentary groups additionally clearly 
demonstrated what Michael Bentley has identified as the three criteria of Radical action: 
that is, their ability to establish easily pressure groups; their j ournalistic abilities; and their 
non-conformist enthusiasm. 21 During the South African War, they certainly demonstrated 
a willingness to oppose critically government policy and Stephen Koss identifies the 
SACC as one of the most prominent groups. 26 He credits it with utilising the intellect of its 
leadership to produce coherent arguments based on history and social theory; prominent 
members included the Liberal Unionist Leonard Courtney, the naturalist Alfred Russel 
Wallace, and the Liberal statesman Bryce. 27 Less `high-profile' was the LLAAM, usually 
nicknamed the `Lambs', formed in direct response to the Liberal Imperialists, which 
included key Liberals, such as Sir Edward Grey and H. H. Asquith. 
While Koss provides some interpretation of key pro-Boer publications and speeches, 
Arthur Davey undertakes an analysis of the role of these groups. 28 In his investigation he 
favourably contrasts the SACC approach of `studied restraint' against the `denunciation 
and drama' utilised by groups such as the Stop-the-War Committee. Both the SACC and 
LLAAM also feature in Richard Price's broad study of working-class attitudes to this 
imperialist war. 29 The roles of these groups during the South African War also receive 
attention in both Martin Ceadel's and Paul Laity's admirable studies of the British Peace 
25 Michael Bentley, The Climax of Liberal Politics: British Liberalism in Theory and Practice 1868- 
1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), 20-2 1. 
26 The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, ed. by Stephen Koss, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1973), xxxii. 
27 See Appendix 1 for biographical information. 
28 Arthur Davey, The British Pro-Boers, 1877-1902 (Cape Town, S. A.: Tafelberg, 1978). 
29 Richard Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working-Class Attitudes and 
Reactions to the Boer War 1899-1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). 
10 
Movement. 30 The `liberal conscience' together with their pac jcistic outlook enabled them 
to speak out publicly, even during periods of jingoistic fervour. Through the continuity 
over time in the core personnel of all the liberal internationalist groups and their consistent 
orientation towards international affairs, the inter-connectiveness of the groups, is I trust, 
revealed in the course of this thesis. 
In arguing for better relations between nations, the liberal internationalists were hoping 
to reduce conflict and suffering, without regard to faith or race of the sufferers. However, 
in two particular cases the humanitarian concern was explicitly expressed for their fellow 
Christians, who were being oppressed by the ruling Ottoman-Turks. The first occurrence 
was in the Balkans, especially in Macedonia, the second was over the treatment of the 
Armenians. Both the BC and the BAC sought to persuade the Foreign Office to take 
greater responsibility for these subject peoples, for whom the liberal internationalists 
believed Britain had a moral responsibility. This responsibility derived from the refusal 
of Britain and her allies to accept the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano signed in 
March 1878, following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. The implications of what 
former Prime Minister David Lloyd George described as `our sinister intervention' are 
discussed in chapter four. 3' 
The historiography directly relating to the BC is limited to two articles: the first by Balkan 
scholar L. S. Stavrianos appeared in 1941 and the second by Robert McCormick over 
sixty years later. 32 The BC also features in passing in Akaby Nassibian's study of Britain's 
involvement with Armenia, and is highlighted by Richard Vogel, where he identifies the 
BC as figuring large in the Buxton papers at McGill University. " The role of the BC can 
30 Martin Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists. The British peace movement and international relations, 
1854-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Paul Laity, The British Peace Movement, 
1870-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). 
31 David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, (London: Victor Golancz, 1938) Vol. 2, 
1256-7. 
32 L. S. Stavrianos, `The Balkan Committee', Queens Quarterly, 48, no. Autumn (1941); Robert B. 
McCormick, `Noel Buxton, The Balkan Committee and Reform in Macedonia, 1903-1914', in 
Antiquity and Modernity: A Celebration of European History and Heritage in the Olympic Year 
2004, ed. by Nicholas C. J. Pappas, voll (Athens: Atiner, 1984), 151-164. 
33 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question; Robert Vogel, `Noel Buxton: The `Trouble-Maker' 
and His Papers', Fontanus : From the Collections of McGill University, 3, (1990), 138 - here he 
identifies `twelve boxes and another substantial group of unnumbered files' relating to the Balkan 
Committee and associated issues. 
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also be pieced together from the biographical accounts of BC stalwarts, Noel and Charles 
Roden Buxton, Henry Noel Brailsford, Henry W. Nevinson, together with Lord Bryce. "' 
The BAC lacks even a dedicated article, but does receive several mentions in Richard 
Hovannisian's multi-volume history of The Armenian Republic, which also deals to 
some extent with the pro-Armenian groups and individuals. " While Akaby Nassibian 
primarily analyses the attitudes within Britain to Armenia through official governmental 
records, the role of the pro-Armenian groups is not neglected. 36 The parliamentary debates 
subsequent to the news of the Armenian massacres have recently been published, and in 
the introduction the Armenian historian Ara Sarafian identifies Aneurin Williams as the 
leading advocate in the Commons, supported by Noel Buxton and T. P. O'Connor, while 
in the Lords, the eminent Bryce led the debate. 37 Bryce was also responsible for the 
British government's Blue Book, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 
1915-16.38 The failure to establish an independent Armenia was a tragedy, or to put it 
in Williams' own words, it was to `put a premium on massacre'. 39 The debate over the 
Turkish government's direct involvement has rumbled on now for over ninety years, with 
both sides continuing to argue their case. 4° There is little dispute that the atrocities were 
carried out against the Armenian people and that the liberal internationalists squarely laid 
the blame on the Ottoman government. Recently the role of Aneurin Williams has once 
34 T. P. Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy from a Back Bench 1904-1908: A Study based on the Papers 
of Lord Noel Buxton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932); Mosa Anderson, Noel Buxton 
A Life (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952); Victoria de Bunsen, Charles Roden Buxton 
(London: George Allen & Unwin 1948); F. M. Leventhal, The Last Dissenter (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985); Angela V. John, War, Journalism and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century: The 
Life and Times of Henry W Nevinson (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006); H. A. L. Fisher, James Bryce 
Viscount Bryce of Dechmont, O. M. ), 2 vols (London: Macmillan and Co, 1927); John T. Seaman, 
A Citizen of the World: The Life of James Bryce (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006). 
35 Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic ofArmenia (Berkeley: University of California Press) 4 
vols., I: The First Year, 1918-1919 (1971), II: From Versailles to London, 1919-1920 (1982), 
III: From London to Sevres, February-August 1920 (1996), IV: Between Crescent and Sickle: 
Partition and Sovietization (1996). 
36 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question. 
37 British Parliamentary Debates on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918, ed. by Ara Sarafian, 
(Princeton, N. J. ; London: Gomidas Institute, 2003), x; See Appendix 1 for biographical 
information. 
38 James Bryce, and Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment ofArmenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915- 
1916: documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, (Hodder and Stoughton, 1916). 
39 British Parliamentary Debates on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918, v; Hansard (51 Series), CXI, 
House of Commons (hereinafter HC), 18 November 1918, col. 3239-70. 
40 See for example Isreal. W. Charny and Daphna Fromer, `Denying the Armenian Genocide: Patterns 
of Thinking as Defense-Mechanisms', Patterns of Prejudice, 32, no. 1 (1998), 39-49 and V. N. 
Dadrian, 'The signal facts surrounding the Armenian genocide and the Turkish denial syndrome', 
Journal of Genocide Research, 5, no. 2 (2003), 269-279. 
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again come to the fore in his native Wales, as the 2002 Armenian Genocide debate in the 
National Assembly for Wales and the 2007 dedication of the Welsh National Monument 
to the Armenian Genocide clearly demonstrates 41 He was in both cases cited as an 
exemplary Welshman who spoke out against the genocide. 
The declaration of war in August 1914 initiated the formulation of proposals for a 
permanent international body to maintain better understanding and relations between 
nations, ultimately, leading to the founding of the LNS and its successor the LNU. Of 
the groups engaged in formulating proposals, Lord Bryce's committee was perhaps the 
most distinguished. The influential role of this committee has been scrutinised by Martin 
Dubin, and provides a useful, if limited background to the formation of the LNS. 42 The 
Bryce Group is also the starting point for Donald Birn's examination of the LNU. 43 As 
far as most historians writing on the British League of Nations movement are concerned, 
the statement of Peter Raffo's that the origins of the LNU were `somewhat obscure' 
adequately sums up their knowledge of the LNS. 44 Although Henry Winkler and Martin 
Ceadel are notable exceptions, in the main there has been an overwhelming tendency 
to concentrate on the internal divisions within the LNS and its subsequent split and re- 
amalgamation with its sibling organisation. 41 This has, I would argue, resulted in the 
underplaying of the role of the LNS in formulating and promoting the idea of a League 
during the early years of the war. 
41 Cynog Dafis, Short Debate, `The Armenian Community in Wales and Genocide in Turkey, ' 
National Assembly of Wales (The Official Record), 16 May 2002,75; `Unveiling of the Memorial 
to Victims of the Armenian Genocide 1915', Temple of Peace, Cardiff, 3 November 2007 
included a tribute to Aneurin Williams pioneering of the Armenian cause. 
42 Martin D. Dubin, `Towards the Concept of Collective Security: The Bryce Group's "Proposals for 
the Avoidance of War", 1914-1917', International Organization, 24, no. 2 (Spring 1970), 288- 
318. 
43 Donald S Birn, The League of Nations Union 1918-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). 
44 Peter Raffo, `The Founding of the League of Nations Union', Canadian Journal of History, 12 
(1977), 193-206. 
45 Henry R. Winkler, The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain 1914-1919 (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952); Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists.; Martin Ceadel, 
`Supranationalism in the British Peace Movement during the early Twentieth Century', in The 
Federal Idea, ed. by Andrea Bosco, ii vols (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1991), vol. i, The 
History of Federalism from the Enlightenment to 1945,169-191; For examples of the tendency to 
undervalue the LNS see J. A. Thompson, `The League of Nations Union and the Promotion of the 
League Idea in Great Britain', Australian Journal of Politics & History, 18, (April 1972); Raffo, 
`The Founding of the League of Nations Union'; George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the 
Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organisation, 1914-1919 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978). 
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Radicals, dissenters and trouble makers 
The views of the liberal internationalists attracted to such groups were often at odds 
with the British government. Consequently, their non-conformist - or `awkward squad' 
- attitudes to foreign policy ensured they form part of A. J. P. Taylor's dissenting or 
Trouble Makers tradition. For Taylor, dissent was a normal and sensible position; they 
were `radicals' regardless of which party was in office; they opposed British foreign 
policy to such an extent that they repudiated its aims, methods and principles. " As a 
result, they rarely held high office, and had to make their voices heard from the sidelines. 
According to A. J. A. Morris, the radicals' message was frequently diluted through their 
failure to co-operate amongst themselves, to the extent that on occasions they opposed 
each other as much as they did the government 47 The liberal internationalist groups 
however demonstrate a greater cross-fertilisation of ideas and personnel than Morris 
gives credit. Increasingly utilising extra-parliamentary methods, they sought to take their 
message directly to the nation, through the printed word. 48 In a period when political 
communication was rapidly changing, with the emergence of cheap mass circulation 
dailies, they primarily addressed the educated elite and because of the slow trickle effect 
of such methods, they have in the main remained obscure figures. 
Morris maintains the radicals were fired by a `nonconformist conscience' that justified 
their campaigns but conflicted with their desire to be loyal to the Liberal government. This 
reference to `conscience' is utilised in Michael Howard's extensive survey of intellectual 
opposition to war. For Howard, the choice of `liberal conscience' has particular relevance, 
as it implies not only `a belief or an attitude but also an inner compulsion to act upon it 
[... together with] faith in the power of human reason and human action' to make changes 
to enable everyone to reach their full potential. 49 This compulsion to act, and an unerring 
46 A. J. P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers: Dissent of Foreign Policy, 1792-1939 (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1957), 19-20. 
47 A. J. A. Morris, Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy of Peace and Retrentchment 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972); see also A. J. A. Morris, Edwardian Radicalism 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974). 
48 These form an integral part of Bentley's key contributions of the Radicals, see fn 25,9. 
49 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (London: Temple Smith, 1978), 11. 
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confidence in rational discourse, made it possible for them to speak out on issues of 
importance, such as peace and oppressed peoples of the world. 
The liberal internationalists have been eclipsed by the dominant post-Second World 
War realist attitudes, which have painted them as ideological idealists. Even prominent 
individuals like Angell, whom Albert Marrin describes as a giant of his time, have 
become merely items of academic interest. 50 Before the First World War his book, The 
Great Illusion proved to be very influential and in September 1914, he was a founding 
member of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC). 51 Louis Bisceglia associates his 
post-war liberal internationalism closely with the LNU in the 1920s and 30s. 12 Hobson's 
international theories also had a significant impact upon liberal internationalist thinking, 
with the introduction of constructive internationalism. " His ideas were developed 
through a `new liberal' approach, arguing for greater institutional intervention, increased 
social organisation and co-operation on an international scale. In his biographical 
analysis of the relationship between liberalism and social democracy in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Peter Clarke identifies Hobson as `a thinker of 
profound originality'. " Hobson was particularly active in international affairs, as were 
his journalistic colleagues such as Brailsford and Nevinson. ss At various times they had 
served as foreign correspondents for the Manchester Guardian, with both Brailsford and 
Nevinson reporting from the Balkans. 
50 Marrin, Sir Norman Angell, 8; other biographies include Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility 
of war; Bisceglia, Norman Angell and Liberal Internationalism; and a forthcoming biography 
by Martin Ceadel, Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1872-1967 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press); for biographical details of Angell see Appendix 1. 
51 Angell's involvement with the UDC feature in Marvin Swartz, `A Study in Futility: The British 
Radicals at the Outbreak of the First World War', in Edwardian Radicalism 1900-1914, ed. by 
A. J. A. Morris, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 246-261; Marvin Swartz, The Union 
of Democratic Control in British Politics During the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971); and Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic 
Control (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1996). 
52 Louis Bisceglia, `Norman Angell and the "Pacifist" Muddle', Bulletin of the Institute for Historical 
Research, XLV (May 1972), iii. 
53 Long, Towards a new liberal internationalism, 1-3,135. 
54 Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats. 46 
55 Leventhal, The Last Dissenter; John, War, Journalism and the Shaping of the Twentieth Century; 
See Appendix I for biographical information. 
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As well as in `quality' journalism, the liberal internationalists were evident on the 
parliamentary backbenches. Bryce was undoubtedly their most authoritative figure, 
guiding much of the liberal internationalist groups' activities, but not involving himself 
in the minutiae of organisation. sb He served in Gladstone's second ministry, and was 
influential in mobilising him in 1895-6 on behalf of the Armenians. " Under Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman's premiership, he initially served as Irish Chief Secretary before 
becoming British Ambassador in Washington in 1907. He played an active role throughout 
the period of study and was instrumental in many of the liberal internationalist groups. 
The other important parliamentarians were backbench Liberals, and in particular Noel 
Buxton and Aneurin Williams. Of the two Buxton is the better known though, concerning 
Armenia and the League, Williams' role was more notable. 58 The late 1890s saw the 
development of their interest in foreign affairs and soon after, they became effective and 
influential members of several liberal internationalist groups. In many ways, they were 
exemplars of early twentieth-century liberal internationalism, from championing `small 
nations' and the right to self-determination, to the advocacy of the League of Nations. 
Unquestionably part of Taylor's `trouble makers' tradition, a study of such individuals can 
be justified on two counts; firstly as Taylor observed `The Dissenters existed: therefore, 
they deserve to be put on record. They cannot be passed over by anyone who is studying 
British foreign policy in its official form; and they appear in all the books if only as 
`noises off". 19 Secondly, and more importantly, through a study of their involvement 
with these groups we can see how liberal internationalism manifested itself during the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. 
56 The most recent biography is Seaman, A Citizen of the World; a more detailed account is however 
provided by Fisher, James Bryce. 
57 Christopher Harvie, `Bryce, James, Viscount Bryce (1838-1922)', Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
58 For biographies of Noel Buxton see Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy; Anderson, Noel Buxton A Life; 
and H. N. Fieldhouse, `Noel Buxton and A. J. P. Taylor's `The Trouble Makers", in A Century of 
Conflict 1850-1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor, ed. by Martin Gilbert, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1966), 175-198; biographies of Aneurin Williams include Barry Dackombe, `A fine and 
disinterested spirit', Journal of Liberal History, no. 57 (Winter 2008), 34-41; Representation: The 
Journal of the Proportional Representation Society, `Aneurin Williams: A Personal Tribute', no. 
42, February 1924,4; Dictionary of Labour Biography, ed. by Joyce Bellamy and John Saville, 
(London: 1974), i, 346-347. 
59 Taylor, The Trouble Makers, 15. 
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This thesis demonstrates that by taking a holistic approach to the study of the groups it 
is possible to obtain a more complete view of liberal internationalism than by studying 
one individual or group. Although they emphasised the optimistic belief that liberal 
democracies could establish peaceful relations through the development of economic 
interdependence and international law, it would be a fallacy to view them as the `utopian' 
caricature painted by E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis (1939). As the New York 
Globe commented in 1916, `only by adopting some of the principles of utopia can peace 
and justice be safeguarded. '60 




Liberal Internationalism in the early Twentieth Century 
As a system of beliefs, liberal internationalism can be traced back to the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and in particular Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill. ' By the end of the nineteenth century, it was closely associated with international 
co-operation between individuals and organisations for the promotion of peace through 
economic, social and legal channels. By the 1920s, the liberal internationalists' hopes 
of transforming international relations were embodied in the League of Nations and the 
emergence of International Relations as a separate academic discipline. The trauma of 
the First World War and the events preceding it had resulted in the realisation that the 
traditional balance of power and the use of military force were no longer the answer 
to international disputes. The alternative they advocated was the fostering of peaceful 
relations by developing an international system of law, international arbitration and 
collective security. Consequently, the new liberal internationalists actively argued in 
favour of public scrutiny and the introduction of democratic accountability to international 
relations. On this basis Hedley Bull, identified their distinctive characteristics as a: 
Belief in progress: the belief, inparticular, that the system ofinternational 
relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being 
transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; 
A history of the development of liberal international history is provided by Mark W. Zacher and 
Richard A. Matthew, 'Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands', in 
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Noeliberal Challenge, ed. 
by Charles W. Kegley, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1995), 107-150; see also F. H. Hinsley, 
Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Philip Bobbitt, The Shield ofAchilles: War, 
Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). 
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that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of 
the `international mind', the development of the League of Nations, the 
good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own 
teachings, it was in fact being transformed. ' 
Liberal international convictions 
Since the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace has regularly been 
cited for its argument that the spread of republican liberal democracies would negate the 
possibility of war. The establishment of a `universal association of states' and `universal 
conditions of hospitality' Kant argued would enable states to share common values. He 
constructed a framework of ideas in which the generally acknowledged rights and duties of 
states vis a vis their own citizens can be shown to require, logically, acknowledgement of 
certain equally important rights and duties towards each other (and each other's citizens) 
if their traditionally recognised tasks are ever to be effectively discharged. ' Kant's theory 
has led to the proposition of Doyle and others that liberal states do not go to war with one 
another, though they are not precluded from engaging in wars with non-liberal states. ' 
Doyle has identified two particular legacies of liberal internationalism., The first he 
describes as the pacification of relations between liberal states, and the peaceful restraint 
exercised amongst them. This Doyle equates to Kant's `pacific federation', which has 
resulted in a separate peace amongst liberal states. The second legacy he identifies as 
international `imprudence', where peaceful restraint does not apply to relations with non- 
liberal states. Consequently, numerous wars have been fought for defensive purposes 
against authoritarian regimes and even for territorial expansion against weaker non- 
liberal states. 
2 Quoted in Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 20. 
3 See W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
4 M. W. Doyle, `Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12, no. 
3 (Summer 1983), 205-235; M. W. Doyle, `Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12, no. 4 (Autumn 1983), 323-353. 
5 Doyle, `Liberalism in World Politics', 1155-57. 
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The importance of liberal states to the establishment of peaceful relations between states 
is unmistakable in this analysis: a liberal regime was associated with constitutional 
government and the emancipation of its citizens. In Perpetual Peace, Kant outlined three 
definitive articles, which form an integral part of liberal internationalist thought. 6 Firstly, 
nation states should have representative and responsible government as they will not 
initiate war but they still reserve the right to defend themselves; secondly, international 
law should be based upon a federation or league of peace whose ultimate aim is to abolish 
war; and thirdly, a system of `Universal Hospitality' should exist to allow the freedom of 
movement for individuals between nations in a peaceful way. 
Kantian internationalism is identified with the development of co-operation and 
interdependence between nations, and the development of a league or federation of 
states. The greatest problem for such a vision is that it has from necessity come to rely 
upon institutions, which depend for their effectiveness upon the leadership and will of 
the Great Powers. The indecisiveness of international organisations is all too evident 
where there is a conflict of interest, a problem inherent in both the League of Nations and 
the United Nations. 
Whereas Kantian internationalism focuses on international governance the Liberal and 
Radical traditions focused on an international civil society where individuals, groups 
and transnational communities could co-operate despite the narrow national interests of 
the individual state. Closely linked to this world view was the belief in free trade, which 
they thought would encourage interdependence between nations and a mutual desire 
to avoid conflicts, to the benefit of both producer and consumer alike. The intellectual 
rationale for free trade can be found in Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776), 
where he demonstrated the importance of extending the market in raising productivity and 
improving the welfare of mankind. Bentham too recognised the economic importance of 
free trade, together with its potential to discourage war through international commerce. 
His Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace (1789) recognised that international 
6 W. L. Huntley, 'Kant's third image: Systemic sources of the liberal peace', International Studies 
Quarterly, 40, no. 1 (March 1996), 49; Doyle, `Liberalism in World Politics', 1157-1159. 
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integration would remain unattainable as long as the conflicting interests of individual 
states were allowed to dominate concerns. While being passionately opposed to war on 
moral grounds, he recognised the possibility that war may be acceptable for reasons of 
defence and security against outside aggression. ' F. H. Hinsley credits him with being 
the first internationalist to recognise the importance of public opinion as the means by 
which states could be coerced to keep their pledges under international law. ' This was to 
be an important tool for the early twentieth-century liberal internationalists, in an age of 
quickening communications and emergent mass media. 
For the nineteenth-century liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Richard Cobden free trade 
was in many ways the panacea, which would provide peace and prosperity through the 
co-operation of private enterprise operating within the freedom allowed by representative 
government. Trade free of governmental restrictions enabled industry to develop unfettered 
by contrived limitations, while fostering a better understanding and friendship with 
fellow traders in other countries. Certainly, for Cobden free trade was a means towards 
an end, as the resultant prosperity would lead to peace. On this basis, he successfully 
integrated free traders within the pacifist peace movement. Mill meanwhile provided the 
intellectual basis by which liberals of the early twentieth century could understand the 
need for national self-determination. As Hoffman illustrates, he provided both an explicit 
and convincing explanation why multinational states or empires would remain illiberal 
while their aspiring nationalities sought self-rule. ' Consequently, democratic government 
would best serve the post-1918 liberal dream of self-determination. 
Liberal pac jcism 
John MacMillan questions the Kantian liberal peace thesis as expounded by Doyle, as 
he argues that peace is just one manifestation of the correlation between liberalism and 
pac jcism. 1 ° For him peace is such an essential constituent of liberalism that he labels 
7 Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, 81-2. 
8 Ibid., 86. 
9 Hoffmann, `The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism', 162-3. 
10 John MacMillan, On Liberal Peace: Democracy, War and the International Order (London: 
I. B. Tauris, 1998), 275-7; This argument is further developed in John MacMillan, `Whose 
Democracy: Which Peace? Contextualising the Democratic Peace', International Politics, 41, no. 
4 (December 2004), 472-493. 
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the process whereby it is interwoven with the positive values of liberalism as `liberal 
pacjcism'. Peace then is recognised as a positive value or moral requirement, which 
following Kant's argument will enable the construction of a society of nations. 
MacMillan deliberately uses the term paccism rather than pacifism to describe the 
peaceful nature of liberalism. This distinction is important, as the work by Martin Ceadel 
clearly demonstrates the historical significance of liberal pacificists. A clear distinction 
exists between pacifism and paccism; the latter is associated with the conviction that 
war can ultimately be prevented and abolished through reforms, which establish justice 
in both international and domestic politics. " Pacifism in contrast is the complete rejection 
of war, and the just or defensive war ideas supported by pacificists. More recently, 
Ceadel has identified the origin of pacificism in the eighteenth century when `beliefs 
in the harmony of international interests and in the capacity of public pressure to alter 
government policy both began to develop. "' Interestingly while not directly using the 
term pacificist, Angell's continually evolving interpretation is evident in the numerous 
editions of The Great Illusion. In 1912, he argues that a balance was required between 
those advocating war and the pacifist as `to concentrate on either half to the exclusion 
of the other half is to render the whole problem insoluble. "3 By the 1930s he describes 
what he terms the `active pacifist' as an individual who believes that war is likely unless 
precautions are taken, and that it is justifiable to protect a nation's `vital interests' through 
warfare. 'a 
Ceadel has further developed his typological analysis to identify several variants within 
pac f cism. Those of particular relevance are liberal pac f cism and radical pac f cism. 1I 
Both can trace their development to the influential ideas of Richard Cobden who played 
11 Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980); Martin Ceadel, Thinking About Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); 
Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists. 
12 M Ceadel, `Pacifism and pac fcism', in Bellamy, Richard, ed. by Terence Ball, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 473-492,475. 
13 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A study of the Relation of Military Power to National 
Advantage (London: William Heinemann, 1912), 330. 
14 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, 1933 (London: William Heinemann, 1933), 90 & 268 
15 Ceadel, Thinking About Peace and War, 109-21. 
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a pivotal role in both the free trade and peace movements. While radicalism during 
the early twentieth century was primarily concerned with the extension of democratic 
control, as exemplified by the UDC, that of liberalism looked outwards to reforms of the 
international system and the recognition that a supranational body is necessary for the 
peaceful co-existence of states. Similarly, as previously mentioned, Bentham advanced a 
pac jcist argument for defensive wars. 
David Martin has identified a clear correlation between pacificism and dissenting 
opposition to war. 16 That this should be the case is perhaps not surprising as pac f cism 
is re-introduced in Taylor's seminal work on dissent over British foreign policy, where 
he defines pacificism as advocating a `peaceful policy. '" This link is significant as the 
liberal internationalists' interests encompassed many aspects of British foreign policy, but 
overwhelmingly advocated an alternative policy based on co-operation and conciliation. 
This together, with their principled conscience, meant that they rarely achieved office, 
and on the odd occasion they did, it was because they had something else to offer. A case 
in point is Noel Buxton, an outspoken critic of British foreign policy who served in the 
first Labour government as Minister of Agriculture. 
Within liberal pac jcism Ceadel has further identified four phases: internationalism 
(up to 1914), confederalism (1914 to the 1940s), federalism (from the late 1930s to the 
1950s) and transnationalism (since the 1960s). Of these, only the first two have a bearing 
on the period under consideration. The first phase placed its faith in international law and 
arbitration treaties to solve disputes, particularly through the role of the Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The second phase evolved out of the shock of the First 
World War, which persuaded many liberals of the need for a confederal institution, such 
as the League of Nations. Ceadel of course is not without his critics, but his typology is 
extremely useful in revealing the nuances within this concept. 18 
16 David A. Martin, Pacifism: An Historical and Sociological Study (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1965), 73. 
17 Taylor, The Trouble Makers, 51 n. 
18 For example see David S. Yost, `Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations', 
International Affairs, 70, no. 2 (April 1994), 281 and Norman Ingram, The Politics of Dissent: 
Pacifism in France 1919-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 7-10. 
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Towards a new liberal internationalism 
In the early twentieth century, liberal international theory underwent a profound change. 
The leading proponents of what David Long has termed the `new liberal internationalism' 
were the radical journalists Hobson, Angell and Brailsford. 19 Academic credibility was 
provided by George Peabody Gooch, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Gilbert Murray 
and Arnold Toynbee. While in Parliament the crusading internationalist spirit was evident 
in their political collaborators such as Bryce, and backbench Liberals Noel Buxton and 
Aneurin Williams. 
A central proposition of `new liberal internationalism' was that foreign policy-making 
should be democratically accountable, rather than being formulated by a secretive, 
aristocratic elite within the governing class. Parliamentary scrutiny of foreign policy 
was limited, which had the inevitable consequence that the British public were ill- 
informed on foreign affairs. Calls for the establishment of a Parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee came from many quarters, most notably from the UDC during the 
First World War, but there had been earlier demands for greater parliamentary oversight 
of imperial and foreign policy; for example, the Jameson Raid of 1896 prompted calls 
for an inquiry into Joseph Chamberlain's alleged collusion with this disastrous episode. 
Liberal internationalists wholeheartedly endorsed the principle of parliamentary scrutiny 
and many supported the Liberal Foreign Affairs Committee in the years leading up to the 
First World War. While adamantly opposing the veil of secrecy Brailsford recognised the 
need for parliamentary scrutiny to operate quietly while treaty negotiations proceeded. 2° 
Bryce fully supported this approach, but he believed both parliamentarians and the public 
required more knowledge of world affairs, since ignorance was the greatest obstacle to 
peaceful relations. " 
19 Long, Towards a new liberal internationalism, especially chapter 9. 
20 H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold. - A Study of the Armed Peace, sixth edn (London: G. 
Bell & Sons, 1916), 208-9. 
21 James Bryce, Modern Democracies, ii vols (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 2,383. 
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For convenience, the main arguments of liberal internationalism are divided into four 
significant areas: the role of capitalism and imperialism; democracy and free speech; 
co-operation and institutionalism; and, nationalism and self-determination. In the main, 
these will be addressed through the theories advanced by Angell, Brailsford and Hobson, 
together with relevant ideas advanced by the other liberal internationalists. 
Imperialism and the capitalist conspiracy 
The `taproot of Imperialism' was, according to Hobson, under-consumption in the 
industrialised economies, which encouraged their expansion into new overseas territories, 
and stimulated the rise of militarism and its associated arms race (with periodic outbreaks 
of war). This theory of imperialism was significant in that it made a major impact upon 
liberal internationalism; no longer was it possible to regard economics and politics as 
mutually exclusive. Sectional interests endowed capitalism with the potential to act as a 
catalyst for war. " In his critique of imperialism, he observed: 
Every improvement of methods of production, every concentration of 
ownership and control, seems to accentuate the [expansive imperialist] 
tendency. As one nation after another enters the machine economy and 
adopts advanced industrial methods, it becomes more difficult for its 
manufacturers, merchants, and financiers to dispose profitably of their 
economic resources, and they are tempted more and more to use their 
Governments in order to secure for their particular use some distant 
undeveloped country by annexation and protection. [... ] Everywhere 
appear excessive powers of production, excessive capital in search 
of investment. It is admitted by all business men that the growth 
of the powers of production in their country exceeds the growth in 
consumption, that the more goods can be produced than can be sold 
at a profit, and that more capital exists than can find remunerative 
investment. " 
22 See J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1938), part I, chs. 4 
& 6; Long, Towards a new liberal internationalism, 184. 
23 Hobson, Imperialism, 80-81. 
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In a similar vein, Brailsford's War of Steel and Gold (1914) argued that the pressure of 
economic expansion and the resultant demand for new markets was the driving force behind 
the international struggle. He advocated a distinctly socialist approach to correct what he 
perceived as the dominant capitalist-inspired policies. Hobson's notion of imperialism 
also had socialist political implications though its intellectual sources were non-marxist 
in that he believed redistribution and democracy could `correct' the imperialist tendency 
in the development of capitalism. Nonetheless, Hobson had a more significant influence 
upon Vladimir Lenin, whose theory regarding the inter-imperialist rivalry indicated that 
competition between capitalists of different nationalities transformed into competition 
between states seeking to defend their interests. 
The task of British diplomacy according to Brailsford was to preserve our freedom 
and independence, followed by preserving the freedom of the seas for our exports and 
imports. 24 He argued imperialism had led to individuals expecting the government to 
protect their investments abroad. Consequently, imperialism was `simply the political 
manifestation of the growing tendency of capital accumulated in the more civilised 
industrial countries to export itself to the less civilised and the less settled. '25 
While Hobson's Imperialism provided the theoretical groundwork with which to criticise 
the prevailing imperialistic policies, it was also a departure from the traditional Cobdenite 
doctrine advocated by Norman Angell in his influential The Great Illusion. Angell sought 
to defend the pacifying tendencies of international capitalism, which he viewed as a 
positive force against war. 26 Certainly, in the pre-war years, his reassuring message that 
the interdependence of the world's economies rendered fallacious the prospect of any 
financial gains from war was eagerly welcomed. The problems of the twentieth century, 
Angell argued, were based upon the false assumption that each nation needed to expand 
its territory in order to ensure sufficient outlets for its industry and capital investments. 
Industrialised nations were struggling with each other, he claimed, not for the raw 
24 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 52. 
25 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 79. 
26 Angell, The Great Illusion, 1933,251. 
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materials or resources required in manufacturing, but for the right to sell them at the 
expense of their competitors. On this basis, he argued that there was no need for the 
build-up of armaments, as the size of the British navy had done little to halt the success of 
Germany's industrial expansion. 27 Rather than seeing capitalists as conspirators seeking 
to gain financially from war, he argued that in order to make a profit they required some 
degree of security for their investments. The instability war causes would be detrimental, 
and capitalists therefore sought stability and consequently, he believed, they were amongst 
the greatest internationalists. " While accepting Angell's thesis, Brailsford argued that he 
failed to take full account of the nationality of capitalism, by which Brailsford meant that 
the capital invested within a colony or sphere of influence tends to belong predominantly 
to the subjects of that power. 29 On this basis, he questioned Angell's assumption that a 
nation does not benefit from conquest. 
Democracy and free speech 
The link between capitalism and imperialism was, as Hobson explained, a danger 
to democracy due to its `destruction or enfeeblement of the popular franchise and 
representative government. '30 Imperialism was therefore anti-democratic and associated 
with autocratic regimes. Despite this for those with greater parliamentary experience, 
such as Bryce, the role of managing foreign policy was naturally within the purview of 
the Foreign Office and their agents; the general principles by which such policy was to 
be guided should however be informed by the views of the people. " In a similar vein the 
political scientist, Graham Wallas described the ideal democracy as one where: 
Every citizen is intelligent, patriotic, disinterested. His sole wish is 
to discover the right side in each contested issue, and to fix upon the 
best man among competing candidates. His common sense, aided by 
a knowledge of the constitution of his country, enables him to judge 
27 Angell, The Great Illusion, 64. 
28 Ibid., 309. 
29 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 164. 
30 Hobson, Imperialism, xxi. 
31 Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. 2,368-70. 
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wisely between the arguments submitted to him, while his own zeal is 
sufficient to carry him to the polling booth. 32 
The greatest problem was the limited knowledge the public had of other countries. Due 
to this ignorance, it was natural that they should look to more experienced voices for 
guidance, such as politicians or the press. These, Bryce argued, were untrustworthy as 
most politicians would seek to make political capital and the press could easily exaggerate 
prevailing sentiment. 33 Brailsford ascribed the British public's sporadic interest in foreign 
affairs to the striking and spectacular nature of isolated and shocking events, such as 
the Balkan atrocities, in comparison to the everyday routine of diplomatic relations. 34 
The difficulty of arousing public opinion in favour of intervention in Macedonia was 
attributed by Noel and Charles Buxton to the exhaustion of the country's `stock of 
sensation' following the SouthAfrican War. 35 Moreover, the main outlet for public opinion 
to express itself effectively was at parliamentary elections. These occurred infrequently 
and rarely related to foreign policy, a notable exception being the 1900 `Khaki' election 
fought on what was then believed to have been a successful campaign in South Africa. 
The primary concern of parliamentary candidates in either general or by-elections was 
nevertheless domestic issues to which their electors could more easily relate. 
The free press was an important feature of democracy since it diffused information rapidly 
and actively engaged its readership in public debates. While a free press was seen as a 
guarantor of public expression in a democracy, it was nevertheless subjected to a variety 
of pressures. One was its commercial nature; it had to sell both news and advertising, and 
adopting an unpopular line could seriously affect its circulation. Editorial policy could, 
therefore be determined by commercial imperatives. 36 
32 Quoted in Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics (London: Archibald Constable & Co, 1908), 
126. 
33 Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. 2,370; see also Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 159 
34 Brailsford, ibid., 129. 
35 Noel Buxton and C. R. Buxton, `Public Opinion and Macedonia', The Monthly Review, no. 39 
(December 1903), 96,98. 
36 See Brailsford, op cit., 135. 
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Increasingly, the profitability of a newspaper rested on its ability to entertain and 
stimulate, as well as inform its readers. In presenting non-domestic issues there was a 
greater possibility of misrepresenting, falsifying, or even suppressing the facts. 37 The 
power of what Bryce termed the `cheap press' concerned many liberals who feared its 
capacity to mis-inform, prejudice or unduly influence an ill-educated audience. 38 This 
mis-information, Hobson claimed, was designed to pander to vulgar curiosity rather than 
educate. In addition, liberals were persuaded that the ill-educated were credulous readers 
for whom the mere appearance of a statement in a newspaper guaranteed its truth. They 
feared the power of suggestion without real evidence. With the increase in publications, 
Hobson found the possibility of misleading the public particularly disturbing: 
Those papers which have lent themselves to this unscrupulous 
enterprise are debasing the intellectual currency of print - one of the 
foulest injuries which can be inflicted upon a civilised nation. 39 
Co-operation and Institutionalism 
The dominant principle of the international system of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was the balance of power, which sought to preserve an equilibrium between the 
Great Powers of Europe, by denying preponderance to any one of them. For `realists' the 
balance of power was a source of security; for liberal internationalists it was in reality an 
unstable balance of force, always liable to be upset by states pursuing their own interests. 
The establishment of a new international system would, they hoped, provide the stability 
that the division of the Powers into rival alliances had ultimately failed to do. As Brailsford 
argued, the alliances just like the arms race were a symptom of the universal insecurity 
prevalent in the years leading up to the First World War. 40 The balance of power was 
merely a metaphor to `disguise the perennial struggle for power and predominance, ' and 
establish exclusive areas of financial penetration a' 
37 Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. 1,100-01. 
38 Ibid., 94-5; J. A. Hobson, The Psychology of Jingoism (London: Grant Richards, 1901), 9. 
39 Hobson, ibid., 124. 
40 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 22. 
41 Ibid., 28 and 63. 
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The distinction between the civilised states and the non-civilised world had long been a 
`background' assumption of international relations, one shared by J. S. Mill. Speaking in 
1916, Hobhouse echoed this distinction when he identified the future of internationalism 
with European civilisation. 42 They were, he claimed, so intertwined that without one, there 
was no hope for the other. As Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest have noted, civilisation 
was `an elusive, always slippery concept' emanating out from a Christian European 
core. 43 On the periphery was the Ottoman Empire, which possessed `civilised' potential 
as evidenced by its ability to enter treaties with European states, but was nonetheless 
never regarded as being fully `within the pale'. Brailsford implicitly endorsed this notion 
of civilisation when he observed that the Balkans, Transvaal, Turkey and Japan were 
outside the `charmed circle of European fraternity. '44 As part of the Ottoman Empire's 
peripheral `quasi civilised' position some Powers supported and encouraged its Christian 
subject ethnic groups in their claims for autonomy and self-determination, on the grounds 
that this would enable their entry into the civilised world. Similarly, the Powers were able 
to subvert the Sultan's sovereignty in all but name, through the occupation and direct 
administration of provinces such as Bosnia and Egypt. The fig-leaf of sovereignty was 
maintained until the early twentieth century, with Bosnia being annexed by the Austro- 
Hungarians in 1908, and Britain declaring a Protectorate over Egypt following Turkey's 
entry into the First World War. The protests over the Armenian massacres in 1915 again 
highlighted the distinction between the Christian `civilised' Allied Powers and the 
non-Christian Turks. While France and Russia proposed condemning the massacres as 
`crimes against Christendom', the British with an eye to Muslim opinion within India, 
put forward the suggestion of `crimes against humanity'. 45 
For the liberal internationalists, the pre-war international relations were not a `system' but 
in Lowes Dickinson's phrase an `international anarchy', with fundamental irremediable 
42 L. T. Hobhouse, The Future of Internationalism, an address delivered by Professor L. T. Hobhouse, 
18 January 1916, Transactions (London: National Liberal Club Political & Economic Circle, 
1916), 90. 
43 Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest, `International Society in Victorian Political Thought: TH Green, 
Herbert Spencer, and Henry Sidgwick', Modern Intellectual History, 3, no. 2 (2006), 232 
44 Brailsford, op cit., 15. 
45 See chapter 8. 
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defects that had resulted in the breakdown of peace. 46 Moreover, its failure to prevent the 
outbreak of the War, led him and many internationalists to advocate the notion of a league of 
nations, with mutual interdependence or collective security. By placing the responsibility 
for keeping peace on all nations, it was believed that peaceful relations would ensue. 
Through the establishment of new pac(cistic institutions including arbitration tribunals, 
and international courts, coupled with disarmament, they believed it was possible to 
transform state behaviour. Specifically through the idea of collective security, a degree 
of coherence and direction was given to the inter-war liberal internationalists in Britain 
and, similarly to their American counterparts after 1945.47 Indeed, as Michael Howard 
observes, it had been the consistent aim of liberal statesman throughout the twentieth 
century, to work for the creation of a `genuine world system of collective security. "' 
In Towards International Government (1915), Hobson maintained that `public opinion 
and a common sense of justice were inadequate safeguards. There must, [he argued], be an 
executive power enabled to apply an economic boycott, or in the last resort an international 
force. '49 Importantly this embraced and expanded upon the institutional ideas of Lowes 
Dickinson and Aneurin Williams, which had been independently formulated soon after 
August 1914.50 Leonard Woolf was to further the process of institutional internationalism, 
through the publication of his Fabian-inspired International Government (1916). As a 
result, the traditional liberal internationalist policies of disarmament, international law 
and peace became firmly associated with the League agenda. 
In a similar vein, Angell attributed the outbreak of war to a lack of federalism and co- 
operation, between individuals and nations. " As well as aiding wealth production, an 
important aspect of co-operation was its instilling of social habits and behaviour, which 
46 G. Lowes Dickinson, The European Anarchy (London: 1916), 9-10 & 151-2. 
47 G. W. Egerton, `Collective Security as Political Myth - Liberal Internationalism and the League of 
Nations in Politics and History', International History Review, 5, no. 4 (1983), 496-524. 
48 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (London: Oxford, 1989), 132. 
49 J. A. Hobson, Towards International Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1915), 6. 
50 See Aneurin Williams, `Proposals for a League of Peace and Mutual Protection among Nations', 
Contemporary Review, November 1914), 628-636 and E. M. Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes 
Dickinson (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), 136. 
51 Angell, The Great Illusion, 1933,252-3. 
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he believed would enable the successful survival of co-operative nations. A co-operative 
alliance between nations would, he believed, additionally provide security from predation. 
He therefore argued that an international body was required to administer this collective 
power. Hobhouse, too, recognised that there was a need for a `mechanism which will bind 
the nations together into an orderly whole. '52 In 1916, he was unsure how internationalism 
could be reinstated, but argued that every possibility should be fully investigated. In 
Hobhouse's view, internationalism was based upon a union of independent nations, but 
the greatest obstacle was the misunderstanding that such a union was a surrender of a 
nation's sovereignty and power. 
As far as the liberal internationalists were concerned, peace and justice could only be 
achieved through the extension, strengthening and enforcement of international law. This 
has led to `realist' charges of utopianism as international law is between sovereign states 
and not over them: they are unlikely to observe those judgements, which are contrary to 
their national interests. The liberal internationalists riposte was that, without recourse 
to institutionalism there was the danger of the continuation and expansion of the arms 
race and would ultimately culminate in the `Balkanisation of the world' and mutual 
destruction. " 
Nationalism and self-determination 
Many liberal internationalists experienced at first hand the inflamed nationalistic passions 
of their fellow countrymen, when during the South African War they were publicly 
denounced as pro-Boers. Brailsford identified this false patriotism with the militarism 
which turned `men into machines' and was a necessary condition of the `criminal stupidity 
called war. 'S4 Hobson in his Psychology of Jingoism (1901) identified false patriotism or 
jingoism as: 
52 Hobhouse, The Future of Internationalism, 2. 
53 Norman Angell, The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to `The Great Illusion' (London: W. Collins & Co, 
1921), 101; Angell, The Great Illusion, 1933,241. 
54 This observation was based upon his personal experiences fighting in the Greco-Turkish war of 
1897, see Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 180 & 177. 
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That inverted patriotism whereby the love of one's own nation is 
transformed into the hatred of another nation, and the fierce craving to 
destroy the individual members of that other nation. " 
The rapid spread of jingoism during the South African War he attributed to improvements 
in mass communication, which brought the cheap press, music hall chains and other forms 
of popular entertainment to the labouring classes. Consequently, jingoism was clearly 
viewed as the product of a `civilised' country. " As Hobhouse observed, nationality was 
a vague term, but it included `a heightened sense of group consciousness, a feeling for 
a corporate life animating a certain mass of people and separating them out from other 
people. 'S' He continued that a peaceful world should recognise nationalistic aspirations 
and enable sufficient autonomy to satisfy their requirements. Nationalism, then, was 
regarded as Janus faced; on the one hand it was easily elided with xenophobia but 
on the other it inspired subject peoples to strive for their political self-determination, 
something which Liberals could only applaud and which they believed had a positive 
role in amicable international relations. For President Woodrow Wilson this notion is 
evident in his speech to the Senate on 22 January 1917, when he stated that `only a peace 
between equals can last' and `no peace can last or ought to last, which does not recognise 
and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent 
of the governed. 'S8 The First World War firmly placed nationalism on the international 
agenda, and in the form of self-determination, its application would prove to be very 
problematic. 
Acceptance of the notion of national self-determination was significant in that it tied 
the formation of new nations to democracy and it embedded popular sovereignty in 
international law. It broke with the historical tradition that states derived their legitimacy 
from their military power to sustain themselves in a world of hostile states. It was also a 
55 Hobson, The Psychology ofJingoism, 1. 
56 Ibid., 12. 
57 Hobhouse, The Future of Internationalism, 5. 
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controversial move, as it theoretically gave a voice to nationalist movements, which as 
the US Secretary of State Robert Lansing recalled in his diary: 
The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of 
self-determination, the more convinced I am of the danger of putting 
such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis 
of impossible demands on the Peace Conference and create trouble in 
many lands. 
What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and 
the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder 
and rebellion? Will not the Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and 
possibly Morocco and Tripoli rely on it? " 
As a stepping-stone towards autonomy, Noel Buxton argued that the new League 
Mandates be applied to all colonies, not just those of Germany and Turkey. Norman 
Angell, in contrast, viewed the nationalist tendencies within multinational states as 
anarchical and ultimately leading to conflict. 60 Increasing pressure for self-determination 
has continued apace making many of Robert Lansing's concerns a reality. Frequently 
self-determination has legitimised the tyranny of the majority and the exclusion by force 
of ethnic and religious minorities. 
According to Bryce, self-government was only successful when it had been actively 
fought for, and therefore was highly valued by those who saw it as the only true remedy 
for mismanagement and misgovernment. " Bryce recognised the importance of a nation's 
social structure, in which he included language, religion and caste distinctions as well as 
racial differences. Where such distinctions are prevalent, there exist grounds for mutual 
distrust and animosity. For Graham Wallas, the European experiment of creating a 
homogeneous state, whereby the citizens can recognise in each other similarities, played 
59 Quoted in David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention 
(London: Pluto Press, 2002), 125. 
60 Angell, The Fruits of Victory, 101. 
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an important part in the development of the political consciousness of the nineteenth 
century. 62 
Bryce identified three distinct dangers for newly emergent nations, especially those 
with limited experience of constitutional government. 63 The first danger was covetous 
neighbouring countries, which experience had shown were not always ready to respect 
international agreements. Writing soon after the establishment of the League of Nations, 
he was hopeful it would prove to be an effective enforcer of the new territorial settlements. 
The second problem for newly emergent nation states was the need to earn the respect of 
their new citizens, without misusing this power. The last problem was not just confined to 
the newly emerging nations. It also related to the exploitation of the weaker members of a 
society through the restriction of suffrage, and therefore any requirement to acknowledge 
their needs. He also expressed concern that newly empowered officials and legislators 
would be tempted to abuse their positions. He concluded that only in those countries 
where the seed of democracy had been fertilised by European influence would democracy 
take root, and mature successfully. 64 
The true internationalists 
Certainly, the liberal internationalists viewed war as irrational and an anathema, which was 
the result of militaristic and undemocratic self-interest. Despite this it would be a mistake 
to view them as pacifists when their outlook was predominantly pac f cist in orientation, 
so perhaps it is not surprising that Angell identified the `active pacifist' or pacificist as 
the true internationalist. " They also shared the Cobdenite belief in the immorality of 
state-directed force as exemplified by their hostility to needless entanglements, distrust 
of traditional diplomacy and a belief in the limitation of armaments. At the same time, 
they acknowledged the moral obligation to come to the aid of the weak and oppressed 
with the full force of economic and military sanctions. This was clearly demonstrated in 
62 Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, Pt II, Ch IV: Nationality& Humanity, 269. 
63 Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. 2,508. 
64 Ibid., 513. 
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their attitudes towards the suffering of subject peoples whether it be due to imperialism 
or indigenous tyranny. For this reason, they actively supported the national struggles for 
emancipation. 
This chapter has outlined the views of the new liberal internationalists, who were 
concerned with the central questions of political theory, which Collini identifies as 
democracy, authority and the rights of individuals. " Although this thesis is concerned 
with how the liberal internationalist ethos was manifested during the first two decades of 
the twentieth century, it should be pointed out that the individuals were not blind to the 
situation closer to home. As David Long indicates in his analysis of Hobson's international 
theories, his concern was to illustrate the interrelationship between international affairs 
and the domestic situation. " Indeed many of the liberal internationalists were actively 
engaged simultaneously with domestic problems such as housing, temperance, and 
democratic representation. According to Stanley Hoffman, the ideas and practice of 
liberal internationalism were not as precisely defined as domestic liberalism, and 
therefore he argues that the `international side of the liberal coin is far less polished than 
the domestic one. '68 While this stricture may generally be true, it should not occlude the 
breadth and sophistication of liberal internationalist thinking. The groups and individuals 
with whom this thesis is concerned made a sustained collective effort to identify the 
principles of conduct in international affairs that would be both ethically defensible and 
of practical application to the complex situations in South Africa, the Balkans and the 
Near East. They recognised the inherent conflicts between national self-determination 
and minority rights, freedom and order in the concrete situations in which they were 
concerned and advocated liberal, `progressive' solutions which would endow foreign 
policy with an `ethical dimension'. The following chapter will look in detail at how the 
liberal internationalist groups were established and provide a comparative analysis of 
how they functioned. 
66 Stefan Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930 
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3 
The Liberal Internationalist Groups 
The extra-parliamentary groups provided the focal point where the various strands of 
liberal internationalism could converge. Gladstonian moralism remained a potent source 
of the groups' energies, but one combined with sympathy for liberal nationalism and 
institutionalism. This chapter turns from the ideas and theory of the liberal internationalists 
to the practical workings of the groups, which articulated their understanding of foreign 
affairs. 
The liberal internationalists often bemoaned the volatility of the British public's interest 
in foreign affairs. According to Brailsford, it was due to a defect in the English psyche, 
whereby the public will could be organised and articulated only in relation to foreign issues 
that were clearly associated with humanitarianism, such as slavery and the slave trade, or 
massacres and the mistreatment of subject peoples. ' Certainly, the liberal internationalist 
groups contained an element of humanitarianism but it would be a mistake to view this as 
their primary raison d'etre. They maintained their political nature and purpose due to the 
establishment of separate but closely allied humanitarian groups: viz. the Balkan Relief 
Fund for the BC and the Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund for the BAC. 
1 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 134. 
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Group Characteristics 
All the groups operated within the bourgeois public sphere at a historical junction between 
the elitist politics of the later nineteenth century, when most major offices of the state were 
held by aristocrats or men with aristocratic connections, and the `mass' democratic politics 
which emerged in the early 1900s. Their modus operandi reflected this junction: they 
sought to both influence ministers and party leaders and mobilise democratic citizens. In 
doing so, they conformed to the generally accepted definition of a pressure group: that is 
an organisation, which seeks to `influence the formulation and implementation of public 
policy. '2 In attempting to differentiate between extra-parliamentary groups, and other 
voluntary associations, Francis Castle offers the definition that a pressure group covers 
`any group attempting to bring about political change, whether through government 
activity or not, and which is not a political party in the sense of being represented, at that 
particular time, in the legislative body. '3 This highlights a disconnection between party 
politics and pressure group politics, but in the case of the groups being studied nearly all 
key figures were backbench Liberal politicians. 
Certainly, the groups attempted to exert pressure upon the Foreign Secretary, and the 
British government, as A. G. Symonds' letter to Noel Buxton illustrates, when he referred 
to the `good work' done in securing Sir Edward Grey's attention to the Armenian Question 4 
They utilised a variety of mechanisms to ensure their opinion was heard by those wielding 
power within Whitehall, thereby demonstrating many of the characteristics of pressure 
groups. It would however, be a mistake merely to view them as such; as Martin Ceadel 
has observed of the peace movement in general, such groups owed their existence not 
just to influence policy makers, but to bear witness to their beliefs. ' In doing so, they 
manifested a non-conformist or liberal conscience, which was an essential part of the 
liberal internationalist ethos. Through the involvement of the politicians at the highest 
2 Wyn Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain (Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 
1989), 9. 
3 Francis G. Castle, Pressure Groups and Political Culture: A Comparative Study (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 1. 
4 A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 9 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2. 
5 Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists, 3. 
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level, the groups attempted to emulate the parliamentary select committees, by bringing 
together those with knowledge and experience of the pertinent issue. Therefore, rather 
than viewing them as pressure groups it would perhaps be appropriate to treat them as 
self-appointed select committees, or as Brailsford describes them, `unofficial leagues or 
committees. ", 
Group Classification 
Three possible ways of classifying the groups will be put forward: the liberal 
internationalist argument employed; the influence they wielded; and the methods they 
utilised to get their message across to the government ministers and the British public. 
The first simply differentiates them by the type of internationalism being advocated; 
firstly, moral internationalism which was prevalent in the period up to the First World 
War and secondly, institutional internationalism, which developed in response to the 
war. 7 To summarise: the moral arguments are essentially based upon a positive view 
of humanity, where the development of an international consciousness will lead to the 
benign transformation of the international system. Certainly, the early twentieth-century 
liberal internationalists were imbued with moral and humanitarian principles, which were 
heavily influenced by Gladstonian Liberalism. Some, such as the Buxtons, belonged to 
the evangelical tradition but Williams was agnostic for whom humanity was the source 
of moral precept! 
Whether they were religious believers or agnostics, an appeal to the conscience of the 
public could help in the reformation of international politics. The institutional approach 
recognised that raising people's consciousness was insufficient to achieve the desired 
changes. A suitable mechanism was therefore required. The liberal internationalists 
reacted to the war with deep pessimism, but also a determination to seek an alternative 
way of achieving their ultimate goal. The proposals for a League or Society of Nations 
emerged from this mix of emotions. 
6 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 132. 
7 For an overview of these concepts in relation to British liberal internationalism see Sylvest, 
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In the move towards institutionalism, the moralist arguments were not totally displaced, 
but there was an abrupt rise of those advocating institutional ones. During the Paris Peace 
Conference, the BAC simultaneously advanced both moral and institutional arguments for 
direct intervention on behalf of the Armenian people and their right to self-determination 
and protection under a League of Nations Mandate. 
Alternatively, it is possible to differentiate between the groups according to how much 
influence they exerted on the political class. ' Brailsford argued that the more influential 
were wealthier and better organised and consequently, he believed, `that the tendencies 
which they represent are well entrenched within the governing class. They can always 
secure peers and bishops for their platforms, and great capitalists sit on the inner executive 
committees of several of them. "° He argued it was the `weight' of the individuals 
supporting the groups, and not necessarily the number of supporters they could muster, 
which led to their success. Such groups were `influential just so far as they can persuade 
or delude the Foreign Office into the belief that they speak for society and capital. " I The 
key to success, Brailsford argued, was access to large funds and imposing names and, 
importantly, a competent secretary. In contrast, those with limited funds and reliance 
upon voluntary services were seldom a real force. Ultimately, he saw their function as 
`strengthening'the hands of the relevant Minister, by generating public opinion in support 
of a policy he was either already committed to, or at least in sympathy with. As will be 
seen in subsequent chapters this latter point is exemplified by the difficulties of the pro- 
Boer groups during the South African War, and the BC's feeling of accomplishment 
during Lord Lansdowne's tenure as Foreign Secretary. 12 Brailsford identified the BC as 
one of the more successful groups: the other liberal internationalist groups also fulfil his 
criteria in that they had good financial support, and efficient secretaries to support their 
activities. " For the SACC and LLAAM, the major difficulty was finding a Minister even 
vaguely sympathetic with their view point. 
9 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 132-3. 
10 Ibid., 133. 
11 Ibid., 133. 
12 See chapter 5 and 6. 
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Hitherto, the groups have been classified in simple terms, the argument they employed or 
the influence they wielded. For a more sophisticated method, we must turn to the academic 
studies of pressure groups. Wyn Grant's distinction between insider and outsider is the 
most significant in the literature. "' In essence, an insider group is afforded some form of 
legitimacy through its privileged access to the government, either through senior civil 
servants or junior and occasionally middle-ranking ministers. This consultation enables 
them to have a greater influence on policy-making. In order to achieve this status they 
usually operate in areas where government knowledge or provision is inadequate. " 
In addition, if their area of interest becomes sufficiently popular, they may be able to 
undertake a media campaign. Conversely, outsider groups are excluded from what is 
termed `the corridors of power, ' and as a result have to resort to raising public awareness 
in order to gain support for their views. These actions can in turn further alienate them 
from the government. Despite this, it is possible in certain circumstances for groups 
carefully to balance the use of outsider strategies without loosing their insider status. 
As Edward Page has observed, for those groups seeking to influence the government the 
insider/outsider distinction ascribes influence to some and impotence to others. 16 Insider 
characteristics are predominantly concerned with access, such as contact with government 
ministers and their civil servants, Members of Parliament and the House of Lords and, 
importantly, specialist knowledge on the particular issues. Outsider characteristics are 
in contrast predominantly related to public opinion, and methods to engage its attention. 
These include utilising the press, through letters to the Editor and the provision of 
press releases, together with engaging with the British public through the publication 
of leaflets and pamphlets, as well as organising public meetings and the preparation of 
petitions to illustrate public support for the relevant issue. Typically, the insider/outsider 
distinction has been applied to modem pressure groups, which can be classified by their 
response to a questionnaire, but such a luxury is not available to the historian. To assign 
14 Grant, Pressure Groups, 15-2 1; Wyn Grant, `Pressure Politics: From `Insider' Politics to Direct 
Action? ' Parliamentary Affairs, 54, (2001), 337-348. 
15 Grant, `Pressure Politics: From `Insider' Politics to Direct Action? ', 346. 
16 Edward Page, `The insider/outsider distinction: an empirical investigation', British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 1, no. 2 (June 1999), 206 & 208, 
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the groups either insider or outsider status it is instead necessary to assess their use of the 
different strategies, using a `whole life' analysis, rather than the `snap-shot' approach of 
a questionnaire. Whilst this cannot match the critical interrogation of modern pressure 
groups, it nevertheless provides an important tool by which to evaluate the overall role 
of the liberal internationalist groups and their modus operandi. 
Through a detailed study of the workings of the liberal internationalist groups, it is 
possible to identify the key methods they employed. The different approaches associated 
with either insider or outsider strategies, by which the groups were evaluated, can be 
seen inTable 3.1. The benefit of this procedure is that it provides an assessment that can 
be readily applied to all groups, thereby enabling their methods to be compared and 
contrasted. 
The pro-Boer groups were, overwhelmingly, outsiders with limited access to government 
ministers, and only slightly greater rapport with the upper echelons of the Church of 
England. The other groups were predominantly insider groups as they had regular access 
to government ministers and the support of high-ranking Church officials such as the 
Archbishop of Canterbury. All the groups at various times utilised the outsider strategy 
of press and public campaigns to advance their cause. However, their willingness to use 
such campaigns varied during the lifetime of the groups. For the SACC and LLAAM 
it was the main channel open to them; government ministers regarded them as giving 
comfort to the enemy. What follows is a discussion of how the liberal internationalist 
groups exploited the strategies associated with the insider/outsider distinction. 
Governmental Connections 
Contact with government was a strategy closed to the SACC and LLAAM as they were 
regularly derided by ministers as being pro-Boer and by implication anti-British. They 
were ideologically at odds with both the Conservative government and their Liberal 
Imperialist colleagues. The other groups were advocating policies which were more 
congruent with the overall thrust of British foreign policy, and could certainly not be 
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South Africa Aggression British League of League of 
Conciliation and Balkan Armenia Nations Nations 
Committee Militarism Committee Committee Society Union 
Insider Strategies 
Governmental Connections 
Regular contact with 
ministers 
No 




House of Lords Yes 
Members of Parliament Yes 
Religious Connections 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Church of England Limited Limited 
Non-conformist Yes Yes 
Specialist Knowledge 
Access to first-hand yes 
reports 
Relevant knowledge yes 
and experience 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Outsider Strategies 
Press Campaigns 
Letters to the Editor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Press Releases Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Campaigns 
Publication of leaflets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
and pamphlets 
Public Meetings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Outsider Outsider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Predominant Strategy Outsider Outsider Both Both Both Both 





Argument Approach Moral Moral Moral / Moral / Institutional Institutional Institutional Institutional 
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construed as unpatriotic; they were therefore afforded the privilege of insider status. As 
a result, they were able to make representation to government ministers, and entered into 
regular and fruitful correspondence with departmental officials. 
The necessity of having access to government departments, but maintaining sufficient 
independence to enable constructive criticism of their policies became more of an issue 
with the change to a Liberal government. In 1903, at the time of setting up the BC, 
Bryce, as a former Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, insisted that it should pursue 
its aims `without directly challenging any of the Powers with which a [future] Liberal 
Government might have to deal. "I 
The Foreign Secretary and his junior ministers regularly received deputations from the 
BC and BAC. The BAC was also able to develop good relations with the Conservative 
members of the wartime coalition government, including Lord Robert Cecil and Lord 
Curzon at the Foreign Office. Bryce, Aneurin Williams and other representatives of the 
BAC and LNS also held meetings with Lloyd George including a breakfast meeting on 
4 December 1919 and a private meeting `in the country' in May 1920.18 Two important 
differences made governmental contact easier for the post-South African War groups: 
firstly, they were dealing at least initially with members of their own political party; and 
secondly, while they were scathing of Britain's previous policy, their actions were not in 
conflict with Britain's war efforts. 
Parliamentary Connections 
Through their political membership, all the groups were fully capable of utilising the 
political system to their best advantage. Politicians sat on the executive committees of all 
the groups; in some cases, they were founded and controlled by backbench MPs. With the 
exception of the LLAAM, the other liberal internationalist groups were able to claim they 
17 Quoted in Conwell-Evans, Foreign; Policy, 3; this letter could not be found amongst the Noel 
Buxton Papers at either McGill or Duke Universities as not all of the papers used in the biography 
are extant. 
18 `Notes of breakfast meeting', 4 December 1919, Private Collection: Aneurin Williams Papers 
(henceforth AWP) AW/3/4/1; Aneurin Williams to Boghos Nubar, 21 May 1920, Bibliotheque 
Nubarn. Archives of the Delegation Nationale Armenienne (henceforth ADNA) Liaise 1/24. 
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were above party politics. This was particularly important in their appeal to a wide range 
of parliamentarians, academics and journalists. Prior to 1914, liberal internationalism 
was predominantly the domain of Liberals, but it could nevertheless appeal to a wide 
political spectrum including both Labour and Conservatives. Opposition to the Boer 
war was not exclusively Liberal, and anti-war Conservative and Liberal Unionist MPs 
included Leonard Courtney, Sir Edward Clarke, Arthur Elliot and J. M. Maclean. " The 
association with Labour was more evident, particularly through the radical Liberals. The 
drift of many of the more prominent radicals to Labour during and after the First World 
War enabled them to play an important role in directing post-war Labour foreign policy. 20 
As a result, by the 1920s, the Labour Party had officially come to accept the liberal 
internationalist ideal embodied in the League of Nations. 
The South African War was an important turning point for many, as it served as a spur 
for their political involvement. Some may have been politically active prior to the war, 
but for others like Aneurin Williams it marked his active involvement in foreign policy 
issues; prior to this, his interests were primarily with Radical domestic policies. As can 
be seen in Table 3.2 and Appendix 3, he was one of at least 28 SACC and LLAAM 
members to stand for Parliament after the South African War. 
Table 3.2: Members of SACC and LLAAM standing for Parliament 
MPs before 1900 but not standing in that election 18 
Unsuccessfully standing for Parliament before 1900 20 
Cändidates; in 1900 General, Election -43 
Elected after 1900 25 
Unsuccessfully standing for Parliament after 1900 9 
Note: For details of the individuals see Appendix 3 
19 See Richard Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1972), 16, note 15; see also Derek Walker-Smith and Edward Clarke, The Life of Sir 
Edward Clarke (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1939), 256-274. 
20 See R. M. Douglas, The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939-1951 (London: 
Routledge, 2004) and C. Sylvest, `Interwar internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the 




Religious support for the pro-Boers was in the main restricted to non-conformist ministers, 
with only a few representatives from the Church of England. 21 In Liverpool, support for 
the SACC came primarily from the nonconformist churches. 22 For the subsequent groups 
support from the highest levels of the Church of England was easier to elicit. Randall 
Thomas Davidson, the Archbishop of Canterbury (1903-1928) led several BC and BAC 
delegations to the Foreign Secretary, and spoke at public meetings for them and the 
LNS. 
Specialist Knowledge 
Journalists and experienced travellers on the committees gave the groups an unrivalled 
knowledge of the regions. In addition, they acted as conduits for missionaries, European 
residents, andthose directly affected. Access to experienced and distinguished international 
lawyers was especially important in the formulation of their policies. During the First 
World War, the pro-leaguers formulated and promoted various institutional proposals at 
a time when the government were not able to give them sufficient thought. In this way, 
they were performing the function of a political think tank. 
Public Opinion 
The mobilising of public opinion was an essential tool, which required careful 
management. If the groups could get their timing right, it was possible for them to 
influence public opinion without jeapodising their insider status. The distribution of 
selective information on issues relating to foreign affairs was not just the preserve of 
the press. Public meetings, especially those organised in Central London or the major 
municipalities, usually attracted a certain degree of press attention. However whether or 
not to hold a high profile meeting was a fine judgement as a low turn out could lead to 
the press dismissing a group as insignificant. Indeed the cautious approach advocated by 
Bryce in the post-South African war period was testimony to this dilemma. " 
21 See Appendix 2 and 4. 
22 I. Sellers, `The Pro-Boer Movement in Liverpool', Unitarian Historical Society, Transactions, 12, 
no. I (October 1960), 72-3 and 75-76; they were amongst over 200 religious ministers to join the 
SACC, see Appendix 2. 
23 An example of this cautiousness can be seen in the setting up of the LNS public meeting on 14 May 
1917, see 167 
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An important attribute of the liberal internationalist groups was their ability to lead rather 
than to be merely led by events. The making of opinion was, according to Brailsford, the 
sign ofan effective group rather than purely expressing `the spontaneous movements of the 
mass mind. 'ZQ In a more detailed analysis ofpublic opinion in relation to modem democracy, 
Bryce identified three distinct categories of individuals involved in its formulation: 
the opinion makers, the opinion moulders and the opinion followers. " The `opinion 
makers', were actively engaged in politics professionally as either parliamentarians or 
journalists, together with some enthusiastic amateurs. Despite only being a fraction of 
the voting public, Bryce concluded they practically made public opinion. They were the 
leading members of the liberal internationalist groups and the primary members of what 
Brailsford viewed as effective foreign policy groups. 26 Such individuals are equivalent to 
Stefan Collini's `public moralists, ' in that they attempted to persuade a public audience 
of the need to `give such moral considerations priority over other concerns, whether 
personal, political, or aesthetic. '27 Whether viewed as public moralists or opinion makers 
the liberal internationalists played a significant role in utilising public opinion in relation 
to issues of foreign affairs. 
Bryce's second category, the critics or `opinion moulders' took a more passive interest 
in politics. Through listening and reading, they carefully considered both sides of an 
argument before forming their own judgements. According to Bryce, they represented 
the true feelings of the nation and could therefore influence the `opinion makers. ' This 
category was more numerous and formed the backbone of the liberal internationalist 
groups' membership. The final category was the `opinion followers' who represented the 
bulk of the population. Invariably they read little and exhibited no real interest in public 
affairs, but what little opinion they expressed generally follows that prevailing within 
their locality, workplace or social class. By its size, this group could provide a major 
presence for or against a movement. 
24 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 134. 
25 James Bryce, Modern Democracies, (New York: Macmillan, 1922), i, 156. 
26 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 133. 
27 Collini, Public Moralists, 1. 
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Press Campaigns 
All the groups regardless of status followed a high-profile strategy in their attempts to 
cultivate public opinion. The support of the press was invariably limited, no more so 
than during the South African War when the anti-war stance adopted by the Manchester 
Guardian, Morning Leader and Daily News was overshadowed by the pro-war attitude 
of the bulk of the middle-class papers such as the Daily Mail and The limes. Hobson's 
experience in South Africa as a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian is well 
known. Scott had also wanted to send Brailsford to South Africa but the Manchester 
Guardian's owner blocked his posting so he joined the Morning Leader. 28 
Prior to 1917, while the United States remained a neutral power, Aneurin Williams 
successfully attracted a great deal of press attention in America to the genocide of the 
Armenians. He also recognised the need to arouse press interest in how Armenia should 
be governed following the peace settlement. 
Public Campaigns 
The rampant jingoism during the South African War was a sobering experience for many 
liberal internationalists, who were consequently cautious of making themselves targets 
in subsequent campaigns. Even ten years after the event, Liberal MP Philip Morrell was 
warning against loud public pronouncements, preferring to influence `public opinion in 
articles in the Press and all other well known silent methods [rather] than the clumsy 
method of a public meeting. '29 
The objective of most groups was the education of the public, and the focusing of 
public opinion through the dissemination of accurate news, through public meetings and 
publications. All the groups at various times organised public meetings, but only the pro- 
Boer ones attracted the unwelcome attentions of the jingoistic mob. One other way of 
demonstrating support was the preparation of petitions and the collection of signatures. 
Rather than concentrate on quantity the liberal internationalist groups invariably followed 
28 Leventhal, The Last Dissenter, 42. 
29 Philip Morrell to Noel Buxton, 18 October 1912, NBP, MS951, c4/13. 
49 
Brailsford's maxim of selecting `weighty' public figures. 3° Consequently, they sought the 
affirmation of Peers and other prominent men whose position would warrant the Foreign 
Secretary's attention. 
Another `non-silent' method was the publication and distribution of literature. Of all 
the groups, the SACC most successfully utilised this medium. In its first three months, 
it distributed around 390,000 copies of its 38 leaflets and pamphlets. 3' In addition, its 
Liverpool branch succeeded in distributing in excess of 120,000 leaflets and pamphlets 
around the city, during its first twelve months. Utilising their considerable membership 
base they undertook a major door-to-door distribution of leaflets, as well as approaching 
churches and work places. Amongst the distributed leaflets was one aimed directly at 
the local shopkeepers: it appealed to them as businessmen, by highlighting the fact that 
the war would need to be paid for by taxation of the British consumers, who would in 
consequence have less money to spend. These were just part of the leaflet campaign 
waged by the government's opponents and its supporters, as John S. Galbraith's seminal 
study of the role of the pamphlet during the war clearly illustrates. 32 
The groups also embraced the new medium of film as a propaganda tool. In 1919, the 
LNU agreed to sponsor the American produced film Auction of Souls, which was based 
on Aurora Mardiganian's Ravished Armenia and sought to re-enact many the Armenian 
atrocities described in the Bryce's report. 33 Prior to its three week run at the Royal Albert 
Hall, the film had received the approval of a LNU sub-committee including Lord Bryce 
and Aneurin Williams. They lauded the film as `a vivid exemplification of the horrors 
of war', but it soon fell foul of the authorities. " Only after modification of crucifixion 
30 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 133. 
31 SACC, Minutes of General Meeting, 25 April 1900, Oxford University Bodleian Library: John 
Johnson Collection (Ephemera) (henceforth JJC), Box 4: South African War, 3. 
32 John S. Galbraith, `The Pamphlet Campaign on the Boer War', Journal of Modern History, 24, no. 
2 (June 1952), 111-126. 
33 Henry Leyford Gates, Ravished Armenia; or, "The Auction of Souls ": the story ofAurora 
Mardiganian, the Christian girl who survived the great massacres. (New York: International 
Copyright Bureau, 1919); James Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment ofArmenians in 
the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916: documents presented to viscount Grey ofFallodon (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1916). 
34 Lord Robert Cecil to Philip Kerr, 28 January 1920, National Archives of Scotland: Philip Kerr 
Papers (henceforth PKP), GD40/17/207; no extant copies of the fiten have been located. 
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scenes and the removal of `Christian' from all subtitles did it get a public airing. 35 The 
furore created by the film caused considerable consternation to LNU chairman, Lord 
Robert Cecil, and Phillip Kerr, Lloyd George's personal private secretary. Kerr was being 
`besieged' by complaints of the films `artificial manufacture of atrocities' and its potential 
to affect Moslem opinion within India. 36 Cecil's response to the re-enactment of events 
in the film demonstrated his exasperation: `It is of course quite obvious that the pictures 
of the atrocities were not taken on the spot [... ] I cannot think that any spectator is so 
foolish or perverse as to imagine that, when the Turks were going to murder somebody, 
they sent for a cinematographic operator to record the incident! '37 Similarly, he dismissed 
the claims of the film's potential to embitter Moslem feelings as `the greatest balderdash 
I ever heard. '38 
Group Membership 
As can be seen in Table 3.1 (page 43) the groups were primarily `open' to members 
from the general public; however, only the LNU could be truly classified as a mass 
membership group, especially in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The BAC's membership 
was predominantly by invitation, and usually restricted to those with specialist knowledge 
of the region, while the BC could be considered as a hybrid in that, although it acted very 
much as a select committee, it nevertheless actively sought members at least in its early 
years. 
The Usual Suspects? 
Returning to Hobhouse's assertion that it was always possible to get together a `scratch 
crowd, ' an important question is, were these groups in effect new clothing for the same 
old dissidents? How representative were the groups, or did they just provide a suitable 
home for the `usual suspects': A. J. P. Taylors' Trouble Makers, the dissenters, and the 
35 James C. Robertson, The Hidden Cinema: British Film Censorship in Action, 1913-1972 (London: 
Routledge, 1989), 14-16. 
36 Philip Kerr to Lord Robert Cecil, 26 January 1920, PKP, GD40/17/207. 
37 Lord Robert Cecil to Philip Kerr, 2 February 1920, PKP, GD40117/207. 
38 Ibid. 
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radicals? In order to evaluate this adequately, a list of officers, members and supporters, 
of all the groups has been compiled which is as comprehensive as the surviving literature 
and manuscripts allow 39 
As we have noted the membership of the groups varied and the evidence on this matter 
is variable. The SACC published regular detailed membership lists, while the LLAAM 
and BC published limited details of all their subscribers in their annual reports. Only two 
complete membership lists for the LNS are known to survive, together with an undated 
list of additional members. 40 No details of LNU members are available, while the BAC 
sole membership appears to have been its executive committee. From an examination 
of the surviving minute books and publications, it is possible to identify Presidents, 
Vice-Presidents, prominent supporters and Committee members for all the groups. 
Together, as can be seen in Appendix 2, these give a combined membership of just over 
2,200 named individuals, which - though not an exhaustive list - provides a significant 
sample of support for liberal internationalism over a seventeen-year period. (By way of 
comparison, the LNU boasted 987 founding members, and 14,665 by the end of 1919; 
but these remain anonymous. ) Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the overlap in membership 
between the comparable groups varied considerably, depending on their membership 
type and the information that survives. 
By combining the membership of the comparable groups, it is possible to compare the 
different strands of liberal internationalism. Figure 3.2 demonstrates that the overlap 
of members is not very large, and amounted to just 8.31 percent of the combined 
membership. Appendix 2 demonstrates that the `core' members were overwhelmingly 
male and well educated with over half receiving a university education, and three-quarters 
had a publication history. Just under half were or had been MPs, and amongst the others 
were journalists, academics and religious ministers. This made them ideal candidates to 
39 The complete list of individuals can be seen in Appendix 2, and will be referred to throughout the 
remaining text. 
40 'First list of members, 12 June 1915', AWP 3/1/3; `List of members, March 1916', oxford 
University Bodleian Library: Willoughby Hyett Dickinson Papers (henceforth WHDP), c404, 
f14-18. 
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be Lord Bryce's `opinion makers, ' Stefan Collini's `public moralists, ' as well as fulfilling 
Michael Bentley's criteria for radical action. ' 
SACC LLAAM 
976 1 244 1 349 
LNS LNU 
184 ( 57 1 214 
BAC BC 
47 16 384 






LNS or -- BC or LNU 81 / BAC 




The characteristics of the mass membership is much harder to identify, however taking 
the SACC membership lists as being representative, it is possible to undertake an 
analysis of a ten percent sample in conjunction with the 1901 Census returns. 42 While 
the executive committees were certainly middle class, it is debatable whether the SACC 
was `entirely middle class in membership' as Richard Price claims. 43 How he came to 
this conclusion is unclear, other than a reference to the fact that just fewer than twenty 
percent of its membership in March 1900 held an ecclesiastical post. 44 While the sample 
SACC membership does contain a similar percentage of religious ministers, this is an 
unsatisfactory method of classifying a group. Certainly, the sample contains some very 
eminent figures including the former Lord Chief Justice Lord Coleridge, Lady Fitch, 
Lady Hobhouse and Sir Robert Head, together with numerous professionals. There are 
however, also shopkeepers, postmen, steel workers and labourers, who accounted for 
nearly a quarter of the sample membership. Analysis of the membership lists indicates 
that Price's assumptions do not bear up to detailed scrutiny. 
During its two years of existence, the SACC attracted 1,220 full members and around 730 
associate members, slightly more than Price's membership figure of 1,700 for November 
1900.45 His claim that one-half of the membership lived in Liverpool does not bear up 
to scrutiny either, as interrogation of the lists only identifies 17 individuals living in 
Liverpool, while the local branch boasted a membership of 781.46 Liverpool was one of 
35 such branches and auxiliary groups throughout Great Britain, which by June 1900 had 
42 122 individuals were sampled out of a membership of 1220 full members. The membership list 
gives name and address of all members at the time of joining, which can be compared with the 
1901 Census returns; see Appendix 4. 
43 Price, An Imperial War, 18. 
44 Ibid., 18 n29. 
45 Six published membership lists for the SACC have been identified: the first three (11 January 1900, 
17 March 1900 and 27 June 1900) are cumulative while the last three only list new members (31 
October 1900,29 March 1901 and 29 March 1902); The figures quoted by Price appear to be 
the combination of the full members (1082 at the end of October 1900) plus the Associates, see 
Price, An Imperial War; The First Annual Report on the Work of The League of Liberals Against 
Aggression and Militarism, (London: The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 
1901), 18; see also Appendix 2. 
46 While some active Liverpool branch members, like Sir John Brunner gave their London address, 
such individuals however were in the minority. While large numbers joined the Liverpool branch, 
only a small percentage became full members of the SACC. It is highly likely that the local 
members were working class, but in the absence of local membership lists this cannot be verified. 
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a combined membership in excess of 3,900.47 Of the eight major cities with significantly 
sized local branches, the number of full SACC members living within them on average 
amounted to less than five percent of the local branch membership. 8 
The SACC lists 22 women's groups in London, and it organised several women-only 
meetings. The controversial Emily Hobhouse was co-organiser and main speaker at what 
Martin Ceadel describes as `the first public meeting for women during a major war', 
held at Queen's Hall on 13 June 1900.49 Despite representation from leading women 
campaigners, such as the suffragist and radical Jane Cobden Unwin, the freethinker 
Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner, and Elizabeth Bryce, all the groups were predominantly male. 
As can be seen in Table 3.3 female membership of the groups confirms the observation 
made by Felix Moscheles in 1912 that there was a considerable under representation of 
women in the peace groups. 50 The role of women in the groups was usually of a secondary 
nature, the exceptions being the BAC and the LNS where they played an important role 
in the executive committees. 
Table 3.3: Female Membership of groups 
Membership 
Female Total Percent 
SACC 252 1220 20.65 
LLAAM 87 593 14.67 
BC 4 63 2.75 
BAC 11 400 10.64 
LNS 51 215 23.72 
Note: see Appendix 2 for details of individuals 
The LLAAM certainly did not actively seek to engage women in the debate over the 
South African War. When the former Liberal MP, C. A. V. Conybeare suggested that they 
47 The Peace and Humanity Society of Victoria, Australia was also recorded as an auxiliary group. 
48 The eight cities being Birmingham, Bradford, Bristol, Derby, Huddersfield, Leeds, Liverpool, and 
Sheffield. 
49 Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists, 155. 
50 Ibid., 185; Moscheles was a member of the SACC and BC. 
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should organise a meeting to hear Emily Hobhouse's account of life in the Concentration 
Camps no action was taken. " Similarly, when Jane Cobden Unwin requested that women 
be represented on the executive committee, the request was initially deferred and finally it 
was decided not to pursue it. " This under-representation is also evident in the analysis of 
the core members, where less than ten percent were women. Attempts to engage women 
followed the gradual awakening of interest of existing women's groups to the unfolding 
events in South Africa, which according to Stephen Koss was a result of their perceiving 
themselves as an `interest group'. 53 
The liberal internationalists were as Akaby Nassibian observed all thoroughly `imbued 
with moral and humanitarian principles. "' Gladstone's 1876 agitation was an inspirational 
example of moral passion being brought to bear on British public opinion and the 
liberal internationalists echoed Gladstone's view that the Crimean War had ensured the 
continuation of a `system of gross barbarism and cruelty. "' This link to Gladstonian 
principles is a recurring theme. In describing his brother's motives, Noel states that 
`What inspired Charlie was, I think, the pure Gladstonian doctrines, the Liberal idea for 
small nations, with the added motive of Gladstone's abhorrence of barbarity - such as 
was shown by the Turks'. 56 There was also the belief that they were the inheritors of the 
Gladstonian tradition, which meant that, `Wherever in the world a high aspiration was 
entertained, or a noble blow was struck, it was to England that the eyes of the oppressed 
were always turned. '57 
Another biographical vignette of the Gladstonian myth is demonstrated by Brailsford's 
1898 reporting on the turmoil in Crete, where the insurgents were demanding union with 
Greece. The Powers and the Sultan desired a less definitive solution. He observed at 
51 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 
1 July 1901, Glasgow University Special Collections: Alexander MacCullam Scott Papers 
(henceforth AMSP), MS Gen 1465/69. 
52 Ibid., 15 April, 5 May and 23 May 1902, AMSP MS Gen 1465/69. 
53 The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, ed. by Stephen Koss, 173. 
54 While her observation was in relation to Armenia it is equally true of the other groups; see 
Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 35. 
55 Westminster Gazette, 8 October 1912. 
56 Noel Buxton quoted in de Bunsen, Charles Roden Buxton, 54. 
57 The Voice of Gladstone, Balkan Committee Leaflet No. 15, (1912) I. 
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close quarters the actions of a small British garrison who held the port of Candia where 
around 50,000 Muslim refugees gathered in near starvation. " The distress he attributed 
to the naval blockade and the failure of the authorities to allow communication with the 
interior. Consequently he became very disillusioned about Britain's foreign policy, which 
he equated with a `soul-less pursuit of power and gain. 'S9 A belief further strengthened 
by his period reporting on the South African War for the Morning Leader. Contact with 
Noel Buxton, in whom he saw the ideals of an older Gladstonian tradition, soon restored 
his faith. Similarly, Sir Mark Sykes recognised Buxton as the inheritor of the `great 
Gladstonian tradition in the Balkans'. 60 
Although not conceived as pressure groups, through their attempt to educate and inform 
they shared many of the same methodologies. The analysis of their membership shows that 
even a small `core' was sufficient to mobilise a `stage army of the good'. 6' People largely 
engaged with single issues, rather than committing themselves to liberal internationalism 
as such, which was the `world-view' of a progressive political-cum-intellectual coterie, 
not a popular creed. We must recall, too, that the inter-play of history and biography was 
complex: we sometimes find the same individual responding to ostensibly similar events 
in dramatically different ways. Bertrand Russell is a pertinent example: he reacted to 
the Boer War with a fierce patriotism and penned a general defence of imperialism that 
echoed the views of his god-father, J. S. Mill, on the British Empire's role in disseminating 
`civilisation'. Nevertheless, he was appalled by the Liberal Government's decision to 
declare war in August 1914 and became an early member of the UDC. 62 The central 
figures in this study - Williams, Hobson, and Bryce - were rather more consistent in their 
political outlook over the years but we should not exaggerate their consistency. They 
brought certain principles (explicit and implicit) to their understanding of world affairs, 
58 See Leventhal, The Last Dissenter, 34-39. 
59 `Dinner given by the members of the Balkan Committee to the Chairman, Noel Buxton', NBP, 
MS951 c25/3. 
60 Sir Mark Sykes to Noel Buxton, 10 February 1915, NBP, MS951 c24/10. 
61 A phrase coined by Nevinson to refer to the small number of people who could be called upon 
to support worthy causes, see Henry W. Nevinson, `Edward Carpenter, 1844-1929', in Great 
Democrats, ed. by Alfred Barratt Brown, vols (1934), 101-118.; John, Mar, Journalism and the 
Shaping of the Twentieth Century, 199. 
62 See Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell; The Spirit of Solitude, (Jonathan Cape, 1996), 125-6,370-1. 
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but they did not have a programmatic doctrine comparable to socialist internationalism. " 
As with much liberal political argument, their interventions were (mostly) extemporised: 
they were unscripted responses to events but with a characteristic `voice'. The second 
part of this thesis will look in more detail at how they engaged with British foreign and 
imperial policy and the international situation, between the outbreak of the South African 
War and the demise of the Armenians' aspirations for self-determination in the 1920s. 
63 In this respect, it is instructive to compare Lenin's Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism 





Liberal Internationalism and the Eastern Question 
Liberal internationalism developed as an antithesis to the imperialistic nature of British 
foreign policy, which on strategic, economic and moral grounds was considered 
abhorrent. Imperial expansion, liberal internationalists argued, would be damaging to 
Britain's relations with the other Powers, and those benefiting from such expansion 
were an influential minority. They also opposed the idea of a `spirited' foreign policy 
whereby national patriotism was projected upon an international stage. The dependence 
of imperialism upon patriotism was as repugnant as its dependence on the use of force. ' 
British foreign policy in the words of a BC leaflet instead should be adapted `to protect 
the weak, to relieve the oppressed, and to secure the kindly light of civilisation for every 
backward and unfortunate State. '2 
Any consideration of liberal internationalism which ignores the historical context of the 
`Eastern Question' would impede our understanding of the crucial importance of this 
issue to the crystallisation of their outlook on foreign affairs, so this chapter provides the 
essential context for understanding that hugely complex imbroglio. It is significant for this 
study because Britain's involvement in the Eastern Question in the 1870s foregrounded 
jingoism and imperialism. ' The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the growth of Balkan 
nationalism subjected the region to the political machinations of the Great Powers and in 
I See Hobson, Imperialism, 107. 
2 The Appeal of the Churches, (The Balkan Committee Leaflet No. 12, n. d. ), 4. 
3 George J. Holyoake, a co-partnership colleague of Williams, is credited with first coining the phrase 
`Jingoes' in 1878, see Hugh Cunningham, `Jingoism in 1877-78', Victorian Studies, 14, no. 4 
(June 1971), 429. 
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particular, the conflicting interests of Britain and Russia. ' Britain's need to maintain the 
status quo arose out of strategic concerns for the route to India and fears that any newly 
emerging states would be more receptive to Russia due to their shared Orthodox culture 
and Slavic ethnicity. 
The Balkan uprisings of the 1870s brought together Christian humanitarian sympathy 
for the suffering of co-religionists at the hands of their Muslim overlords and liberal 
sympathy for the aspirations of national minorities to sovereign nationhood. That such a 
combination of Christian humanitarianism and liberal nationalism should find a particular 
resonance in Britain is not surprising: non-conformists constituted about half the church- 
going population and they were particularly active in sustaining political Liberalism 
outside parliament. Central to this union was former Liberal Prime Minister William 
Gladstone, a figure of inspiration to the liberal internationalists, particularly through his 
pamphlet The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, published in response to 
the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876. Here he claimed that in order to redeem British honour 
it was imperative that the Turks' `anarchical misrule' was halted by: 
The extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the 
Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely 
by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their 
Bimbashis and their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, 
one and all, bag and baggage, shall I hope clear out from the province 
they have desolated and profaned. This thorough riddance, this most 
blessed deliverance, is the only reparation we can make to the memory 
of those heaps on heaps of dead; to the violated purity alike of matron, 
maiden, and of child' 
4 For the history of this conflict see Jennifer Seigel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle 
for Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). 
5 W. E. Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London: John Murray, 1876), 
61-62; for further details regarding Gladstone's involvement with the Balkan situation see 
Richard Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, (Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 
1975) and Gladstone: Heroic Minister, 1865-1898 (London: Allen Lane, 1999). 
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This extinction of executive power required both a change in British foreign policy, and 
coercion by the Concert of Europe: it would not be by force of arms, territorial invasion 
or loss of Ottoman sovereignty. ' Instead, Gladstone advocated a pacific policy, which 
called for Balkan autonomy while recognising the need for territorial integrity as an 
essential barrier to Great Power expansion. ' This remained fundamental to the liberal 
internationalist solutions in the years leading up to the First World War. Utilising both 
insider and outsider strategies they followed Gladstone's maxim that the government 
must be taught what to say and do. ' In order to understand the subsequent actions of the 
liberal internationalists it is imperative first to consider the pertinent events of the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. 
The Balkan Uprisings 
The revolts of the mid-1870s firmly placed the Eastern Question on the national and 
international agenda. In 1875, the peasants in Bosnia and Hercegovina rose up in protest 
at the level of taxation and the deplorable conditions imposed by their overlords. This 
led to waves of refugees, Muslim and Christian alike, resulting in around one and a half 
million Muslims seeking refuge in Anatolia. The presence of these displaced Balkan 
emigres was no doubt an exacerbating factor in the ensuing waves of ethnic cleansing. 
Meanwhile, in June 1876 the Serbs declared war and subsequently invaded Bosnia, 
followed soon afterwards by a Montenegrin declaration and its invasion of neighbouring 
Hercegovina. Conditions in Bulgaria were little better and at the end of April 1876 a 
carefully planned and co-ordinated rebellion erupted, resulting in the slaughter of local 
Moslems. The Ottoman response was swift and severe, leading to the destruction of 
some 60 villages and the massacre of tens of thousands of peasants. When news reached 
Britain in May 1876, public opinion was aghast, all the more so due to the claims of 
complicity through Britain's long-standing Near East policy. 
6 John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 2 vols (London: Edward Lloyd, 1908), 121. 
7 Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors, 50-55. 
8 Ibid., 11. 
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In May 1876 the Dreikaiserbund or the League of the Three Emperors (Austria-Hungary, 
Russia and Germany), issued the Berlin Memorandum. This called for the Porte to initiate 
a ceasefire with the rebels and carry out the already agreed to reforms in the Christian 
provinces. British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli refused to sign in part because it 
contained the implication that the Powers were willing to act should the Ottomans fail to 
comply and thereby opened Britain to criticism that it had failed to support the Christian 
subjects. 9 A further Note issued by the Dreikaiserbund in late December, expressed their 
fears that in the Spring Bulgaria would rise up, and that Serbia and Montenegro would 
enter the fray. The Sultan acquiesced to the suggested reforms, but failed to implement 
them, and consequently the predictions of the Dreikaiserbund came to fruition. 
By October 1876, the war over Bosnia and Hercegovina, which had broken out four 
months earlier, was reaching its conclusion. A Serb defeat looked imminent and as a 
result, the Russians issued an ultimatum to the Porte, which secured a six-week ceasefire 
and a peace treaty that enforced the status quo ante bellum. Consequently, Russian 
attention turned from the Serbs to the prospects of Bulgaria, and the Budapest Convention 
of January 1877 accepted Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in return 
for Austro-Hungarian neutrality. Additionally it precluded the establishment of `a large 
compact' state in the Balkans. 
As well as pressure on its periphery, the Ottoman Empire was subjected to internal 
instability, as within the space of three months, May to August 1876, two Sultans had 
been deposed. Their successor was Abdülhamid II, whose thirty-three year reign was 
notorious for its authoritarianism over an increasingly secessionist population. One of his 
first actions was promulgating a liberal Ottoman Constitution, which contained provisions 
for an elected parliament, representative of all religions, as well as promises of religious 
freedom and a fairer tax system. The Sultan however retained ultimate power to declare 
war, make treaties, and issue legally binding decrees without consultation. While the 
Ottomans adjusted to the new Constitution and the return of peace to the Balkans, Russia 
9 For a discussion on Disraeli's attitude see John Charmley, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance 
of Power and the Origin of the First World War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), 25. 
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entered into negotiations with Romania to ensure the safe passage of their troops, in 
return for recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
The Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of San Stefano 
In what would prove to be the most decisive of their many conflicts, Russia declared war 
on the Ottomans on 24 April 1877. The possibility of British intervention and Romania's 
declaration of complete independence intensified the ongoing crisis. In Britain anti-Turk 
and anti-war feeling had been strengthened by Gladstone's rhetoric and Cabinet divisions 
limited the scope for Beaconsfield's interventions (Disraeli had recently been created 
Earl of Beaconsfield). For over five months, the Ottomans seriously impeded the Russian 
advance in both Bulgaria and Armenia. 
By the end of January 1878, the Russians were within sight of Istanbul and the Sultan 
requested an Armistice. The peace terms were particularly severe and included the creation 
of a large autonomous Bulgaria, together with autonomy for Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
independence for Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Additionally Russian interests in 
the Straits and eastern Anatolia were to be safeguarded. During the war, Russia had 
seized the Armenian districts of Kars, Ardaham, Bayazid and Alashkert together with the 
seaport of Batum. 
Just over a month later, on 3 March 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed. This 
confirmed the preliminary territorial changes, which in effect transferred the majority of 
the Christian subjects out of the Ottoman Empire (see Figure 4.1). The Sublime Port had 
also agreed under Article 16 of the Treaty to `carry out into effect, without further delay, 
the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited 
by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security from the Kurds and Circasians. 7° This 
protection was necessary, as the Armenians had given assistance to the Russians during 
the recent war. In addition, the Russian army would remain within Turkish Armenia until 
10 Parliamentary Papers, 1878, LXXXIII (Turkey no. 22), Preliminary Treaty of Peace between 












these reforms were introduced. As a result, the Armenian Question was projected to the 
forefront of international politics. According to the distinguished Belgian international 
lawyer, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyes, this was the first international compact to mention 
Armenia. " 
Between his request for an Armistice and the Treaty of San Stefano, the Sultan abruptly 
ended his attempt at constitutional monarchy by suspending the parliament, which during 
its brief existence was preoccupied with the disastrous war, and levelling criticism at the 
governments handling of the situation. The constitution would remain in abeyance for 
another 30 years until its reinstatement following the Young Turk revolution, a false 
dawn widely welcomed by the liberal internationalists. 
Congress of Berlin and Internationalism 
The Powers did not welcome the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano. While Britain 
and Austria were not averse to the establishment of an autonomous Bulgaria per se, its 
creation by force of arms would they feared lead to its becoming a Russian satellite, 
provide a springboard for future Russian incursions, and importantly seriously affect 
the current balance of power in the region. According to the terms of their agreement 
of 1856, Britain, Austria and France were bound to defend the integrity of the Empire; 
as a result, they were able to claim that the treaty terms were of international concern 
and therefore any treaty required the consent of the Powers. In an attempt to prevent the 
possibility of Britain and Austria-Hungary being drawn into a conflict over a post-San 
Stefano Balkans, the German Chancellor, Bismarck intervened as an `honest broker'. 
Consequently, a Congress in Berlin was convened to renegotiate the treaty. Britain 
insisted that, without exception, all the terms were to be submitted to the Congress and, 
importantly, no territorial changes would become legitimate without its approval. Britain's 
objection to the treaty centred primarily upon Russian territorial gains in Armenia, and 
the new autonomous Bulgarian principality: potential threats to British prestige and its 
power base in India. 
11 He was a Belgian jurist and founder of the Institut de Droit International as a body of experts on 
international law.; Gustave Rolin-Jaequenyes, Armenia, the Armenians, and the treaties (London: 
1891). 
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Before the Congress met, it was made clear to the Porte that the price of British intervention 
in a future conflict was to be the island of Cyprus together with the promise of improved 
conditions for all Christians within the Empire. On the 4 June 1878 the secret Cyprus 
Convention was signed, which stated that, should Russia not return the captured territory 
or again threaten the integrity of the Empire, Britain promised to help `the Sultan in 
defending them by force of arms. In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to 
England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers 
in these territories. "2 The terms of this treaty did not become public knowledge until after 
the Sultan issued afirman, or Royal decree, proclaiming the occupation on the 6 July. 
The Congress of Berlin was one of seven called as part of the `Concert of Europe' during 
the nineteenth century. 13 The Concert arose in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars (1798- 
1815) as an attempt to preserve peace and international order and thereby maintain the 
balance of power. This was to be achieved by the mutual recognition of the other Great 
Powers' authority within certain geographical areas and national frontiers. Consequently, 
the Concert was not predisposed to recognise the idea of national self-determination. 
Changes to the status quo in Europe required the consent of the Great Powers through the 
convening of a Congress. Importantly the Concert marked the first recognition that the 
Great Powers had a duty to limit the pursuit of their individual interests where this was 
detrimental to the stability of Europe. 14 The notion of working together to maintain peace 
was not consistently sustained, and as the century drew to a close competition between 
the opposing alliances would intensify. 
Consequently, the Berlin Congress has been described as the last `great international 
gathering of the `old diplomacy', the last to be held before democracy and small-state 
nationalism transformed international relations so much for the worse. "' Certainly, the 
issue of nationalism would resurface on a regular basis with the number of internationally 
12 Parliamentary Papers, 1878, LXXXIII (Turkey no. 36) Convention of Defensive Alliance Between 
Great Britain and Turkey, signed 4 June 1878. 
13 F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, 214. 
14 F. H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 
84. 
15 M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1966), 210. 
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recognised states increasing with every decade. While the Concert system viewed self- 
determination unfavourably, the liberal internationalists argued that nationalism or 
`heightened group consciousness' should not be suppressed; instead sufficient autonomy 
should be allowed in order to guarantee their freedom. The First World War heightened 
the issue of nationality, as well as the liberal internationalists' vision of a league or `union 
of autonomous nations'. 16 
Liberal internationalist concerns 
While upholding most of the provisions of San Stefano, the Treaty of Berlin contained 
significant changes. An autonomous Bulgarian Principality did emerge, but it was 
significantly smaller in size and excluded the autonomous region of Eastern Rumelia. 
In addition Western Thrace and Macedonia were `returned' to the Ottoman Empire, and 
Austria-Hungary occupied a united Bosnia-Hercegovina, much to the chagrin of Serbia, 
and the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, thereby preventing Serbian and Montenegrin unification. 
Russia also had to restore part of the occupied Armenian territories to the Ottoman 
Empire, but retained the three districts of Batum, Kars and Ardahan. As a result the 
Ottoman Empire saw its territory reduced by two-fifths and its population by one-fifth 
(see Figure 4.2). In addition, Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano was superseded by 
Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, which in its diluted form merely stated: 
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the 
ameliorations and reforms demanded by local requirements in the 
provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security 
against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known 
the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their 
application. " 
Such supervision remained unspecified and Britain was unwilling to allow the Russians 
to continue to occupy the territory until such reforms were introduced. For liberal 
16 Hobhouse, The Future of Internationalism, 7. 
17 Parliamentary Papers, 1878, LXXXIII (Turkey no. 38), Despatch from the Marquis of Salisbury, 













internationalists this was a significant change. As the Duke of Argyll commented, `what 
was everybody's business was [now] nobody's business'. " Similarly unimpressed were 
the Workmen's Peace Association who commented that there was `not a free or an 
enslaved Christian in the South East of Europe' that did not `owe England a legacy of 
disappointment and ill-will. ' 19 In his history of the period, Gooch observed the Congress 
completely failed to provide a permanent settlement to the `tangled problem of the 
Balkans' . 
20 
For the early twentieth-century liberal internationalists, the root of the problems for 
both the Armenians and the Macedonians was the Treaty of Berlin. However, there were 
important differences because the Armenians were an ethnically homogenous people, 
albeit widely distributed throughout the Ottoman Empire beyond their traditional 
homelands. In addition, Armenia's location on the eastern edge of the Ottoman Empire 
meant that the `core' Armenian population was in a region where, of the European Powers, 
only Russia could physically intervene. The substantial Armenian population amplified 
Russian interests. 
The liberal internationalists were unequivocal in condemning the substitution of the 
Cyprus Convention and the Treaty of Berlin for the Treaty of San Stefano: without this 
substitution, the great massacres of the 1890s and early twentieth century would not 
have occurred. 2' Bryce observed that the treaties had only served to draw attention to the 
Armenians. Previously the Sultan had shown no interest in them, and they had no real 
aspirations for nationhood. As a result of their raised profile, the Armenians came under 
greater scrutiny by the Sultan while at the same time a slumbering dream of nationhood 
was awakened. " 
18 Very much a Gladstonian Liberal, he nevertheless broke with the party over Home Rule, he 
consistently argued against imperial expansion and took a keen interest in the Eastern Question. 
During the Armenian atrocities of the 1890s he was a prominent critic of Ottoman Turkey; Duke 
of Argyll, Our Responsibilities for Turkey: Facts and Memories of Forty Years (London: 1896), 
74. 
19 Quoted in Laity, The British Peace Movement, 77. 
20 G. P. Gooch, History of Modern Europe 1878-1919 (London: Cassell and Co, 1923), 1. 
21 For example see Noel Buxton and Harold Buxton, Travels and Politics in Armenia (London: 1914), 
132-3; Aneurin Williams, `Armenia: Is It the End? ' Contemporary Review, 108 (Nov. 1915), 555- 
561; The Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1915. 
22 James Bryce, Transcaucasia and Ararat, 4th edn (London, 1896). 
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Armenia and the Eastern question 
The 1890s witnessed another Turkish massacre, this time of the Armenians, who had 
adopted Christianity early in the 300s A. D., and were apparently the first nation to do so 
thereby serving to highlight their differences from their neighbours. Ammnenia's position 
was unenviable, situated as it was between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and caught 
between the tectonic plates of rival empires. Subjected to repeated and quite lengthy 
periods of foreign domination, the Armenians became widely scattered throughout the 
Caucasus and eastern Anatolia, as well as Europe, America and India. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century the Armenian populations were divided 
between the Eastern or Russian Armenia and the Western or Turkish (Ottoman) Armenia. 
Russian Armenia at this point consisted of the provinces of Erevan, Kars, the highlands of 
Karabagh, and southern parts of Tiflis, while Ottoman Armenia consisted of the vilayets 
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Figure 4.3: The Ottoman Armenian vilayets 
23 For detailed history of Armenia, see for example Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road 
to Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Nassibian, Britain and the 
Armenian Question; Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict 
from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (1996). 
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The Armenians were integral to the Ottoman Empire's trading system, with many 
occupying prominent positions within medicine, the gold and jewellery trades, and most 
importantly foreign trade. Arnold J. Toynbee, observed that: 
The Armenians during the centuries they have been under Turkish rule, 
have been characterised by the extraordinary patience with which they 
have borne that rule, and by their unrequited fidelity to the Turkish 
government. Indeed, they have long ago earned in Turkey the name 
of the `Loyal Race'. They are, nevertheless, remarkably progressive 
in their character and eminently suited by their intelligence, industry, 
thrift and sobriety for settled civilised life. 24 
The Armenians had a degree ofreligious and cultural autonomy within the Gregorian millet 
system, which was an expression of nationhood, though this did not imply entitlement to 
a nation state (as in the West) but rather denoted ethnic and religious affiliation. 25 As well 
as being responsible for the spiritual welfare of its followers, the millet also oversaw their 
social and educational life. 
Armenian Revolutionary Parties 
The nineteenth century witnessed a cultural awakening for the Armenians, primarily due 
to exposure to western culture; these included missionary activities and the education of 
wealthy Armenian children in France. However, the greatest catalyst was the Treaties of 
San Stefano and Berlin, which projected the Armenian Question into the international 
arena without producing any tangible benefits. Despite sending a delegation to Berlin, 
they had not been given a hearing. Not surprisingly, the representatives looked to the 
Balkan states, which had gained greater respect from the European Powers because of 
taking up arms. 26 
24 `Pamphlets on the Armenian Question, Draft Memorandum on the Political Future of Armenia', 
1917, Oxford University Bodleian Library: Arnold Toynbee Papers (henceforth ATP), Box 44. 
25 All Christians who were not Greek Orthodox were placed within the Gregorian millet. 
26 A fuller discussion of the impact of the Armenian revolutionaries can be found in Nalbandian, The 
Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 29. 
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In the 1880s, the pacific response of the Armenians was to undergo a significant change. 
In 1887, a group of Russian Armenian students formed the Hunchakian Revolutionary 
Party with the aim of having Turkish Armenia recognised as an independent nation free 
from Turkish oppression. In order to claim the attention of the Europeans they utilised 
propaganda, demonstrations and peaceful protests, together with acts of terrorism. In the 
1890s, they joined forces with otherArmenian groups to form the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation or Dashnaktsuthium (meaning Federation). This organisation sought the 
political and economic freedom of Turkish Armenia but according to Nalbandian, due to 
its diverse membership the fledgling Dashnaks suffered from indecision and vagueness. 27 
The Hunchaks recognised, that as in the Balkans, attacks against their Muslim neighbours 
and the resultant reprisals was the only way to rouse Russia and Europe out of their 
lethargy. For the Hunchaks: 
Armenians are determined to be free. Europe listened to the Bulgarian 
horrors and made Bulgaria free. She will listen to our cry when it goes 
up in the shrieks and blood of millions of women and children [... ] We 
are desperate, we shall do it. 28 
In response to the Dashnak capture of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in August 1896, the 
Ottoman authorities encouraged and instigated Turkish mobs to massacre around 6,000 
Armenian and other Christians in the capital. 29 The resultant protests from the European 
Powers were ineffective, but such drastic action was seen as the only way to achieve 
`human rights' for the Armenians. This onset of Armenian terrorism coincided with a 
major influx of Muslim refugees from Russia, and the Balkan region, many arriving with 
their own tales of atrocities, loss of life and property. 
27 Ibid., 156-7. 
28 The National Archives (henceforth TNA) TNA FO 424/178, Memorandum by the Revd. Dr Hamil, 
Robert College, 25 December 1893; published as Cyrus Hamlin, `A Dangerous Movement 
Among the Armenians', The Congregationalist, (28 December 1897). 
29 See Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement, 178. 
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Armenian Massacres 
The 1890s were a particularly troubled decade for the Armenians and, between 1894 and 
1896, the attention of the foreign press and public was directed to eastern Anatolia. While 
news of massacres was soon alarming British opinion there was little concerted effort by 
either the European Powers or Russia to influence the Sultan. For the Duke ofArgyll here 
was another example of the British government abandoning the Christian subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire to an `incurably barbarous and corrupt government. '30 
The first major massacre occurred at Sasun in the Bitlis vilayet, by the Kurds following 
the refusal of the Armenian villagers to pay a `tribute' or protection money. According 
to Shaw and Shaw, the refusal to pay this `tax' was instigated by the Hunchaks who fled 
into the mountains before the arrival of the irregular Kurdish Hamidiye and Turkish 
army. 31 The resultant publicity led to the establishment of a European commission of 
inquiry, which insisted upon new reforms in favour of the Armenians. In October 1895, 
in response to foreign pressure the Sultan put forward his own reforms, which were only 
partly based upon the European submission, but as far as the liberal internationalists were 
concerned they were little more than `paper reforms. ' 
While the British government pursued an apparently pro-Ottoman policy, the liberal 
internationalists viewed with disdain any action, which prolonged the Ottoman Empire 
at the expense of its non-Moslem subjects. Despite its complexity, many shared Bryce's 
1905 assesment that the essence of the Eastern Question was: 
[That] encamped in Eastern Europe and Western Asia [is] a band of 
raiders, miscalled a government, who have done nothing since they 
came out of Central Asia but rob and murder the unhappy peoples 
they have conquered, and who have unfortunately been treated by the 
European States as if they were a civilised Power. 32 
30 Argyll, Our Responsibilities for Turkey, 78. 
31 S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), Vol. II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of 
Modern Turkey, 204. 
32 The Right Hon. James Bryce on the Near Eastern Question, (London: 1912), Balkan Committee 
Leaflet No. 7,1. 
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Such anti-Ottoman feelings were evident in many of those arguing for liberation of the 
Macedonians, who claimed `the gravest evil of Turkish misrule is not massacre; it is 
daily cruelty and demoralisation. 
"' 
While the Eastern Question and actions of the last quarter of the nineteenth century were 
to prove essential to the new liberal internationalist's conceptualisation of international 
relations, so too were events much closer to home. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
interest was focussed upon the establishment of the international Hague Conferences of 
1899 and 1907. Initiated by Tsar Nicholas II as a means to limit the build-up of armaments, 
they had greater success with the creation ofa permanent international court of arbitration. 
The response of the indomitable W. T. Stead was to initiate an International Crusade of 
Peace: a three-month campaign of meetings around the country culminating in a National 
Convention in London on 21 March 1899.34 It was at Stead's Middlesbrough meeting 
on 10 March that Aneurin Williams spoke in support of international conciliation and 
arbitration, and the institutional approach of liberal internationalism. " 
While the focus was on the potential of The Hague Conference and the International 
Court of Arbitration, Britain's imperialistic policies were on a collision course with the 
independently minded Boer Republics in southern Africa. The following chapters adopt 
a chronological approach to liberal internationalism as it developed during the early 
twentieth century. 
33 Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statements of Accounts for 1903 
and 1904, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1904), 7. 
34 See Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists, 151-3. 
35 Diary, 10 March 1899, AWP AW/1/4; 'Peace Crusade', Northern Echo, 11 March 1899. 
75 
5 
Friends of Conciliation and the South African War, 
1899-1902 
The outbreak of hostilities in October 1899, whilst not totally unexpected, was viewed 
with despair by certain sections of the Liberal Party, and in particular its Radical element. 
This second South African War would drag on for two and a half years and see the 
re-emergence of rampant jingoism not evident since the late-1870s. Importantly, it 
also provided a significant stimulus for liberal internationalist ideas; in particular, the 
critique of capitalist-inspired imperialism, and the defence of the principle of national 
self-determination, and the moral arguments based upon obligations to relieve human 
suffering. From our perspective, however, it is striking how little attention was paid to 
the welfare and political future of the black South Africans. 
Like the earlier Transvaal War of Independence, the liberal internationalists identified the 
South African War's origin with the desire of capitalists to exploit the mineral resources 
and Britain's imperialistic policies. The original Dutch settlers were pastoral farmers 
(Boers) who underwent the Great Trek northwards as British control of the region 
increased. Despite being awarded self-government, the Boers had seen the annexation of 
their territory following the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870. The regional 
balance of power was again under threat when extensive gold fields on the Witwatersrand 
were discovered in 1886. The predominance of non-Boer mine owners and the large 
numbers of immigrant workers, `Uitlanders, ' or outlanders was perceived as a threat to 
the Boer way of life. This resulted in the introduction of a 14-year suffrage residency 
rule, which provoked Uitlander demands for their rights and Rhodes, Premier of the 
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Cape Colony, to champion their cause. The infamous Jameson Raid of December 1895 
resulted in the failed incursion into the Transvaal and the strengthening of President 
Kruger's position. 
On the pretext of Uitlanders' demands and infringement of suzerainty, talks were held 
between British and Transvaal representatives. The Boer ultimatum for a reversal of the 
British troop build up along the Transvaal border was rejected. Consequently, on the 11 
October 1899, the Boers declared war and the following day invaded the Cape Colony, 
laid siege to Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking, and inflicted several defeats upon the 
British forces. 
The SACC grew from the initial idea of Frederic Mackarness, Percy Molteno, and 
Frederic Phillipson Stow during the summer of 1899. ' Together they had identified the 
need for publications to correct the erroneous statements regularly appearing in the 
press. The major achievement of this trio was the organisation of a private meeting at 
the Westminster Palace Hotel on 1 November 1899, at which the SACC was formed. 
Mackarness became its Chairman, following Leonard Courtney's reluctance to accept. 
However, on 18 December, Courtney was persuaded to become President, with the hunter 
and explorer Frederick Selous as vice-president. ' Courtney, despite being a Liberal 
Unionist, was in most respects like many of the pro-Boers, a Gladstonian Liberal. ' As 
Richard Price has observed, for many Liberals the SACC acted as a `spiritual home [... ] 
based [as it was] on the twin pillars of legality and morality. "' For Courtney, Britain had 
no moral right to fight and by doing so it would be committing `an atrocious crime', and 
`that [such a] war would be unjustifiable [and] unjustifiable war is a crime. " The Times 
1 See Appendix 1 for biographical information. 
2 `The Work of the South Africa Conciliation Committee', JJC, Box 5: South African War ; G. P. 
Gooch, Life of Lord Courtney (London: Macmillan, 1920), 393. 
3 He disagreed with Gladstone over Home Rule for Ireland, but supported the Liberal Party in 
nearly everything else, especially as the Liberal Unionists moved closer to the Conservative 
Party. He was later to resign and rejoin the Liberal Party, and in the 1906 General Election stood 
unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate at Edinburgh West. 
4 Price, An Imperial War, 17. 
5 Leonard Courtney to John Morley, 1 September 1899, British Library of Plotical and Economic 
Science (henceforth BLPES) Courtney Papers, Vol. VIII; Draft Manifesto concerning the South 
African War, Courtney Papers, Vol. XVI. 
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described the objects of the SACC as `innocent and even laudable, ' and reported it was 
looking forward to receiving `the promised accurate intelligence. " 
The other pro-Boer organisation under consideration, the LLAAM was closely tied to the 
Liberal Party. It emerged from a private conference of Liberals on Foreign and Colonial 
Policy, held at the Westminster Palace Hotel on 14 February 1900. The audience of over 
200 listened to the assembled anti-imperialist Liberal MPs who included David Lloyd 
George, C. P. Scott, F. A. Channing, Sir William B. Gurdon, Sir Wilfred Lawson, and 
Fred Maddison. The resolutions passed at this meeting were widely reported in the press: 
namely, the denunciation of the war, disbelief in a conspiracy against Britain, opposition 
to increases in spending on armaments at the expense of social reform at home, a 
faith in Gladstone's policy of courtesy and conciliation, and confidence in Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman's leadership. ' The final resolution called for the establishment of 
an `organisation to enforce by means of vigorous political propaganda' the resolutions 
passed by the meeting. 
The political nature of the ensuing body can be seen in its first object, namely `to press 
forward in the councils of the Liberal Party the policy of peace, retrenchment, and 
reform. ' 8 The first meeting of the new organisation took place on 26 February in the House 
of Commons, where Herbert Gladstone objected to their desire to name themselves `The 
Gladstone League. '9 The remainder of the meeting was devoted to finding an acceptable 
alternative, Lloyd George's main input being the suggestion of `League of Liberals', 
to which the `Against Aggression and Militarism' was appended in favour of the more 
suggestive `Against Aggressive Imperialism. ' 
6 The Times, 17 Jan. 1900. 
7 These included the Daily Graphic, Bristol Mercury, Standard, Morning Herald, and Manchester 
Guardian. 
8 The First Annual Report on the Work of The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 
(London: The League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 1901), 4. 
9 Minutes of the Executive Committee of the League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism, 
AMSP MS Gen 1465/69, fl. 
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Anti-war attitudes and the pro-Boers 
The British press and government ministers soon denounced anyone willing to speak 
publicly against the handling of the situation in Southern Africa, as being supporters of 
the Boer Republics and hence derogatorily called `pro-Boer. ' The anti-war protesters 
actively embraced the abusive term, much the same as members of the Society of Friends 
had two centuries earlier taken on the offensive label `Quakers. ' In a speech at Arbroath, 
just one month before the declaration of war, the veteran Liberal MP, John Morley 
claimed: 
They will tell you to-morrow morning that I am pro-Boer [... ] I do not 
believe there can be greater differences in temperament, in pursuits, in 
tastes, in beliefs than there are between the Boers and the very humble 
individual who is now addressing you. '° 
The war was a pivotal point; while the Peace Society and International Arbitration and 
Peace Association participated in the pro-Boer campaigns, it was the new single-issue 
groups, the LLAAM and SACC, which led the agenda. Bernard Porter characterised 
the pro-Boers as a `tiny eccentric minority, ' but this is a facile judgement. " Amongst 
their ranks were to be found many Liberals and much of the Labour movement, all of 
whom were vehemently opposed to both the war and the official interpretation of events. 
Nor was opposition confined to just the Liberals and Labour movement: amongst the 
leading anti-war campaigners were the Liberal Unionist Leonard Courtney, President 
of the SACC, and Conservative Sir Edward Clarke who as an experienced barrister had 
defended Dr Jameson following the unsuccessful Raid of 1895.12 However, any Unionist 
or Conservative MPs who dared to speak out tended to find themselves deselected by 
their constituencies in the October 1900 `Khaki' General Election. 
10 `Mr Morley on the Transvaal Crises', The Times, 6 September 1899. 
11 Bernard Porter, `The pro-Boers in Britain', in The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899- 
1902, ed. by Peter Warwick, (Harlow: Longman, 1980), 239-257 & 239. 
12 See Walker-Smith and Clarke, The Life of Sir Edward Clarke, 256-274. 
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According to Donal Lowry, many of those regarded as pro-Boer were in fact pacifist or 
humanitarian, and projected a romantic notion of the Boers. " While the pejorative use of 
the term `pro-Boer' was intended to suggest they desired a Boer victory, I would argue 
the liberal internationalist element were neither true pacifists nor deluded romantics. The 
reality was that they viewed the Transvaal government as `an unjust and corrupt oligarchy' 
that had been forced to act by the conduct of the British government. " Certainly, both 
the SACC and LLAAM were pac! cist and deplored the negative impact of imperialism 
upon Britain. The Boers' historical triumphs over adversity made it easier to romanticise 
their public image. Even staunchly imperialistic individuals such as Dr Arthur Conan 
Doyle were not immune as his The Great Boer War clearly illustrates. " 
Pro-Boers and liberal internationalist arguments 
Doyle's history of the Boer War, was first published in 1900, and subsequently revised 
until appearing in its final form in 1903. Of greater impact was his staunchly patriotic 
pamphlet on the causes and conduct of the war, published in January 1902. It went on to 
be translated into several languages and served to promote the British case worldwide. 
The propaganda aspect of this cheap paperback was not lost upon the SACC, who 
encouraged Williams to prepare a detailed reply to its numerous `misstatement[s] and 
faulty arguments. 7' Although never completed before the end the war, Williams' self 
styled `anti-Doyle' manuscripts were prepared in consultation with jurists and those with 
first-hand knowledge of conditions in South Africa, including Emily Hobhouse, and 
Hobson. This collaborative aspect together with Williams' new found international zeal 
confers upon the manuscript increased significance, by providing a perspective on liberal 
internationalism during a formative period. " 
13 Donal Lowry, "The Boers were the beginning of the end'?: The Wider Impact of the South African 
War', in The South African War Reappraised, ed. by Donal Lowry, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), 208-9. 
14 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, Somerset County Express, 2 February 1901. 
15 Arthur Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War, Final edn (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1903), 11. 
16 Diary, 11 February 1902, AWP, AW/1/5; Aneurin Williams, `Anti-Doyle' MSS, Part 1: Preface, 
AWP, AW/3/2/5 ft. 
17 The `anti-Doyle' manuscripts were prepared while both Doyle and Williams lived at Hindhead in 
Surrey, their homes a mere 600 metres apart. 
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Williams and the pro-Boer liberal internationalists were not against Empire per se, but 
viewed unfavourably the direction of the new imperialism being pursued by the Colonial 
Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury's Conservative government. They 
viewed the government policy as a betrayal of liberty, which had detrimental effects 
upon British politics. They believed that the war had been forced upon the Boers by the 
British government, which in turn had been manipulated by the capitalists eager to gain 
control of the gold mines. However, the liberal internationalists had to accept certain 
inconvenient truths. Firstly, it was the Boers who delivered the ultimatum that led to 
the declaration of war, and secondly, the speed of their invasion of neighbouring British 
colonies revealed them to be well prepared. Despite this Britain was not an innocent 
party; its aggressive diplomacy handled by Chamberlain and Milner and the build-up of 
troops had ultimately forced the Boers' hand. The liberal internationalists also expressed 
concern over what they viewed as the corrupt financial motives of Rhodes and his fellow 
British South Africa Company directors. They derided the government's claim that they 
were seeking to achieve better political rights for the Uitlanders, as the Boers had met 
nearly all the British demands and those still outstanding could surely have been settled 
amicably. Conciliation, the liberal internationalists argued, was the only satisfactory way 
to solve the problem. 
In his assessment of British policy in South Africa, Aneurin Williams concluded its 
ultimate aim was to grind `the Boer peoples to powder until the remnant submits to 
whatever terms we choose to impose. "8 He believed, like most pro-Boers, that the Boers 
had acted out of fear that Britain, under the pretext of Uitlander grievances, was primarily 
interested in seizing the gold mines, in much the same way as the Kimberly diamond 
mines had been seized nearly two decades earlier. As a result, the Boers actions were 
undertaken in the `cause of justice and freedom. "9 
Both the SACC and the LLAAM were overtly anti-imperialist, the latter were particularly 
scathing of Liberals such as Asquith and the `Rosebery clique', who according to Fred 
18 'Anti-Doyle'MS Preface, AWP, AW/3/2/3 fl. 
19 'Anti-Doyle'MS Chapter Ill, AWP, AW/3/2/11, M. 
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Maddison were stopping the Liberal Party from following the `right path'. 2° The response 
to the formation of the LLAAM, at the end of February 1900, was the emergence of 
the Imperial Liberal Council. Its first public meeting took place in April 1900 with the 
backbench Liberal Imperialist MP Robert Perks in the chair. " Their intention was to 
promote the traditional principles of Liberalism `and, at the same time, cherish the larger 
patriotism which is now called Imperialism. '12 However, the leading Liberal Imperialists, 
such as Grey and Rosebery did not associate with this organisation until the middle 
of 1901.23 Only with the election of Grey and Asquith as President and Vice-President 
in October and November 1901, did control of the organisation effectively pass to the 
Liberal Imperialist MPs. 
Annexation 
The annexing of foreign territory was readily associated with the aristocratic and 
capitalistic influence upon British foreign policy. Hobson deduced from his analysis of 
domestic under-consumption that capitalists sought ever more lucrative returns from their 
investments abroad. Typically, the unpredictable political situation in these countries 
eventually required the manipulation of the British government in order to guarantee 
the security of their investments. Such a situation had arisen twice in the Transvaal, and 
for Williams an unsympathetic British government and its subsequent `breach of faith' 
had brought about the Transvaal War of Independence. 24 This was again an issue in the 
current South African War due to Chamberlain's use of the Suzerainty issue. Further, 
Williams believed that the policy of annexation was ensuring the war's prolongation, as 
it forced the Boers to consider they needed to fight to the bitter end. 25 
In February 1901, Williams publicly outlined his thinking. To him both sides had a shared 
responsibility and he proposed what he believed to be a solution, which would enshrine 
20 The Morning Herald, 15 Feb. 1900. 
21 The Times, 11 April 1900. 
22 The Times, 6 July 1900. 
23 Price, An Imperial War, 39. 
24 Anti-Doyle'MS chapter V, AWP AW/3/2/26, fl -2. 
25 `Anti-Doyle'MS chapter VII. " The Concentration Camps, AWP, AW/3/2/34, t2. 
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the `great principles of liberty and justice. '26 The Boers should, he argued have sufficient 
arms to `defend themselves against hostile natives', but he accepted British responsibility 
for foreign affairs and defence from outside aggression. Eleven months later, he sought 
clarification from the Liberal leader Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman on recent reports that 
he regarded annexation as being inevitable. For Williams, annexation was the `reduction 
of the former [Boer] republics to the status of ordinary British Colonies. '27 Such a course 
he viewed as being unjust, but also dangerous to the British Empire. However, he did 
not believe it possible, let alone desirable, to reinstate the Boer oligarchy. Instead, he 
proposed that the Boer Republics be established as `protected states, without power to 
erect forts or keep artillery, but with complete internal autonomy subject to equal rights 
for all civilised inhabitants. '28 Foreign relations would remain the prerogative of the 
British government. The reference to `civilised' was a problematic issue, with the black 
Africans being excluded. 
In response, Campbell-Bannerman admitted that `annexation' was not a word he would 
care to use, but preferred to talk of `incorporation' with the qualification, `under one 
consideration or another. '29 He explained that he could not envisage the republics being 
granted a form of `independence' that was governed by a Convention, as this would 
ultimately result in the resurrection of the `old intrigues. ' Instead, he confided that he 
preferred `a Colony (with full domestic powers) to the Protected State, which has the air 
of a temporary arrangement'. In addition the Boers should be given `all that constitutes 
identity - flag, name, &c. ' Williams could not see such an arrangement coming about 
as `I fear the Boers will consider that the distinction between a `nation' under British 
protection with however limited powers, and a `Colony' with a governor appointed from 
London, is vital, in spite of self-government. I wish they were otherwise minded. '30 For 
the liberal internationalists the issue of self-determination would resurface on a regular 
basis. 
26 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, Somerset County Express, 2 February 1901. 
27 Aneurin Williams to Campbell Bannerman, 13 December 1901, British Library: Campbell 
Bannerman Papers, MS Add. 41236 f241-2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Campbell-Bannerman to Aneurin Williams, 18 December 1901, AWP, AW3/2/41. 
30 Aneurin Williams to Campbell-Bannerman (copy), 26 December 1901, AWP, AW/3/2/41- 
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In March 1900, Lord Roberts initiated the systematic destruction of the crops and homes 
of guerrillas fighting in the bush. Lord Kitchener extended this practice when he succeeded 
as commander-in-chief in December. The policy was condemned as dishonourable and 
contrary to the Hague Convention, which forbad attacks on undefended property. For John 
M. Robertson, the policy of annexation was at the root of the escalating violence; it had 
forced the Boers to adopt the guerrilla tactics, and ultimately led to the utter devastation 
of the Boer territories. 31 
The major consequence of this was the forced removal of the civilian population, into 
`concentration camps. ' The first camps were formed in September 1900 for surrendering 
burghers and their families, who would be housed and fed by the British Army. Kitchener 
made it official policy that those displaced by the farm-burning policy would be housed 
in the camps. With the increase in numbers and the Army's inability to care for the 
inhabitants, problems arose with food, fuel and general well-being. The Boer prisoners 
were widely dispersed, as well as camps within South Africa many found their way to the 
islands of Bermuda, St Helena and Ceylon. " 
Capitalist inspired conspiracy 
The conspiracy behind the Jameson Raid was still fresh in many minds, and had a 
significant bearing upon attitudes to the war. Writing in the Labour Leader in January 
1900, Keir Hardie observed that the `war is a capitalists' war, begotten by capitalists' 
money, lied into being by a perjured mercenary capitalist press, and fathered by 
unscrupulous politicians, themselves the merest tools of the capitalists. "' Hobson, made 
a similar observation following his time reporting from South Africa at the beginning of 
the war. As far as he was concerned the war was being fought `in order to place a small 
international oligarchy of mine-owners and speculators in power at Pretoria [... ] most of 
31 John M. Robertson, The Truth about the War: An Open Letter to Dr. Arthur A. Conan Doyle 
(London: The New Age Press, 1902), 38. 
32 Further details on the transported Boer prisoners, see C Benbow, Boer Prisoners of War in 
Bermuda, 3rd edn (Hamilton, Bermuda: Bermuda Historical Society, 1994); S. A. Royle, `St 
Helena as a Boer Prisoner of War Camp, 1900-2: Information from the Alice Stopford Green 
Papers', Journal of Historical Geography, 24, no. 1 (1998), 53-68. 
33 J. Keir Hardie, `A Capitalist's War', The Labour Leader, 6 January 1900, in The Pro-Boers: The 
Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement, ed. by Koss, 54. 
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whom are foreigners by origin, whose trade is finance, and whose trade interests are not 
chiefly British. '34 The role of outside interests and foreign financiers were at the heart of 
many of the anti-imperialist critiques, which often adopted an anti-Semitic tone. In the 
weeks leading up to the Boer ultimatum Hobson described Johannesburg as outwardly 
British on first appearance but essentially a Jewish town, where the `rich, rigorous, and 
energetic financial and commercial families are chiefly English Jews, not a few of whom 
here, as elsewhere, have Anglicised their names after true parasitic fashion. "' He was not 
alone in stressing malign Jewish influence: the socialist Edward Carpenter described how 
since the finding of gold in the Transvaal, Johannesburg had become `a hell full of Jews, 
financiers, greedy speculators, adventurers, prostitutes, bars, banks, gaming saloons, and 
every invention of the devil. '36 Similarly Liberal MP John Bums in a debate over the 
British Army in Africa claimed it had `become the janissary of the Jews'. 37 These negative 
portrayals highlighted a contrasting portrait of the Boers as honest and hardworking. In 
defending his reasoning for blaming the Jewish financiers for the outbreak of the war, 
Hobson countered, `that it is not possible rightly to comprehend the methods employed, 
unless the race-basis [... ] is understood to be a fact. 131 Lloyd George too demonstrated a 
venomous prejudice against Jewry, as his condemnation of the Uitlander, who he viewed 
39 as predominantly German Jews clearly demonstrated. 
In his lecture to the South Place Ethical Society, in 1886, J. M. Robertson had criticised 
British imperialism as 'the practice of international burglary. ' In Patriotism and Empire, 
published just before the outbreak of the war, Robertson clearly identified the driving 
force behind imperialism as `the passion for nation and race', which strengthened the 
power exerted by the aristocracy and military. Nevertheless, he also accused capitalists 
of manipulating the situation. Those benefiting from imperialism were `the speculative 
trading class, the speculative capitalist class, the military and naval services, the industrial 
34 J. A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects (London: James Nisbet & Co, 1900), 
197. 
35 'Johannesburg Today', Manchester Guardian, 28 September 1899. 
36 Edward Carpenter, `Boer or Briton', 1 Jan. 1900, in The Pro-Boers: The Anatomy of an Anti-War 
Movement, ed. by Koss, 55. 
37 Hansard, (4th Series) LXXVIII, 6 February 1900, col. 795-7. 
38 J. A. Hobson, `The Last Chance for a Liberal Party', The New Age, 9 Jan. 1902,25. 
39 See John Grigg, The Young Lloyd George (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), 260. 
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class which supplies war material, and generally those who look to an imperial civil 
service as a means of employment for themselves and their kin. '40 G. H. Perris tapped 
into an anti-aristocratic theme by describing the British Empire as `a dumping ground for 
the greedy plutocrats, the decrepit aristocracy, the parasitic official and military classes 
who feel their supremacy in British life gradually slipping away. '41 
Imperialism and social reform 
The soldiers were not the only casualties of the war; non-combatant Boers suffered 
and, as Aneurin Williams observed, the war resulted in the `squandering of millions 
which are so sorely needed for the elevation of our own people. "' As Peter Clarke and 
Michael Freeden have demonstrated this was the main criticism `New Liberals' levelled 
against Britain's imperial policies. 43 Imperialism then was the enemy of social reform 
as it diverted investment into speculative foreign ventures and away from the important 
social issues of the day. An imperialist war was a threat to the alleviation of the ills of 
late Victorian Britain. 
The Westminster Gazette illustrated this dichotomy with Joseph Chamberlain affixing 
a poster of a British soldier over an older poster promising social reform. His remark 
being: `What a relief to get rid of all those old Social Programme promises! ' (Figure 
5.1). In their public deliberations over how the new imperialism could possibly bring any 
direct benefits to Britain, the liberal internationalists questioned why the public were so 
keen to support it. The answer clearly lay with the capitalist conspiracy and the jingoistic 
fervour it was able to command. 
40 John M. Robertson, Patriotism and Empire (London: Grant Richards, 1899), 187. 
41 G. H. Perris, Blood and Gold in South Africa: An Answer to Dr. Conan Doyle: Being an 
Examination of his account of the "Cause and Conduct" of the South-African War (London: 
International Arbitration Association, 1902). 
42 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, Somerset County Express, 2 February 1901. 
43 For further details on the policies of `new liberalism' see Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats; 
and Michael Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978). 
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Figure 5.1: Imperialism and the social reform programme 
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This point was evident to Hobson who characterised imperialism as the enemy of social 
reform and the `forcible conquest and control of foreign peoples. '41 While the Empire 
continued to expand, imperialism together with militarism would absorb all time, energy 
and finance. In a true `Cobdenite' spirit, imperialism was seen as threatening economic 
wellbeing by diverting investment into speculative foreign ventures and de-stabilising 
`retrenched' public finances since it required higher taxation to fund adventures abroad. 
Moreover, imperialism was linked with neo-mercantilism and the abandonment of free 
trade. 45 These attacks upon imperialism revealed the continuing salience ofclassical liberal 
economic thought as well as demonstrating the moral tone of liberal internationalism at 
this time. This was in part a continuation of the `little Englandism' tradition whereby 
the establishment of colonies and empires was seen as serving to promote international 
rivalries and ultimately war. This was a departure from the liberal internationalism of 
John Stuart Mill for whom the expansion of the colonial empire denoted the spread of 
representative government and free trade. For Mill the `colonies' referred principally to 
colonies of white settlement. 
The pro-Boers showed contempt for the profiteering nature of British imperialism, which 
corrupted the unwary. To compensate, some pro-Boer industrialists, such as George 
Cadbury who were compelled to supply the British army, soothed their consciences by 
refusing to make a profit on such orders. " 
`The mind of the nation' 
So long as patriotism and imperialism were firmly linked in the public mind the acceptance 
of the pro-Boers' ideas could make little progress. They struggled to get their message 
heard, with many of their main meetings being broken-up by riotous crowds who were 
fired by the jingoistic press and a surfeit of drink. The organisers and speakers were 
44 Long, Towards a new liberal internationalism, 73. 
45 For the liberal internationalists no one better embodied this than Joseph Chamberlain, especially in 
his advocacy of tariff reform. 
46 See A. Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid- 
Nineteenth Century (Harlow: Pearson, 2005), 35. 
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frequently targeted by the mob, suffering blows to both body and property, while the 
police looked helplessly on, and the government weakly censured the rioters. However, 
as the war progressed and the British army resorted to farm burnings and the use of 
concentration camps, the British public gradually became more receptive to their ideas. 
Jingoism 
Aneurin Williams expressed the liberal internationalists' view, when he observed that `our 
government and people have been greatly to blame, and have acted clumsily, rashly, and 
in a spirit of Jingoism. "' Jingoism was a symptom of the direction in which nationalism 
within Britain was being steered. As Mark Hampton has observed the most effective 
way for an imperialist government to deflect unwanted criticism was to unite feeling of 
patriotism with `its sinister cousin, jingoism"' 
Through this `perversion' of patriotism it was possible for the British government and 
its supporters to attack their detractors, by invariably portraying them as unpatriotic 
eccentrics and accusing them of actively supporting President Kruger and the Boers. In 
an attempt to placate his detractors the publisher and anti-war novelist A. M. S. Methuen 
described a meeting organised by the Haslemere pro-Boer community, as `being held in 
the interests of peace in South Africa, and it was, in the proper sense of the much-abused 
word, a patriotic meeting. '49 Jingoism was of course not a new phenomenon, as Hugh 
Cunningham's study of the period 1877 to 1878 illustrates, however, it was now more 
prevalent and prone to violence. 50 
During the war jingoism became more apparent, particularly in relation to the Mafeking 
and Ladysmith celebrations. In London, celebrations over the relief of Mafeking started 
on 18 May and soon the streets were `draped in red, white and blue from the bus horse 
to the less intelligent ass that rides behind him. "' This according to Paula Krebs helped 
47 Letter to the Editor, Aneurin Williams, Somerset County Express, 2 February 1901. 
48 Mark Hampton, `The Press, Patriotism, and Public Discussion: C. P. Scott, The Manchester 
Guardian, and the Boer War, 1899-1902', The Historical Journal, 44, no. 1 (2001) 178. 
49 The Surrey Times, 25 May 1901. 
50 Cunningham, `Jingoism', 429-453. 
51 Lloyd George to William George, 19 May 1900, National Library of Wales: William George Papers 
(henceforth WGP), 945. 
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to blur the distinction between working-class jingoism and middle-class patriotism. 52 
Lloyd George on arrival at his Solicitors office found his clerks swept up with the 
national rejoicing and released them to join in with the `crowds parading the streets 
shouting and bellowing'. 53 He observed that, had the Boers succeeded, these same people 
would be demanding a `war of revenge' and pro-Boers `would have been clawed to 
pieces'. " The day to day reporting of military operations had excited enormous public 
interest; nevertheless, the celebrations throughout Britain were spontaneous events. The 
allegation they were `got-up' by the press does not bear scrutiny. For Emily Hobhouse 
the resultant hysteria was `most alarming', while Lloyd George saw it as indicative of 
the `sick society' Britain had become. " Despite this, the pro-Boers struggled against the 
jingoistic tide of opinion and certainly in the first year were as Brian Porter reminds us, 
`out-shouted' and out-numbered. 56 
The Press 
In the Psychology ofJingoism (1901) Hobson identified the press as being one means by 
which `the mind of the nation' was manipulated to accept the justice and necessity of the 
wars' In doing so it was able to fuel the jingoistic passions and generate a mob mentality 
within the British public. Emily Hobhouse, who in 1901 raised public awareness of the 
situation in the concentration camps, observed `truth and reason were obscured' by the 
press, which `excelled itself in virulence and inaccuracy'. " 
Pro-Boers viewed the South African press as being in the control of the capitalists who 
had bought it up following the failed Jameson Raid. 59 This was particularly important as 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities nearly all the news from southern Africa was supplied 
by these papers. Concern over the influence of an imperialistically-inclined press led to 
52 Paula M Krebs, Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2. 
53 Lloyd George to William George, 19 May 1900, WGP, 945. 
54 Lloyd George to William George, 19 May 1900, WGP, 945. 
55 Quoted in Emily Hobhouse - The Boer War Letters, ed. by Rykie Van Reenen, (Cape Town: Human 
& Rousseau, 1984), 15; see also Kenneth 0. Morgan, `Lloyd George, Keir Hardie and the 
Importance of the `pro-Boers", South African Historical Journal, 41 (Nov. 1999), 296. 
56 Porter, `The pro-Boers in Britain', 239. 
57 Hobson, The Psychology of Jingoism, 107-109. 
58 Emily Hobhouse - The Boer War Letters, ed. by Reenen, 16 & 21. 
59 See Hobson, The War in South Africa, 206-28; Anti-Doyle'MS Chapter IV, AWP, AW/3/2/17, f4. 
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the Quaker chocolate manufacturers, Joseph Rowntree and George Cadbury, becoming 
newspaper proprietors. Both men had been associated with the pro-Boer movement from 
its earliest days and were supporters of the LLAAM and SACC. Cadbury's financial 
involvement with the Daily News enabled it to return to its peace movement roots, under 
the editorship of H. W. Massingham 60 Rowntree's involvement came after the war with 
his newly created trusts to acquire interests in the Northern Echo, The Nation and the 
London-based Morning Leader and the Star. 61 
Propaganda 
While much of the propaganda produced during the war was primarily of a political nature, 
research by Andrew Thompson has identified two other forms, namely, commercial and 
philanthropic 62 The latter was primarily concerned with fund-raising activities, for the 
benefit of soldiers and their families, or to relieve the suffering of the Uitlanders. The 
amount raised by Boer orientated funds such as the Women and Children's Distress Fund 
was just over two percent of that raised by the Lord Mayor's Mansion House Fund on 
behalf of the Uitlanders; thereby demonstrating the difficulty of capturing the financial 
hearts of the populace. 63 However, the political publications operated on several fronts, 
for recruitment purposes, as a justification of the war, and to boost public morale. In 
doing so, they needed to refute the claims made by the pro-Boers, and also to persuade 
the British public that the war was over the rights of the Uitlanders, many of whom were 
British subjects. The pro-war publicity also projected President Kruger and his fellow 
countrymen as the villains and the prime culprits in the war. 
60 For further details of George Cadbury's concern and actions during the South African War, see 
A. G. Gardiner, The Life of George Cadbury (London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1923); Hope 
Hay Hewison, Hedge of Wild Almonds: South Africa, the Pro-Boers and the Quaker Conscience, 
1890-1910 (Portsmouth, N. H.: Heineman, 1989) esp. ch. 8; for details of the role of Cadbury's 
and the controversy over colonial cocoa see Iolo Aneurin Williams, The Firm of Cadbury 
(London: Constable & Co, 1931) ch 8 (Iolo was Aneurin Williams' son, and a close friend of the 
Cadbury family through his father's business interests). 
61 For further details on Rowntree's concern and actions during the South African War, see M. 
Higham, `Rowntree, Joseph (1836-1925)', in Dictionary of Business Biography :a biographical 
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Public Meetings 
The jingoistic attitude of the British public was most evident when prominent pro-Boers 
attended public meetings. The riot following Lloyd George's widely-advertised meeting 
at Birmingham in December 1901, adequately illustrates reaction to their message. 
Birmingham was a predominantly Conservative and Unionist stronghold, however 
the local Liberal Association felt the omens were good following the recent Municipal 
elections where they succeeded in holding onto five of their six contested seats, and 
importantly had gained another from the Unionists' As with many pro-Boer ticket-only 
events, it was subjected to infiltration through the circulation of forged tickets and public 
calls for a crowd to denounce the `Brom Boers. ' The resultant riot produced twenty- 
seven casualties and two fatalities following a baton charge by police. The role of the 
Conservative Birmingham Daily Mail in feeding the jingo mentality included regular 
pronouncements against the `unpatriotic' Lloyd George and the local Liberal Association, 
countenance of forged tickets and spreading of false rumours. 65 The local press squarely 
laid the blame against the Liberals who had `deliberately defied the warnings given and 
courted the disaster they experienced'. " William Finnemore on behalf of the Association 
stated that they did `not believe that any unbiased person will consider us responsible for 
the disturbance, which we did all in our power to avert' and that to cancel the meeting 
would have been against `the inalienable right of Englishmen to free speech. ' 
This was not an isolated occurrence as Lloyd George's meeting in Liverpool in November 
1900 also met with violence. The local press were again hostile to his meeting and 
actively courted mob action with statements like `the riot that would follow would be 
worth seeing. '67 Lloyd George was not alone in being targeted and another ill-fated 
speaker was Samuel Cronwright-Schreiner, a British subject who was a resident of South 
Africa, and husband of the writer Olive Schreiner. In the late 1890s she had contributed a 
64 Of the 84 Birmingham City councillors only 19 were Liberals. 
65 See Price, An Imperial War, 141-2 and MD Blanch, `British Society and the War', in The South 
African War: The Anglo-Boer Mar 1899-1902, ed. by Peter Warwick, (Harlow: Longman, 1980), 
210-238. 
66 The limes, 21 December 1901,11. 
67 Quoted in I. Sellers, `The Pro-Boer Movement in Liverpool', 78. 
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series of articles to the Fortnightly Review, which encapsulated the pro-Boer attitudes 68 
Cronwright-Schreiner's arrival in England in January 1900 enabled him to accompany 
Hobson on a speaking tour; however, by the time of his return to South Africa at the end of 
July, the majority of his meetings had been subjected to violence or intimidation, with the 
result that only a handful actually took place. His arrival at Scarborough in early March 
led to riotous behaviour aimed primarily at property belonging to the Quaker Rowntree 
family, organisers of the private meeting. Aided by the police, Cronwright-Schreiner 
and Hobson were escorted to the train station in an attempt to escape the hostile crowd. 
Commenting in The Speaker, J. L. Hammond saw this and earlier instances of mob rule 
as examples `of a besotted Imperialism [... and] are the inevitable psychological results of 
the treachery of the last few years. '69 A common response was to hold meetings in secret, or 
with promotion being confined only to known sympathisers. Soon after the Scarborough 
debacle, Cronwright-Schreiner was invited to attend the Penistone Liberal Association 
by the local MP, Henry J. Wilson a founding member of the LLAAM. However, fearing 
adverse reactions the Association officers decided to keep his attendance secret from the 
membership until the start of the meeting. " 
Branches 
The SACC was particularly successful in developing a presence beyond the metropolis. 
Of all its local branches, Liverpool was by far the largest. This branch had been formed 
at a meeting in January 1900 attended by just 11 men. " Its leaders were overwhelmingly 
members of the Unitarian church, and its membership included Sir John Brunner, former 
Liberal MP William Rathbone, and William Bowring, one of the financial backers behind 
the take-over of the Daily News. Although the leadership was predominantly middle- 
class, branches such as those in Liverpool were able to attract support from their working- 
class communities. 
68 W. B. Hancock, Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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While R. A. Armstrong of Hope Street's Unitarian Church and Charles Aked of the 
Pembroke Place Baptist Chapel regularly preached from the pro-Boer gospel, the failure 
of the other churches and their religious ministers to speak out against the war was `one of 
the saddest features of the deplorable state of public opinion. "" This observation was not 
confined to Liverpool for throughout mainland Britain only a minority of nonconformist 
ministers spoke out, the majority remained silent or favoured the government's policies 
in Southern Africa. This was in stark contrast to Ireland where the analogy between the 
Irish and South African questions ensured strong pro-Boer support within the nationalist 
communities. " 
One local group thatwas certainly apredominantly middle-class body was the independent 
`Friends of Conciliation' who resided in the area around Haslemere in Surrey. 74 The 
attraction of the `heather-clad hilltops' and its relative wilderness within close proximity 
to London had led to the development of a `hilltop' community of writers, novelists 
and intellectuals. " This area provided a microcosm of attitudes to the war in Southern 
Africa. Those drawn to the pro-Boer cause included the scholars Raynor Storr and 
Gilbert Murray, the Hon. Rollo Russell (Bertrand's uncle), the writer and publisher 
Algernon Methuen, as well as future Liberal MPs Joseph King and Aneurin Williams. 
The presence of these individuals may have influenced Montagu White, the Consul- 
General for the Boer Republics in Great Britain when he chose to settle in Haslemere 
soon after war was declared. 76 Another resident from South Africa was Frederic Philpson 
Stow, the diamond magnate and a founder of De Beers. Despite his close association with 
Cecil Rhodes, he rapidly became disillusioned with his methods and by 1898 had severed 
72 Ibid. 
73 For a detailed study of Irish attitudes to South Africa see Donal McCracken, The Irish Pro-Boers: 
1877-1902 (Johannesburg: Perskor, 1989). 
74 Diary entry, 18 January 1902. AWP AW/1/5. 
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of the South African War on the local community is indicated in Flora Thompson, Heatherley 
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telegraphic service for Williams and the Hindhead community. 
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his connections. " The role of De Beers in the Jameson Raid particularly came as a shock 
and strengthened his view that the war was a capitalist conspiracy aided by Rhodes, 
Chamberlain and Milner: despite his background he identified himself as an opponent of 
`[British] race supremacy and the capitalists. "9 
This close-knit community also contained imperialists, such as the influential Dr Arthur 
Conan Doyle, who was an enthusiastic supporter and vociferous defender of British 
policy during the war. Another was the author Bernard Hamilton, a `brash imperialist' 
who soon after the outbreak of the war published a pretentious allegory demonstrating 
his desire to see Rhodes in charge of the war effort and the British Empire. 79 
While the pro-Boer community at Haslemere was fairly small in number, it was still able 
to attract several influential speakers to their meetings, including Hobson in May 1900, 
and J. X. Merriman the opposition leader in the Cape Parliament and Frederick Selous 
in April 1901. The arrival of friends and associates also served as rallying calls and 
opportunities to discuss the current situation: visitors to Williams' home included George 
Bernard Shaw, John Morley, and George Holyoake. Other visitors locally included Canon 
Samuel Barnett of Toynbee Hall, who discovered: 
A pleasant sense of freedom when one gets in such a company. The 
sense proves how one's mind is occupied by the war even when one 
talks of other things and does the daily work. Last night therefore we 
glowed as we talked freely of our hopes. 8° 
He was particularly intrigued by Methuen whom he found `Very interesting [... ] He has 
more poetry than most pro-Boers, less of that intolerant and masterful principle which in 
77 For details of the pivotal role of Philipson Stow in De Beers and his subsequent opposition to 
Rhodes business and political methods see Rob Turrell, `Sir Frederic Philipson Stow: The 
Unknown Diamond Magnate', Business History, xxviii, no. 1 (Jan. 1986), 62-79. 
78 Quoted in Ibid. 76. 
79 Trotter, The Hilltop Writers, 122-3. 
80 Letter of 21 December 1901, Samuel Barnett to Frank ... , quoted in Henrietta Octavia 
Weston 
Barnett, Canon Barnett : his life, work, and friends, by his wife, 2 vols (London: John Murray, 
1919), 2,183. 
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good people is almost as ugly as a sword and a gun. The question is whether he has their 
grit. '8' In 1901, Methuen published Peace or War in South Africa, which outlined the 
liberal internationalist concerns over the disastrous handling of the situation. 
Meetings organised by the Haslemere pro-Boers were rarely reported in the local press. 
The only exception being the visit in May 1901 of the Morning Leader's J. M. Robertson. 
In a detailed report and editorial, the Surrey l mes welcomed the fact that at least in 
Haslemere they been permitted to express their views as to the origin and `inequality' 
of the war `without the least molestation or serious attempt at interruption. '82 Fears for a 
disorderly meeting were evidenced by the fact that a police Superintendent and a number 
ofpolicemen where present outside the meeting hall. Their services were not required. The 
more imperialistic members of the audience disparagingly accused Robertson of merely 
repeating what they believed to be the unsubstantiated stories regularly appearing in the 
Daily News, Manchester Guardian, and the Speaker. Surprisingly, Bernard Hamilton 
declared to the meeting that he had come with an open mind, but went on to defend 
enthusiastically the government and accused Robertson of presenting an unconvincing 
pro-Boer speech. Some of the audience concurred with Hamilton. It was left to an 
American lady in the audience to remind them that the people in South Africa were also 
human beings, who like the Americans before them were fighting for their freedom. A 
claim readily recognised by many pro-Boers. 83 
Despite the jingoistic attitudes demonstrated in the large cities, very little opposition had 
been directed towards the Haslemere pro-Boers, the main exception being an episode 
of drunken bonfire night rowdyism directed against the house of Montagu White. On 5 
November 1899, a mob of 30 to 40 assembled outside his house where they `hooted and 
howled' and broke several windows. 84 The only other incident in the locality appears 
to have taken place at Midhurst just seven miles south of Haslemere. On 5 February 
1900 ringleaders calling themselves `The Albions, ' led a crowd of some 500 around the 
81 Letter of 21 December 1901, Samuel Barnett to Frank ... , quoted in Ibid., 184. 82 The Surrey Times, 25 May 1901. 
83 See A. M. S. Methuen, Peace or War in South Africa (London: Methuen & Co, 1901), 1-6. 
84 Surrey Times, 11 November 1899. 
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pro-Boer homes in the neighbourhood. Armed with `noise-making instruments' they too 
proceeded to produce an alarming cacophony reminiscent of the rough music protests 
of earlier epochs. This temporarily descended into a full-scale riot with indiscriminate 
breaking of windows, before the rioters returned to a public house for a patriotic 
rendition of the National Anthem. 85 One of their main targets was Jane Cobden Unwin, 
the daughter of the peace campaigner Richard Cobden, who was actively involved in 
The Stop-the-War Committee, and the SACC. Together with her husband the publisher 
T. Fisher Unwin, they and several others in the town had been publicly named on posters 
calling for demonstrations against them. 
The `Khaki' Election 
The divisions within the Liberal Party were hard to hide and long before the disastrous 
`Khaki' General Election of 1900, the sectional interests were evident in the choice of 
by-election candidates. The two by-elections held late in May 1900, at South Manchester 
and the Isle of White are illustrative of the differences of opinion. The pro-Boer Lief 
Jones stood at South Manchester resolutely refusing to `trim his colours to the jingo 
gale', while at the latter was the Liberal Imperialist Godfrey Baring. 86 For Lief Jones 
the government's `policy of Jingoism' was responsible for the postponement of much 
needed social reforms at home, their `policy of reckless and indefinite expansion' was 
also leading to the neglect of the Indian famine. 87 He appealed for a British foreign 
policy that exhibited an element of self-restraint and respect for international morality. 
His opponent, the grandson of Sir Robert Peel, was as a result of his increased majority 
from 78 to 2,309 able to claim solid support for the government's policy in South Africa. 
The Speaker found consolation in the fact that so many voted for `moderation and self- 
restraint' during what it termed the `Mafeking Carnival. "I 
85 See Newspaper Cuttings, University of Bristol Special Collections: Cobden Unwin Collection, 
DM851, 
86 The Speaker, 5 May 1900,125. 
87 Lief Jones South Manchester by-election Leaflet, May 1900, Oxford University Bodleian Library: 
Gilbert Murray Papers (henceforth GMP), MSS 7, f84-5. 
88 The Speaker, 2 June 1900,234. 
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The campaign in the Isle of White illustrated how Field Marshall Lord Roberts ('Bobs') 
and the South African War would be utilised in the forthcoming General Election. Here 
the Liberals operated under the banner `Vote for Baring and back up Bobs', however this 
was to backfire seriously when the Unionists, whose candidate was serving in Southern 
Africa, replied, `Vote for Seely who is backing up Bobs'. 89 In both cases, the Unionists 
or Conservatives already held the seat and the resultant losses were a blow to Liberals 
regardless of sectional affiliation. In a letter to his brother, Lloyd George commented that 
`The Jingo Liberal candidate has been beaten [... ] so much for turning suits to catch the 
passing [... ] gale'. 90 
This public enthusiasm was utilised during the October General Election, following Lord 
Roberts' proclamation that the war was over. The pro-Boer candidates found themselves 
on the defensive and, as in the by-elections of South Manchester and Stratford-Upon- 
Avon, the LLAAM tried to support suitable candidates. The other involvement for the 
LLAAM was the support they gave to J. L. Hammond as Editor of The Speaker. In 
September, he informed the executive committee that he would be publishing an election 
supplement that would actively promote their policies: as a result they purchased and 
distributed over 2,000 copies to their members and other interested parties. The general 
feeling amongst the pro-Boers was it would be unwise to hold meetings in the run- 
up to the General election due to heightened excitement the election campaigns would 
generate. 
The problems some MPs experienced are outlined in Price, for example LLAAM member 
Fred Maddison in Sheffield and W. C. Steadman in Stepney. 91 The latter's consistent 
opposition to the government's policy in Southern Africa generated a great deal of 
hostility, as a result the local Liberals issued a plea for a `volunteer guard of peace' to 
canvass on his behalf. 92 Amongst those answering the call was the East London Working 
Men's Club 93 
89 The Times, 24 May 1900. 
90 Lloyd George to William George, 24 May 1900, WGP, 947. 
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In his analysis of the General Election, Price concluded that the issue of the War and its 
jingoistic appeal was not the main factor, particularly in working-class constituencies. 
More recently, Paul Readman has sought to demonstrate that the Conservatives and 
Liberal Unionists successfully exploited the war to appeal to the patriotism of their 
electorate. 94 Through his analysis of electoral speeches, he has shown that the war was 
a more dominant factor than has been assumed. The Liberals were portrayed as a party 
divided by the war, and those deemed pro-Boer were portrayed as enemy sympathisers 
and unpatriotic. 95 Regardless of their stance towards the war, many Liberal candidates 
were tarred with the pro-Boer brush 
The emotive nature of the campaigns can be gauged from the following examples. Both 
were used on advertising hoardings, the first in Central Leeds was in support of the Irish 
Secretary Gerald Balfour, and the second from Stowmarket was used against the Liberal 
candidate John Horobin. 
Our Brave Soldiers in South Africa Expect that every Voter this day 
will do his duty Vote for Balfour. Remember! To vote for a Liberal is 
a Vote to the Boer. 
Every Vote given for Mr HOROBIN is a BOER BULLET fired at your 
fellow-countrymen and AN INSULT to the memory of every BRITISH 
SOLDIER who has fallen in the service of his Queen and Country. 96 
In both cases, the Liberal candidate was unsuccessful and, despite the assertion of their 
opponents, there is no real evidence to suggest they were pro-Boers. They were certainly 
not listed as members or supporters of either the SACC or LLAAM. As early as July 1900 
94 Paul Readman, `The Conservative Party, Patriotism, and British Politics: The Case of the General 
Election of 1900', The Journal of British Studies, 40, no. 1 (Jan. 2001), 107-145. 
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The Times calculated that there were 68 pro-Boer Liberal and 62 Liberal Imperialist MPs 
in parliament, but as Readman points out the newspaper was keen to give the impression 
that the Liberal Party was a devoutly unpatriotic party and thereby unworthy of support. 97 
His own calculations based upon voting patterns together with analysis of speeches and 
election addresses identifies only 60 pro-Boers, compared to 141 Liberal Imperialists. 
This is higher than the 52 Liberal pro-Boers identified by Price, and 45 by John Auld. 98 
While such lists are of value, an analysis of the merits of each classification is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, combining the lists produced by Auld, Price and 
Readman with that published in The Times on 19 October 1900, generates a list of 88 
MPs. Of these only 25 were members of the SACC and 15 were members of the LLAAM, 
and only 12 were members of both organisations. " So while the MPs identified by Auld, 
Price, Readman and The Times may have demonstrated pro-Boer sentiments the majority 
failed to affiliate themselves with either group. 
What none of the lists are able to show is the level of support these pro-Boer groups 
were able to command from both former and future MPs. Analysis of the membership 
identifies fifteen former MPs who supported both organisations and an additional twenty 
who had unsuccessfully stood for election before the outbreak of the South African War 
(see Appendix 3). Of greater interest is the number of pro-Boers who stood in subsequent 
elections: nine stood unsuccessfully but a further eighteen were elected to parliament. 
Included in this list are the known liberal internationalists Aneurin Williams, Gooch 
and J. Annan Bryce. This is indicative of the impact the War had upon Liberal attitudes 
and politicisation of the leading pro-Boer camp. Despite the calumny heaped on them 
and the jingoistic fervour of the moment liberal internationalism emerged from the war 
strengthened and a more coherent doctrine with greater influence upon British political 
thinking. In many ways it had been tempered by the experience of the South African 
War. 
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Pro-Boers and the Liberal Party 
The LLAAM's attempts to influence the policy of the Liberal Party on the South African 
War were conducted indirectly through their parliamentary members, and directly 
through the National Liberal Federation (NLF). The Federation's President was Robert 
Spence Watson, who was also nominally on the executive committee of the LLAAM. 
They sought to achieve their aims through the submission of anti-war resolutions and 
the encouragement of local associations to support such measures. They also widely 
canvassed on behalf of those candidates they believed were in sympathy with them for 
election to the Federation's Executive Committee. 
On 15 December 1901 Lord Rosebery addressed a meeting in Chesterfield, where he 
challenged the Liberal party to adopt policies, which reflected the new century, abandon 
the Gladstonian Home Rule traditions and embrace the imperialistic fervour currently 
prevalent within the country. He also offered some hope to the pro-Boers by urging 
the government to resume negotiations and condemned those who had announced that 
every Liberal elected in the Khaki election was supporting the Boers. After a troubled 
two months, the liberal imperialists rebranded themselves as the Liberal League and 
announced its main aim was to propagate Lord Rosebery's Chesterfield policy. 100 They 
also put into action an attempt to infiltrate the Executive of the NLF by offering to pay 
delegates' expenses. "' The LLAAM was indignant and the NLF President at the meeting 
in Leicester on 15 February 1902 was forced publicly to condemn the policy of buying 
votes and canvassing in general; despite this, he was reportedly satisfied with the actual 
result of the election. 102 
The Guildford Division Liberal Association in their report for 1900 guardedly commented 
that it was inevitable that divisions should have arisen `as to the justice or otherwise of the 
causes' of the war. 101 As a result the prospective candidate A. W. Chapman, a recognised 
100 Price, An Imperial War, 40. 
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103 The Surrey limes, 9 March 1901. 
101 
Liberal Imperialist, left the local Liberals in no doubt as to his views over the war when 
he addressed them in February 1900. Despite the potential for a disastrous split in March 
1902 the Surrey Times welcomed the way local Liberals were able to `promote unity 
[... ] by reasonable toleration of differences, ' and in doing so commended Williams and 
his Haslemere colleague, T. P. Newman, for their positive response. 104 A month earlier 
Williams as secretary of the Haslemere Liberals stated `that an attitude of conciliation 
and a disposition to treat with the Boers upon generous terms are essential to procure an 
early peace. "°5 As a result, they passed a resolution calling for the government to enter 
into immediate negotiations, and improve conditions within the concentration camps. 
They also declared their full support for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Liberal 
leader, while welcoming Lord Rosebery's Chesterfield speech. 
Culmination 
The South African War demonstrated to the liberal internationalists that without respect 
for liberty Britain had engaged in an imperialistic war fuelled by a jingoistic false 
patriotism. The true alternative they claimed lay in: 
International morality and in the co-operation of nations for mutual 
help; who if they are to dream at all, will dream not of Armageddons 
and Empires, but of progress and freedom, and the ultimate fraternity 
of mankind. 10' 
News that indentured Chinese labourers were being transported to work in the gold 
mines vindicated the pro-Boer arguments which would within a few years triumph in the 
conciliation of the Boer Republics and the British Colonies and between the Dutch and 
the British. A significant figure to emerge from the war was Jan Smuts, a Boer general who 
would join Lloyd George's Imperial War Cabinet in 1916 and successfully champion the 
104 The Surrey Times, 8 March 1902. 
105 The Surrey Times, 8 Feb. 1902. 
106 Francis W Hirst, Gilbert Murray and J. L. Hammond, Liberalism and the Empire: Three Essays, 
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liberal internationalist ethos of institutionalism and self-determination. The paradox was 
that the war had served as a toughening experience for many liberal internationalists. 
Writing in 1902 Williams recognised the Union of South Africa as `a legitimate dream' 
and believed it could even be the `ideal ofall reasonable imperialists'. 101 Within eight years, 
the South African Union became a reality. However, the deep-rooted animosity towards 
the black Africans and other ethnic groups gradually became more legally enshrined. With 
the introduction of racially oppressive apartheid laws, the South Africans would loose 
their appeal as victims of British imperialism. The anti-apartheid movement of the late 
twentieth century would become the beneficiary of many of the pro-Boer sentiments. 
107 'Anti-Doyle'MS Chapter IV, AWP, AW/3/2/22, f26 
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6 
Macedonia and the Ottoman Empire, 1903-1908 
The end of the South African War demonstrated the ephemeral nature of single-issue 
groups: once their original raison d'etre was settled they had to either fold or continue 
aimlessly in search of a new purpose. Subsequently, both the SACC and the LLAAM 
eventually agreed with R. C. Lehmann's conclusion that their objects were too narrow to 
ensure their continued existence. ' As Aneurin Williams' diary clearly shows the decision 
to terminate the groups was not an easy one: the SACC executive continually postponed a 
decision on its future until October 1902, when it finally agreed to windup its operations. 2 
The LLAAM however, sought to strengthen its political base within the Liberal Party 
through the co-ordination of an election fund. According to MacCullum Scott, its future 
lay in its ability to speak out against the growth of military and naval expenditure and to 
provide a co-ordinated opposition to the Liberal Imperialists. ' While there was no doubt 
a role for such an organisation, the LLAAM continued to haemorrhage members at an 
unsustainable rate. As a result, early in 1903 it merged with the New Reform Club. 4 
Williams like many of his liberal internationalist colleagues maintained his connection 
with the LLAAM in its post-merger form, but soon found other issues dominating his 
concerns. The Eastern Question was once more becoming a focus of international attention 
and the activities of his friend Noel Buxton ensured his attention. While the South African 
War was the main inspiration for Williams' political engagement, for Buxton it was his 
I LLAAM Minutes of Executive Committee, 5 November 1902, AMSP, MS Gen 1465/69. 
2 Diary entries, 5 June to 16 October 1902, AWP AW/1/5. 
3 LLAAM Minutes of Executive Committee, 3 September 1902, AMSP, MS Gen 1465/69. 
4 LLAAM Minutes of Executive Committee, see entries 6 August 1902 to 4 February 1903, AMSP 
MS Gen 1465/69. 
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1899 visit to the Balkan Peninsula, which encompassed a tour of Bulgaria, Macedonia and 
Turkey. This and subsequent tours highlighted the deplorable conditions of the subject 
peoples of the Ottoman Empire and initiated his lasting interest in the region. 
In the early twentieth century, Macedonia was central to the Eastern Question and the 
future of Ottoman rule within Europe. It was a key area, straddling southern Europe 
south of the Balkans with the autonomous Ottoman provinces of Bulgaria to the north 
and an independent Greece to the south. It consisted of the three vilayets, Kossovo, 
Monastir, and Salonika (see Figure 6.1). Although the population were generally 
described as Macedonians, it was not an ethnically homogeneous area as the various 
ethnographical maps produced for the Carnegie report on the causes and conduct of the 
Balkan Wars clearly illustrate. ' In reality there was little to distinguish Macedonians 
from the neighbouring states, consequently Macedonia was a microcosm of ethnic 
and religious divisions. These resulted in internecine struggles, which culminated in 
the uprising of August 1903. Organised by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation (IMRO), it was met by ruthless Ottoman reprisals and the loss of over 
5,000 lives. For liberal internationalists the unfolding events were reminiscent of the 
Armenian massacres of 1895 and the Bulgarian atrocities a quarter of a century earlier. 
Importantly it also served as a reminder that the Congress of Berlin had thwarted the 
prospect of Macedonian liberation. ' Additionally Macedonia's position within Europe 
meant its future was of great interest to both neighbouring Austria-Hungary and Russia. 
5 The discrepancies between the Bulgarian and Serbian point of view are clearly illustrated in 
the ethnographical maps reproduced in the Report of the International Commission to Inquire 
into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Mars (Washington D. C, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1914); Another ethnographical map can be found in H. N. Brailsford, 
Macedonia: Its Races and their Future (London: Methuen & Co, 1906). 
6 For example see Autobiography - Balkan Reform chapter, unpublished MS, NBP, MS951, c8/2, 
147. 
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The view of most liberal internationalists was that the desperation of the Macedonians 
would continue for as long as the Ottoman system prevailed. Based on personal 
observations Brailsford concluded that: 
The reality behind the whole muddle of racial conflicts, beyond the 
Chauvinism of the Balkan peoples and the calculations of the greater 
Powers, is the unregarded figure of the Macedonian peasant, harried, 
exploited, enslaved, careless of national programmes, and anxious only 
for a day when he may keep his warm sheepskin coat upon his back, 
give his daughter in marriage without dishonour, and eat in peace the 
bread of his own unceasing labour.? 
7 Brailsford, Macedonia, 57. 
Figure 6.1: Macedonian vilayets 
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The Balkan Committee 
The BC emerged as the new focus for liberal internationalist attention and activism. While 
its genesis lay in Noel Buxton's 1899 visit to Macedonia and the pitiable conditions he 
observed, it was news of the atrocities that provided the catalyst for the Committee's 
formation! Contemporary reports corroborate this, but confusingly Buxton in later 
life would regularly cite 1902 as the beginning of the Committee; subsequent accounts 
have tended to accept this version of events. ' There is however, evidence that Noel 
and Charles Buxton discussed the possibility of forming a committee long before the 
1903 insurrections. At the height of the South African War, F. S. Stevenson of the Byron 
Society advised Noel that his Society's Executive believed there was little hope of rousing 
public sympathy for the subject peoples in the Balkans while Britain was still engaged 
in Southern Africa. 10 Importantly he believed that more harm than good would result 
from `public agitation' at this time; his advice was instead to diffuse well-considered 
information, and he cited a recent article in The Times which was picked up in a `leader' 
as the best way to influence a jingoistic public. It was therefore only after the Macedonian 
uprising of 1903 that the nascent BC actually came into being. Importantly, it was the 
intervention of Bryce in July 1903 that initiated its establishment; consequently, the 
founders agreed that it should: 
Watch the progress of events in Macedonia and the Turkish East 
generally [... ) The Committee ought for the present to be confined to 
obtaining and diffusing information and views, exciting interest in the 
subject and advocating measures calculated to secure peace, and put an 
end to oppression, bloodshed and cruelty. " 
8 Autobiography-Balkan Reform chapter, unpublished MS, NBP, MS951, c8/2,147. 
9 The Balkan Committee, Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and 
Statements ofAccountsfor 1903 and 1904 (1904); The main biographies were written by his 
then Secretaries, based upon his private papers, the majority of which are at McGill University, 
Montreal and Duke University, North Carolina, however some of those used in the biographies 
are no longer extant; Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy from a Back Bench; Anderson, Noel Buxton 
A Life; see also 'Balkan Reform' MS draft autobiography `good copy', NBP, MS951 c8/2,147. 
10 F. S. Stevenson to Noel Buxton, 29 October 1901, NBP, MS951, c24/1. 
11 Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy from a Back Bench, 3. 
107 
The Committee outlined its objectives as being primarily to educate the public as to Britain's 
moral responsibility to the Macedonians (because of its intervention some twenty-one 
years earlier) and focusing public opinion through the dissemination of accurate news by 
meetings and publications. The Speaker, in August 1903, acknowledged that while the 
`English' were not unsympathetic to the plight of the Macedonians, they were unaware 
of the circumstances under which they lived. " The BC also intended to scrutinise the 
actions of the European Powers with regard to Macedonia, and work to ensure the British 
government gave the situation adequate attention. Ultimately, they believed that, without 
European control of the reform process, events would lead inexorably to war between 
Turkey and Bulgaria, and possibly even to a major European conflagration. 
Bryce's long-standing friendship with the Buxton family made him the ideal figurehead 
for the BC, but his appointment to the Cabinet as Chief Secretary for Ireland in the 
new Liberal government obliged him to resign. Subsequently, the eminent international 
lawyer John Westlake K. C. took on the role of President. " The ability to enlist Bryce as 
the BC's first President was an important factor in persuading leading public figures and 
churchmen to lend their support. This is evident in the Bishop of Hereford's decision 
to allow his name to be used as a Vice-President. In a letter to Noel Buxton he pointed 
out that, the BC would be useless without the backing of a President who was `one of 
the few public men whose knowledge, judgement & position will command general 
confidence. '" Despite sympathies with the Macedonians and the aims of the BC, some 
like Joe St Loe Stratchey, editor of the Spectator did not like joining committees, and 
felt he needed to devote his time `to fighting against Mr Chamberlain's disastrous [Tariff 
Reform] proposals. "' This response clearly demonstrates that foreign policy issues were 
competing with urgent domestic ones. 
For Bryce it was essential that the BC was independent of the government so that it had 
sufficient freedom of movement. He foresaw the need for them to criticise a Liberal 
12 The Speaker, 1 August 1903, NBP, MS951 c24/1. 
13 See Appendix 1 for biographical information. 
14 Bishop of Hereford to Noel Buxton, 12 July 1903, NBP, MS951, c24/1. 
15 St Loe Stratchey to Noel Buxton, n. d. [c. 1903], NBP, MS951, c24/1. 
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government because `there never was a Government that did not need criticism'. " Bryce 
would two years later travel to the United States of America as the British Ambassador, 
thereby making direct contact with the BC even more problematic. Despite his official 
position, he would however, remain an active and influential but unofficial member of 
the committee for the rest of his life. 
Public Opinion 
The BC organised its first public meeting at St James' Hall, London in September 
1903. This attracted many influential speakers including the Bishop of Worcester, Lord 
Stanhope, Lord Farrer, Sir Thomas Fowel Buxton, Sir Edward Fry, Bryce, the Irish 
Nationalist T. P. O'Connor, Brailsford and Noel Buxton. The views expressed by the 
Bishop of Worcester, echoed those of most speakers, when he stated that the Macedonians 
`were on the threshold of liberty by the Treaty of San Stefano, which a victorious Russia 
had imposed upon the Sultan'. " He further argued that `No one who knows the place 
that England held in the Convention of Berlin, could doubt for a moment that we are, 
by the obligations we then contracted, pre-eminently interested in this matter'. " These 
statements were in line with Bryce's directions that the BC should dwell on Britain's 
responsibilities beginning with the Treaty of San Stefano as `it will be better to direct 
attention to the vital facts and the responsibility of Britain and the need to clear out the 
Turk once and for all rather than `justifying' the insurrection. "9 
After the initial flurry of activity, the BC settled down to organising or assisting with a 
series of meetings. In the autumn of 1903 over 300 meetings were organised around the 
country, this fell to 60 in 1904,23 in 1905, but rose slightly in 1906 when 31 meetings 
took place. 2° Other outsider strategies employed by the BC included using the press and 
distributing publications. Combined with the insider strategies of submitting Memorials, 
16 `The Balkan Committee: Farewell Speech by Mr Bryce', The Times, 23 December 1905. 
17 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting at St James's Hall, Piccadilly on Tuesday September 
29,1903, Typescript, NBP, MS951 c. 25/1,8. 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Bryce to Buxton, 31 August 1903, quoted in A Century of Conflict 1850-1950: Essays for A.. L P 
Taylor ed. by Martin Gilbert, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966), 179. 
20 See BC annual reports. 
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Memoranda and making direct representations with the support of sympathetic MPs, 
they attempted to keep the Macedonian question at the forefront of the government's 
attention. In addition to regularly submitting copies of their memorials and reports to the 
press, the BC published a series of leaflets and pamphlets. In a similar vein to the SACC, 
these consisted of a mixture of specially commissioned articles and reports, together with 
the reprinting of items previously published in the press. During 1904, they attempted 
to issue regular `Balkan Committee Reports', which consisted of recent extracts from 
the press, together with briefings on the situation in Macedonia. With public attention 
looking elsewhere, they felt that it was `imperative that the needs of Macedonia and the 
responsibility of Great Britain [... ] should be kept before the public. "' However, only 
two issues were prepared, for June and August 1904, as it soon became evident that the 
cost of printing and posting 3,000 copies was beyond the limited finances of the BC 22 
Printing and distribution of literature consumed over 40 percent of its income during 
the first two years. Staff salaries were the other major expense, which amounted to £328 
for 1903 and 1904 (34 percent of its income). 23 The remainder was spent on organising 
meetings, especially the St James Hall meeting in 1903, and renting office space. 
With a limited membership base and no apparent membership fee, the expense of running 
the BC required regular requests for donations. In its first four years, only 21 members 
donated more than £10, with the major subscribers coming from the Executive committee. 
The most generous supporters were the Buxtons, Gooch, William Allen, George Cadbury, 
Lord and Lady Farrer and Aneurin Williams, who together provided nearly 60 percent 
of the its funds. Of these, Noel Buxton was undoubtedly the most generous, contributing 
over £330.24 
One unusual means of attracting attention to the region was their involvement in the 1907 
Balkan States Exhibition at the Earls Court Exhibition Centre, held in partnership with 
21 Balkan Committee Report, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1904), 1. 
22 Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statements of Accounts for 1903 
and 1904,10. 
23 In its first year, it employed MacCullum Scott, formerly the secretary of the LLAAM, who was 
succeeded by W. A. Moore and then A. G. Symonds. 
24 Analysed from statement of accounts as published in Annual Reports. 
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the governments of Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro. Running from May to October, it 
sought to provide an opportunity to demonstrate the arts, industries and handicrafts of the 
Balkan peoples and promote the region as a tourist destination. " This was an important 
vehicle for the BC to convey its message to a curious public, who attended what was 
according to The Times, a popular event. 
Specialist Knowledge 
While news of major atrocities and massacres enabled the mobilisation of public opinion, 
this was short-lived. Such public agitation was vital in promoting the need for Ottoman 
reform, but difficult to sustain without a mechanism to keep Macedonia at the forefront 
of public minds. To this end, the BC decided that it was essential that they should obtain 
accurate news from Macedonia independent of the Foreign Office. Consequently, they 
prided themselves on their propriety, objectivity, and ability to act as a conduit for 
information. They believed this enabled them to advocate policies that were concerned 
purely with the advancement of the Macedonians and not any self-interest. Information 
derived directly from the victims and those close to the suffering was balanced against 
that obtained from European residents and visitors within Macedonia and surrounding 
areas of Turkey. In addition, several committee members made separate but extensive 
forays into the heartland of Macedonia to view for themselves the conditions. 26 During 
these visits, the members sought out the opinions of local inhabitants, together with 
official representatives of the various Powers and the Porte, and foreign missionaries 
working within Macedonia. The BC's Secretary W. A. Moore made numerous visits and 
in 1908 succeeded in arranging with the Chronicle to provide reports. As a result, his 
articles also appeared the Morning Leader, Daily News, Manchester Guardian, and the 
Times, as well as some of the provincial press. 
In addition to Brailsford and Nevinson of the Manchester Guardian, the Committee 
was able to call upon James Bourchier, Balkan correspondent for The Times, whose 
25 The Times, 23 May 1907. 
26 Visitors to the region included Noel and Leyland Buxton, W. A. Moore, C. M. Lloyd and Bryce. 
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local knowledge was unsurpassed. 27 Brailsford visited the Balkans and Macedonia in 
particular, six times between 1897 and 1913, amounting to a total of 16 months in the 
region. 28 In April 1903, C. P. Scott sent him to Macedonia where he observed at first hand 
the increasing tensions between the Macedonians and the Ottoman government. Despite 
his strong belief in self-determination, he concluded that the Bulgarian-supported IMRO 
was `as ruthless, as brutal, as unscrupulous as the Turkish government itself. '29 With his 
return to England preceding the IMRO-inspired uprising, he rapidly became an important 
source for the newly-formed BC. 
In December 1903, as Aneurin Williams' diary indicates, the BC held meetings with the 
leaders of the two rival Macedonian revolutionary groups, who had come to England in 
order to engender support and finance for their struggle. 3° These meetings would provide 
a unique opportunity for individuals like Williams, who had limited direct experience 
of the region. The first meeting was with General Tzontcheff, vice-President of the 
Bulgarian Society, whom Williams described as a `masterful & able man' with `a very 
determined mouth & broad big forehead. ' Later the same day he attended the meeting 
with Boris Sarafoff, General Guerdjikoff and Dr Tatartcheff of the IMRO. Sarafoff was 
the chief speaker of the second group, `a large man, big bulgy eyes, [... ] a powerful man 
in every way, but not with so much shrewdness & self-control as Tzontcheff. Guerdjikoff 
looked more common place [... ] rather ugly, twisted up features [... ] but strong & very 
energetic, Tatartcheff looked rather sinister'. Amongst those present at the meetings 
were C. F. G. Masterman, the archaeologist Arthur Evans and Nevinson. The IMRO 
representatives claimed that Tzontcheff was only representing himself, and only they 
truly had the interests of the Macedonians at heart. 
Williams pointed out that the dynamiting and attacks upon Turkish villages had done 
immeasurable harm to their cause. In their defence, the IMRO representatives replied 
they had been `forced to retaliate. But they had sent the women, children &c. out of the 
27 See Appendix 1 for biographical information. 
28 Leventhal, The Last Dissenter, 47. 
29 Manchester Guardian, 8 June 1903. 
30 Diary, 21 December 1903 (& overflow pages), AWP, AW/1/5. 
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villages unharmed before burning, whereas the Turks dishonoured the women. ' Williams 
was in no doubt that the possibility of annexation by Bulgaria or any power would only 
be an interim measure, for they were revolutionaries who desired complete independence 
regardless of the cost. 
Connections 
While the original executive committee of Uventy-seven consisted of only two MPs 
(Hugh Law and Herbert Samuel), it contained seven future MPs (Noel and Charles 
Buxton, Gooch, Masterman, Arthur Ponsonby, C. P. Trevelyan and Aneurin Williams). 
In addition at least two others had unsuccessfully contested seats, and the committee 
was able to claim the support of a further 31 MPs and several members of the House of 
Lords. 
The BC developed close relations with the Foreign Office, during both Conservative 
and Liberal administrations. The Foreign Secretary would regularly listen patiently to 
their representation if not necessarily welcoming their continued interventions. Certainly 
while Lord Lansdowne was Foreign Secretary, Noel Buxton was able to imply that their 
public pronouncements were welcomed and could strengthen his hand in negotiations. " 
In addition, seven memorials on the situation were submitted during 1905 alone, all of 
which were subsequently published in the press. Furthermore, through Buxton's direct 
intervention in September 1905, the Foreign Office were made aware of the massacre 
at Konopnitsa, where W. A. Moore had personally witnessed the killing of women 
and children by Turkish troops. 32 This resulted in British calls for an inquiry, but the 
perpetrators went unpunished. 
There is certainly evidence that Lansdowne intimated to foreign Ambassadors of his 
need to consider British public opinion when framing foreign policy. 33 Sir Edward Grey's 
tenure as Foreign Secretary was more challenging; his reputation for being remote and 
31 Noel Buxton to Archbishop of Canterbury, 10 Nov. 1905, and 14 November 1905, Lambeth Palace 
Library: Randall Davidson Papers, volume 105, f372 & 377. 
32 Second Report of the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statements ofAccounts for 
the Year ending December 31st, 1905, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1906), 10. 
33 Keith Robbins, `Public opinion, the press and pressure groups', in British Foreign policy under 
Sir 
Edward Grey, ed. by F. H. Hinsley, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 70-88 & 70. 
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aloof convinced many that he was less receptive to outside opinion than his predecessor 
was. However, early in 1911 Grey accepted that public opinion was such that there was 
nothing that he could do that would repress the newly-independent Bulgaria. 34 This gives 
the impression that if sufficiently roused public opinion could make a serious impression 
upon British foreign policy. No doubt, it was this experience that informed Brailsford's 
declaration that groups such as the BC were able to strengthen the hand of the Foreign 
Office 35 In reality, as Noel Buxton and his colleagues were frequently to discover, the 
Foreign Secretary and the government were only likely to be amenable to their suggestions 
when they were harmonised with official policy. 
The BC along with other like-minded organisations within Britain and Europe sought 
the international supervision of a reformed Ottoman administration. Consequently, a 
joint meeting with other societies concerned with Armenia, Crete and Macedonia was 
held in February 1906 in the Westminster Palace Hotel, under the presidency of Baron 
d'Estournelles de Constant. D'Estoumelles, an international jurist, was also to serve as 
the President of the Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry into the Balkan Wars, 
which included the liberal internationalists Brailsford and F. W Hirst. The former he 
described as `a true disciple of Lord Byron and of Gladstone' and in invaluable member 
of the Commission. "' 
Later in August 1908, the BC worked together with the Congo Reform Association and the 
Anti-Slavery Society on a joint publication. 37 7,000 copies were printed and distributed 
through the Baptist Association, Church of England Men's Societies, Congregational 
Churches, Free Church Secretaries, Liberal Clubs, P. S. A. Societies, as well as working 
men's clubs and the YMCA. 38 
34 Keith Robbins, `British Diplomacy and Bulgaria, 1914-15', Slavonic and East European Review, 
49 (1971), 218. 
35 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 133. 
36 Report... into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 7. 
37 An extant copy has not been traced but its production indicates a significant overlapping of 
humanitarian interests. 
38 George 0. Donald to Noel Buxton, 15 August 1908, NBP, MS951, c24/1. 
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Non-partisan message 
Although undoubtedly Gladstonian in outlook, the BC was at pains to stress it stood 
above party politics and this appears to have been a significant factor in its appeal. While 
calling for the British government to intervene and ensure the introduction of much- 
needed reforms, it attempted to propagate a non-partisan message in both sectarian and 
non-religious terms. Consequently, Bryce felt confident when he claimed that the question 
of Macedonian reforms was above party politics. " In contrast to the South African War, 
this was an occasion when both the established church and the non-conformists could 
rally together for a common cause. Support within the Church of England came from the 
highest levels, with the Archbishop of Canterbury playing a prominent part. In July 1907, 
he headed a deputation to Sir Edward Grey, during which he declared that he believed that 
to varying degrees everyone felt some direct responsibility for the Macedonian Question 
by virtue of Britain's political intervention in the events of 1878, which had created an 
obligation to improve the Macedonians' situation. Furthermore, they argued Britain had 
a self-interest in reform because of her financial and trade commitments to the region. 40 
This latter point was of particular significance as Turkish requests for an increase in the 
Custom duties could give Macedonian reforms a significant negotiation advantage. 41 
At the time of the BC's formation, the underlying tensions created during the South 
African War were still evident when, during the 1903 St James' Hall Meeting, the Revd. 
R. J. Campbell described the war as `just' it was met by calls from the audience of `No' 
and `It was unjust'. 2 He did however admit that the war in South Africa had seriously 
weakened Britain's role as the traditional champion of the oppressed. However, by 
1907 the Rev. Dr Horton, ex-President of the Free Church Council reported that `in this 
particular instance the Free Churches of the country stand shoulder to shoulder with the 
Established Church' 43 
39 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting ... September 29,1903, NBP, 
MS951 c. 25/1,14. 
40 Balkan Committee, The Appeal of the Churches, 1-2. 
41 Since declaring itself bankrupt in 1875 the ottoman debts and custom dues had increasingly come 
under international supervision. 
42 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting 
... September 29,1903, NB P, 
MS951 c. 25/1,26. 
43 Balkan Committee, The Appeal of the Churches, 3. 
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Despite the BC priding itself on being impartial between the different ethnic groups within 
Macedonia, it was perceived by many as being pro-Bulgarian, which was undoubtedly 
true of the Buxtons. However, the complete picture was more complex. Certainly, it 
greatly disapproved of the Ottomans administration of the Empire and its detrimental 
effects upon its non-Muslim subjects. The BC's composition ensured that it attempted to 
speak openly in support of all Macedonians regardless of ethnicity and religion. In July 
1905, a joint statement from the BC and the Byron Society stated that `We cannot be 
partisans in this racial struggle, nor can our habitual sympathies with either race blind us 
to the faults on both sides. '4° Despite this, some BC members were uncomfortable with 
the pro-Bulgarian attitude of Noel and Charles Buxton. Following the first Balkan War, 
Aubrey Herbert resigned in response to the partisan attitude exhibited by the BC in its 
resolutions and public declarations 45 
Moral Argument 
The notion of British culpability was an essential part of the BC's ethos. However, its 
concern for the Macedonians was far greater than just a humanitarian one; indeed if 
this had been the case then the relief fund formed under the presidency of the Bishop of 
London would have sufficed. While the funds raised through the generosity of the British 
public helped alleviate the initial hardships, those donors attracted by the BC's message 
sought a more pro-active approach. The heart of the Macedonian problem was Ottoman 
misrule, and as far as they were concerned, only the introduction of drastic reforms to its 
government would alleviate it. 
According to Bryce, speaking in 1903, there were three possible outcomes; firstly, the 
extermination of the Macedonians; secondly, Bulgaria would be driven to war to achieve 
what negotiation had failed to restore to them; or thirdly, there was the possibility of 
an all-out European war. 46 The full implementation of reforms were only way to avert 
these possibilities. Nine years later Bryce wrote it was Britain's duty to see the complete 
44 `Protest to Lord Lansdowne' 28 July 1905, NBP, MS951, c. 25/2. 
45 A Century of Conflict 1850-1950, ed. by Gilbert, 181, n2. 
46 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting 
... September 29,1903, NBP, MS951 c. 
25/1,20. 
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liberation of the Macedonians from Turkish rule. He identified two options: the first 
was to give it independence as an autonomous state, such as that accorded to Greece, 
Serbia and Bulgaria; the alternative was to allow the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan to 
remain, but with the removal of his direct control. Instead, there would be a European- 
appointed Governor, answerable to the Powers and responsible for the upkeep of law and 
order through the gendarmerie and judicial system. " The latter had always been the BC's 
preferred policy as it was the easier option. In order to generate support for this initiative 
they sought the help of the Labour movement through the issuing of a manifesto to the 
workmen of the United Kingdom, signed by a total of 54 prominent Labour leaders. 
The manifesto urged Labour organisations and Trades Councils to forward the following 
resolution to Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary: 
That we call upon His Majesty's Government, with a view to carrying 
out British obligations, 1 st: - To urge upon the other great Powers the 
appointment of a Governor of Macedonia, not himself a Turkish 
subject, and independent of Turkish interference; and 2°d: - If necessary 
to summon a Conference of the great Powers of Europe to consider the 
affairs of Macedonia and the carrying out of the Treaty of Berlin. '48 
It would take another four years for the British government to show any public signs 
of acknowledging the merits of this solution. On 24 February 1908, Sir Edward Grey 
in response to speeches by both Gooch and Masterman, demonstrated his frustration 
with the pace of reforms whose progress or lack of it was he considered `little better 
than a farce. '°9 As a result, 112 Members of Parliament signed a Manifesto, in which 
they welcomed his acquiescence in the need for the Concert of Europe to secure the 
appointment of a governor as the minimum reform required. They warned that `unless the 
Powers will give their support, the Concert of Europe will perish from lack of vitality and 
47 Bryce on the Near Eastern Question, 1905,5. 
48 To the Workmen of the United Kingdom. Our Duty to Macedonia, AWP AW/3/3. 
49 Hansard, CLXXXIIl, HC, 25 February 1908, col. 1707. 
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a catastrophe be precipitated. 'S° Events over the past decades led Bryce to warn them that 
the Powers had offered a `perfectly empty and ineffective protection' to Macedonia. " 
Reform Programmes 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Powers began again to show an interest 
in Turkey-in-Europe, and Macedonia in particular. The uprising and resulting violence 
led the Tsarist and Habsburg governments to formulate a policy, which could maintain 
the status quo, while simultaneously addressing the concerns of the Christian population. 
The result was the Märzsteg Programme, as accepted by the Sultan in November 1903; 
it consisted of two civil assessors, one Austrian and the other Russian, to assist a Turkish 
Inspector-General who would establish control over the application of reforms by the 
local Ottoman authorities and reform the entire system of civil administration within two 
years. The Powers were also to provide officers for an international gendarmerie, though 
poor pay and miserable conditions turned many to corruption. 
Reports received from Nevinson, Brailsford and others in the field convinced the BC 
that the Märzsteg reforms were wholly ineffectual. They provided insufficient executive 
authority to the European officials and failed to remedy the inept Ottoman bureaucracy. 
The reform scheme contained the seeds of failure, and the Porte's uncooperative attitude 
had turned it into a farce. Even the Powers were forced to admit that the scheme was not 
working and the British government in particular was pressing for further reforms and 
concerted action to coerce the Porte. 
1905 saw the British government taking several promising steps, with the Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Lansdowne outlining a scheme which would reduce the military presence 
in Macedonia to the minimum required for internal security. The scheme proposed the 
appointment of a Commission consisting of delegates nominated by the Powers, under 
the presidency of an Inspector-General. The Commission was to have administrative and 
executive powers so that it could instigate effective controls of local finance and justice. 
50 Sir Edward Grey's Proposal in 1908, (The Balkan Committee, Leaflet No. 3). 
51 Bryce on the Near Eastern Question, 1905,2. 
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The financial reforms were to include the commutation of the tithes, and provide for a 
fixed payment to the Porte by each of the Macedonian vilayets, the balance of the revenue 
collected remaining available for local purposes. In addition the Inspector-General was 
to be entrusted --vith the command of such Turkish troops as it might be found necessary 
to remain in Macedonia. 52 
Neither Austria nor Russia was willing to accept such a scheme, and France would take 
no action without Russian consent. As a consequence Russia and Austria put forward 
a counter proposal for financial control within Macedonia, which maintained their 
preferential treatment. Lord Lansdowne responded with a scheme which ensured greater 
equality, but the Porte ultimately rejected this. The glaring omission from the liberal 
internationalists' perspective was failure to incorporate any form of effective guarantees. 
To compound matters events at home made it impossible to keep the public spotlight 
on Macedonia and the government's resignation at a critical stage in the negotiations 
resulted in what the BC considered `concessions which are clearly fatal to the efficacy of 
the scheme for financial control. '" They further viewed the introduction of a Turk to the 
Board of Delegates and Turkish financial inspectors as seriously weakening its potential. 
In addition, its Turkish President could refuse to execute any of the Board's decisions, 
thereby enabling the Turkish government to obstruct and passively resist any reforms. 
Nationalist forces eager to claim greater representation continued to subject the region 
to terrorism. In response, the Turkish troops indiscriminately raided the villages whilst 
avoiding conflict with the armed nationalist bands. 54 As a result by 1907 the BC 
believed that over 10,000 individuals had been murdered, the majority of them women 
and children. Despite previous promises of reform, the subject Christians were still 
suffering from mal-administration, corrupt officials, illegal taxation, and the absence of 
judicial equality with Moslems. Bryce echoed the resounding feeling of many when 
52 Balkan Committee, Second Report ... Year ending December 31st, 1905,13. 
53 Ibid., 14. 
54 `The Action of the Great Powers in Macedonia up till the end of 1907' memorandum dated 10 
January 1908, reprinted in Fourth Annual Report of the Executive Committee for Year ending 
December 31st, 1907, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1908), 15-20. 
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he proclaimed that any reform scheme was dead before it was even born because `its 
execution is entrusted to the Turks and they never execute any reforms [... ] the promises 
of the Turk are almost as numerous as his victims'. " Without external pressure, there was 
no possibility of implementing effective reforms. Visible coercion they argued was an 
essential prerequisite; this could be either fiscal or by force. 
Discussions increasingly centred on the Turkish government's desire to increase its 
custom duties from eight to eleven percent. While the other Powers acquiesced in 
this proposal, for Britain this was of far greater significance, as around 60 percent of 
Turkey's imports were British. Lansdowne could only contemplate such an increase on 
the proviso that the surtax would not be utilised to offset the cost of the military force 
within Macedonia, but instead allocated to assist local administration. Again, the BC 
argued that the proposals contained no adequate guarantees on reform, but as far as the 
Porte was concerned, they were too stringent. The British government's attempt to get 
the custom surtax allocated to civil administration and an increase in gendarmerie powers 
were unsurprisingly unpalatable to the Porte and to some of the other Powers. Following 
the change of government and further negotiations, the Foreign Office felt impelled to 
accept the increase, as: 
Sir Edward Grey considers, therefore, that the assent of His Majesty's 
Government to the increased duties has been made conditional upon 
the maximum of concessions it is possible at present to obtain, and that 
further resistance on this question would impede and embarrass, rather 
than effectively promote, the progress of reform. 56 
To the consternation of liberal internationalists, the Powers regularly demonstrated a half- 
hearted engagement with the Eastern Question. In many ways, the liberal internationalists 
55 The Macedonian Massacres: A Public Meeting 
... 
September 29,1903, NBP, MS951 c. 25/1,18. 
56 Extract of letter from Foreign Office to Balkans BC, 9 June 1906 in Third Annual Report of 
the Executive Committee with List of Subscribers and Statement ofAccounts for Year ending 
December 31st, 1906, (London: The Balkan Committee, 1907), 19-20. 
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were naively idealistic in expecting Britain and the other Powers to get too embroiled with 
the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The expectation that the moral indignation 
of concerned citizens such as themselves could generate sufficient public pressure to stir 
the Powers into action on behalf of their fellow Christians was flawed. The BC focused 
upon the British public and as events demonstrated the interest of the press vacillated in 
its search for topicality. Increasingly the inability of the Powers to reach agreement on 
major issues paralysed any possibility of concerted international action. 
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The Young Turks and the Balkan Wars, 1908-1914 
Events in the Balkans took a dramatic turn in 1908, with the Young Turk Revolution of 
July. This was the culmination of the growth of secret societies pledged to the reform 
of the Ottoman Empire, which had developed during the post-Berlin Congress period 
and following the suspended Constitution of 1878. Macedonia, long a hotbed of ethnic 
tensions and insurrections, provided the perfect atmosphere for the development of a 
Turkish nationalist movement. Fears that the empire's Christians, with the backing of 
the Great Powers, were assuming greater influence at the expense of the ethnic Turks, 
coupled with a principled objection to the Sultan's autocracy, assisted the formation of 
an underground revolutionary movement. 
The secretive Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was the result of a merger of 
the Young Turks and the Ottoman Freedom Society, which replicated the structure 
and discipline of the IMRO guerrillas by operating through small isolated cells. Their 
target was the Porte and consequently they received support from the existing Christian 
guerrilla networks. They sought to infiltrate the civil and military administrations, and 
had their greatest success in the Second and Third Armies, based in Salonika and Edirne. 
Amongst their Macedonian based members were several important figures in the future 
governments: Mehmet Talat, Enver Bey and Mustafa Kemal. 
Initially the ideology of Turkish nationalism was not an influencing factor behind the 
conspirators' actions, but rather the removal of the corrupt regime headed by the Sultan 
and the restoration of the constitution. Following fears of Great Power intervention, 
the CUP acted quickly. An attempt by the Sultan to quell rebellion within the ranks 
in 
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Macedonia resulted in the assassination of his personally chosen general. With rebellion 
spreading, the Sultan announced on 24 July the reinstatement of the suspended Midhat 
Constitution. The diminution of the Sultan's power was clear for all to see. 
Since its formation the BC had been calling for Great Power intervention on behalf of the 
Christian subject peoples; ironically it was the fear of such an intervention that served 
as the impetus for the emergence of the Young Turks. While the result, at least at first, 
achieved the BC's aim its initial response was one of amazement which `reduces us 
almost to silence' due to the `amazing transformation' that had occurred. ' The BC's new 
policy, as outlined by W. A. Moore to Arthur Ponsonby, was to express sympathy with 
the liberal movement in Turkey and to obtain assurances from the British government of 
its neutrality and its support for the continuation of the reform schemes in Macedonia. 
While the sympathy of the public was naturally with the Young Turks, Moore warned 
that the failure to restore public order would result in the transference of public sympathy 
to those who could, and here he identified the Bulgarians as the most likely recipient. 
The power vacuum created by the Young Turk revolution was quickly followed by 
Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria declaring independence, and the 
unification of Crete with Greece. Instead of preserving the integrity of the empire, the 
Young Turk Revolution had resulted in its diminution. With the dawn of a new regime, 
the BC and its members soon succumbed to the CUP assurances of `freedom to every race 
and creed. ' They therefore publicly requested that the new leaders be allowed sufficient 
time to come to terms with the situation before any criticisms should be levelled against 
them. For Charles Buxton the important question was `not whether the present Turkish 
Government is all that was hoped for by the optimists [... but] whether it is preferable to 
any alternative which is, at the present time, possible. '2 In arguing for the right to speak 
out against past and present actions of the Turkish government, he wanted it to be: 
1 [W. A. Moore] to Arthur Ponsonby, 27 July 1908, NBP, MS951, c24. 
2 Seventh Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 1910, (London: The Balkan 
Committee, 1911), 11. 
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Understood that we express our opinions, not because we wish to 
interfere in her internal affairs for interference's sake, but because 
Turkey herself aims at bringing her Government into accord with 
Liberal opinion in Europe, and wants to know what that opinion is, and 
because we have responsibilities under the Treaty of Berlin towards 
the Christian subjects of the Porte. These facts justify us in following 
more closely the course of affairs in Turkey than in other foreign states. 
While criticising, we should at the same time support and help the 
Young Turks in their efforts towards progress. 3 
Putting `money on the right horse' 
Through their shared interest in Macedonia, the BC was well known to the CUP leaders 
and, following the unprecedented change in the BC's attitude from vehement outspoken 
critics to forthright supporters of what they identified as a new liberal regime, their 
relationship was to become much closer. The first evidence of this was the arrival of 
Noel and Charles Buxton, Dr Arthur Evans, Sir Arthur Pears and two other BC members 
in Constantinople in December 1908 at the invitation of the CUP. They were entertained 
at dinner by the Young Turks, received by the Sultan and even witnessed the opening 
of the Turkish Parliament. According to Noel Buxton, they had been invited in order to 
`strengthen' the Young Turks' hands, and that `it cannot be denied that the BC can claim 
to have helped the reformers'. 4 In a reference to an earlier comment on Britain's backing 
of Turkey, he commented that `By chance we put our money on the right horse. 'S This 
visit by the Buxtons was widely reported and certainly, Charles Buxton was `amazingly 
thrilled by the idea of reconciliation of Moslem and Christian, and especially by the 
atmosphere which surrounded the opening of the Turkish parliament. '6 
To foreign observers the December invitation to Constantinople and the attempts of the 
CUP leadership to obtain the support of influential friends in London were evidence of 
3 Ibid., 11-12. 
4 `Mr Noel Buxton's Tour in Near East', Eastern Daily Press, 22 December 1908; `A Mission to 
Turkey. Cordial Reception of the Balkan Committee', Daily News, 8 December 1908. 
5 `Mr Noel Buxton's Tour in Near East', Eastern Daily Press, 22 December 1908. 
6 Noel Buxton quoted in de Bunsen, Charles Roden Buxton, 55. 
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the great power wielded by Noel Buxton and the BC. This visit also demonstrates the 
concerns of the Great Powers over the role of the BC. Osmanischer Lloyd, the German 
newspaper in Constantinople, regarded Buxton as both a power broker to the CUP and a 
puppet of the British government. Buxton's immediate retort was that he had been at odds 
with the British government on too many occasions to be seriously considered its tool. 
' 
This demonstrated an ongoing problem for the liberal internationalists, while wishing to 
influence governments and develop an authoritative position they nevertheless needed to 
maintain their integrity and independence. 
At the same time, the Austro-Hungarians also exhibited concern over Noel Buxton's 
potential influence in the region. At the end of December, their Foreign Minister Count 
von Aehrenthal complained to the British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, 
about his alleged financing of Serbian insurgents! Such an accusation was `absurd', but 
Cartwright was instructed to obtain specific details should the subject be raised again. By 
the end of January 1909, Grey informed Cartwright that Buxton had attempted to `exercise 
a moderating influence' and had informed the Serbians they could expect assistance 
from neither the BC nor the British government should war break out. ' Reports in the 
Budapesti Hirlap critical of British policy in the region following the annexation were 
attributed to `the efforts of the Balkan Committee, and particularly of its president, Mr 
Noel Buxton'. 10 Together these events supported the Foreign Office view that Buxton 
was a nuisance who was blithely unaware of the mischief his actions were causing. 
The BC while projecting an image of authority to all concerned were at pains to dispel 
the belief that they held any official position. Following their visit to Constantinople in 
1908, they informed the Foreign Office that when the CUP `appeared to regard us as able 
to voice official views we were, of course, careful to explain our position and refer them 
to the proper quarter. "' 
7 Sir Gerard Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 9 December 1908, TNA FO 371/561/43986. 
8 Sir Fairfax Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 23 December 1908, British Documents on the Origins 
of the War, 1898-1914. vol. S. The Near East: The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of 
Bosnia, 1903-1909, ed. by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, (London: HMSO, 1928), 535. 
9 Sir Edward Grey to Sir Fairfax Cartwright, 26 January 1909, Ibid., ed. by, 575. 
10 `Perfidious Albion', Daily Mail, 21 January 1909. 
11 [Report to Sir Edward Grey following visit to Young Turks], NBP, MS951, c24/4. 
125 
By 1909, the BC was so enamoured with the Young Turks that they saw within them 
the salvation of Macedonia. Consequently, they felt so confident in the situation that the 
Committee held a dinner in Noel Buxton's honour. To Buxton the recent events in Turkey 
had proved that the efforts of the BC had been on the `right lines and had had some 
effect in helping the cause of justice, though in an unexpected fashion. "2 However, they 
detected within official circles a degree of reticence towards the new regime: while the 
British government viewed them with restrained optimism, their European counterparts 
were overtly pessimistic as to the future. 
Such was their enthusiasm for the new regime that a CUP delegation, consisting of Dr 
Riza Tewfik Bey, Ismael Hakki Bey, Ismael Djamblat Bey and Talaat Bey, attended the 
BC's 1909 Annual Meeting. In a resolution the BC expressed its `profound admiration' 
of what the CUP had achieved for its subjects, developing good relations with the Balkan 
States and ultimately they anticipated `a regime at once strong and tolerant, wherein all 
races of the Empire may give loyalty and receive equal justice. '" At this Meeting Sir 
Edwin Pears, remarked that as one of the delegates to Turkey the previous year, he was 
impressed by the 'the unanimity of the sentiment prevailing among the Moslem people 
in favour of giving equal rights to their Christian fellow-subjects. ' 14 Like many of his 
compatriots, he viewed the BC's work as being instrumental in imbuing the leaders of 
the revolutionary movement in Macedonia and Constantinople with the desire to work 
in a legitimate and constitutional manner to rid themselves of tyranny. In response, the 
Turkish representatives confirmed that the Gladstonian desire for liberty had been a 
factor in helping make Turkey free, and that they welcomed the BC's work in the cause 
of liberty and equality within Turkey. 's Another sign of the good relations is evidenced in 
their March 1910 luncheon in honour of Enver Bey, Turkish Military Attache to Berlin, 
who was described by Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster-General, as `the Garibaldi of 
12 `Dinner given by the members of the Balkan Committee to the Chairman, Noel Buxton', NBP, 
MS951 c25/3. 
13 Sixth Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 1909, (London: Balkan Committee, 
1910), 10. 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 Ibid., 11-12. 
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Turkey. ' 16 In response Enver Bey welcomed the opportunity to meet the `true friends of 
Young Turkey', especially Noel Buxton whom he had previously met in Constantinople, 
and whose visit had given them courage and moral support. 
Foreign affairs 
It was during the period of optimism for a new liberal Turkey, that Noel joined the Anglo- 
German Friendship Committee, whose aim it was to reduce tension between the two 
imperialistic nations. Dissenters such as Buxton viewed with dismay the policy of Sir 
Edward Grey in relation to both Germany and the Balkans and, following the Agadir 
Crises of 1911, he and Arthur Ponsonby formed the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group. " 
This Group, which boasted an initial membership of over seventy-five Liberal MPs, 
advocated greater parliamentary control over foreign policy through the establishment 
of a Foreign Affairs Group rather than the plethora of unofficial groups concerned with 
specific problems such as the BC. Despite its limited success, Buxton viewed this as one 
of his greatest achievements. '8 For Marvin Swartz the most important fact was that the 
Group actually existed and its failure was influential in the establishment of the UDC. '9 
Armenia and the Young Turks 
The Armenians' hopes and aspirations had received little attention in Europe since 1897, 
so they particularly welcomed the Young Turk revolution. Consequently, the newly 
formed CUP received the support of the Armenian leaders, for which they were rewarded 
with seats in the Ottoman Parliament, the re-establishment of the Armenian National 
Assembly and the freedom to develop their own schools, libraries and newspapers. 
However, regime change did not halt the attacks against the Armenians, and in April 1909 
up to thirty thousand Armenians in Cilicia lost their lives. The Turkish authorities accused 
the Hunchaks of providing arms in preparation for new demands for independence. Both 
16 Ibid., 12; `Enver Bey and Turkish Reform', The Times, 8 March 1910. 
17 `Foreign Affairs Group', NBP, MS951, c19/1. 
18 Biographies of Living Members of Parliament - questions from Committee on History of 
Parliament NBP, MS951, c10/8. 
19 Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control, 6-7. 
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the British Vice-Consul at Mersina and the Russian Vice-Consul at Adana dismissed the 
idea that the Armenians provoked the massacres. 2° This was to provide a foretaste of 
future events. 
Return of the sceptics 
By 1911, hopes of the development of a more egalitarian Turkish state had been severely 
dented; the honeymoon period was well and truly over and fiustration was evident on 
both sides. The BC's policy of advocating a degree of latitude to the Turkish leaders 
and a strong reluctance to criticise them while the new regime was establishing itself, 
now appeared too sanguine. The failure of the CUP to improve significantly conditions 
for the Macedonians resulted in new claims of the BC financing insurrections amongst 
the Christian populations. " The subsequent execution of leaders and the suppression of 
revolutionary propaganda were also reminiscent of the pre-revolutionary period. 
Despite the enlightenment and good-will demonstrated by the new regime, there still 
remained an underlying level of distrust amongst non-Muslim subjects of Ottoman 
government. This distrust was exacerbated by attempts to create a secular state, which 
would forcefully abrogate the long recognised liberties of the Christians. 22 Consequently, 
the Churches and schools were viewed as a state-within-a-state, which was subjected 
to a new regime of misguided oppression. By the beginning of 1912, the BC concluded 
that the new Turkey offered no better hope for the Macedonians and other non-Moslem 
subjects than the old Ottoman regime. ' The new government was, it realised, undertaking 
a `Turkification' policy, which was contrary to the original pledges made for political 
and religious equality. Consequently, the BC could no longer plead for patience and a 
sympathetic treatment of the government's actions. 
20 Manoug Joseph Somakian, Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers. 1895-1920 
(London: 1. B. Tauris, 1995), 42. 
21 Translation of newspaper report from Serbia, 1 March 1911, NBP, MS951, c24/2. 
22 H. N. Brailsford, Who are the Balkan Peoples? (1912), Balkan Committee Leaflet No. 9. 
23 The Condition of the Subject Races in Turkey', Balkans Committee, January 1912, NBP, MS951, 
c24/2. 
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Naively the BC felt confident that the CUP's desire for a common Turkish patriotism 
was compatible with individual ethnic consciousness and religious equality. However, 
they were not blind to the possibility that the habits of the old regime could eventually 
become re-established. Following their 1908 visit, they warned Sir Edward Grey they 
were concerned by the level of jingoism certain CUP leaders exhibited. 24 If left unchecked 
this could lead to two possible outcomes: either they would provoke hostility among the 
different Christian nationalities; or the self-confidence they displayed would lead them 
inextricably into difficulties with the various nationalities within the empire. In addition, 
the CUP was subject to the conflicting internal interests of the liberal reformers, the 
chauvinist militarists and the Pan-Islamists. Should the latter gain the upper hand they 
predicted the destruction of the Empire. " According to Brailsford, in the run-up to the 
Balkan Wars the Young Turks had committed the `supreme folly of alienating every 
Balkan race at once. '26 
The return of the old policies of repression and misgovernment proved that the Young 
Turks were little better than the old ones. The Porte's Turkification policy and its failure 
to improve conditions in Macedonia came as a disappointing blow to Buxton-2' In August 
1912, A. G. Symonds, the BC's new Secretary, was caught in a dilemma between issuing 
a manifesto which boldly advocated Gladstone's `bag and baggage' policy which, he 
recognised, might have encouraged the `subject populations to go to war' or a more 
optimistic proclamation. 28 Brailsford however was against issuing any form of manifesto 
or even making representations to Sir Edward Grey. The conditions in Macedonia prior 
to the outbreak of war were highlighted by the Daily Telegraph 's Paris Correspondent, 
who compared Macedonia with its neighbour Romania, `both equally rich countries 
naturally. On the one hand, in Roumania, peace, prosperity, and wealth. On the other 
side, in Macedonia, wretched poverty. '29 
24 [Report to Sir Edward Grey following visit to Young Turks], NBP, MS951, c24/4. 
25 Sixth Annual Report of the Executive Committee for the Year 1909,9. 
26 Brailsford, Who are the Balkan Peoples? (1912). 
27 `Balkan Committee Remonstrance', The Times, 12 January 1912. 
28 A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 28 September 1912, NBP, MS951, c24/2. 
29 Daily Telegraph, 10 October 1912. 
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An Ideal War 
Throughout its early years the BC constantly warned that unless a peaceful solution was 
quickly found, the region would descend into anarchy, insurrection and ultimately war. 
However, when war came it was unexpectedly initiated by the Italian attack on Tripoli 
in September 1911, which the Great Powers had clearly been impotent to avert (or even 
foresee). Following the outbreak of war in North Africa, the normally factious Balkan 
states exhibited a degree ofco-operation that was previously believed impossible. In order 
to achieve this, Bulgaria and Serbia came to an agreement over the future of Macedonia. 
Under Russian auspices in early 1912, they divided Macedonia into three zones, one 
Bulgarian, one Serbian and a central uncontested buffer zone. Despite the failure to 
resolve the territorial dispute between the Bulgarians and the Greeks over Salonika these 
two belligerents joined to form the Balkan League with Serbia and Montenegro to divest 
the Ottoman Empire of its remaining European possessions. 
While the BC had long been calling for the different ethnic groups to co-operate this 
was not necessarily the outcome they had in mind. In July 1905, they had issued an 
appeal to the various `races' in the Balkan Peninsula to unite in common action and not 
to weaken their forces by mutual hatreds. 30 Their combined desire was for the Great 
Powers to accept responsibility for their fellow Christians and ensure that the Turkish 
rule was at least moderated, if not completely removed. Ideally, protection would come 
from a European Power with international authority to govern in the interests of the local 
population, which in many ways foreshadowed the Mandate System that would emerge 
as part of the post First World War League of Nations. 
The Balkan Wars were significant for the Armenians as those living in the Balkans fought 
alongside the Bulgarians, while those in Anatolia agitated for Russian involvement. 3' 
While the Tsar appeared to be sympathetic to the Armenians, his prime concern was to 
30 Balkan Committee, Second Report ... Year ending December 31st, 1905,16. 
31 Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 31. 
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avoid anarchy in Transcaucasia. By reviving the Armenian Question, he hoped to retain 
the loyalty of the Russian Armenians 32 The 1905-1907 disturbances within the Russian 
heartland encouraged the Russian government to seek the introduction of reforms for the 
Ottoman Armenians in order to mitigate disturbances along their border with Turkey. 
The increase of Russian influence in the region, following the Anglo-Russian Entente of 
1907, which identified the northern provinces of Persia as being within a Russian zone of 
influence, compounded the need. 
An Albanian rebellion in May 1912 served to highlight the internal pressures and in 
October, the Balkan League declared war. The future of Macedonia was central to the 
nationalist struggles of the League members, a fact the BC viewed with dismay. In a 
last-ditch plea to the Powers, the BC urged the despatch of their fleets to Constantinople 
to `achieve without bloodshed what the armies of the [Balkan] League may win with 
slaughter. '" As far as the BC was concerned, the Balkan states had mobilised not for 
war, but for the prospect of justice for their fellows. In vain, they looked to the European 
Powers to intervene. 
Buxton's response was to go with his brother Charles and see at first hand the horrors of 
the war. 34 Their position with the Bulgarian general staff was, according to Noel Buxton, 
the result of his high profile position within the BC. 35 During this period, he observed the 
devastation the war was causing and the distress and suffering it brought to the ordinary 
peasants. In his address to the 1912 National Peace Congress, Noel Buxton demonstrated 
the liberal internationalists' frustration at the failure of the international system to settle 
the dispute between Turkey and her neighbours: 
Must I abandon my desire to see home happiness brought to the 
unfortunate subjects of Turkey, must I abandon my hope that this can 
32 Roderic H. Davison, `The Armenian Crises, 1912-1914', American Historical Review, 53, no. 3 
(April 1948), 486-7. 
33 Balkan Committee, Manifesto of the Balkan Committee, 12 October 1912, NBP, MS951, c24/2- 
34 Noel Buxton, `The Wounded', Contemporary Review, 103 (1913), 153-159. 
35 `Mr Noel Buxton on the War. ' Norwich Eastern Daily Press, 18 December 1912. 
131 
be done by peaceful means, and so must I become an advocate of this 
war? That is a dilemma [... and] what a horrible contradiction presents 
itself in this matter. 36 
The level of co-operation between the Bulgarian, Greek and Serb armies indicated 
that now was the time to implement Gladstone's `bag and baggage' policy. The war 
Buxton concluded was `an ideal one', as it provided the greatest chance of releasing 
the Macedonians from the Turkish yoke; it was a war of liberation, which placed the 
right of self-determination above peace. " Angell in his Peace Theories and the Balkan 
Mar concurred by arguing that the war was `justified' as it brought to an end centuries 
of tyranny and repression: `that is why those of us who do not believe in military force 
rejoice. "' 
Despite their initial reservations over the resort to war, the BC could not be anything but 
satisfied with the outcome of the First Balkan War, which saw the Balkan League states 
victorious. The subsequent peace conference opened in London on 16 December 1912, 
with Austro-Hungarian demands for the Serbian withdrawal from the newly proclaimed 
state of Albania. In January 1913, the BC issued a Manifesto to the Peace delegates of 
the Balkan States, in which they expressed their `profound satisfaction at the glorious 
results' achieved through the use of force. 39 Paradoxically, this was a pac jcistic response 
to the justness of the recent war. Nevertheless, a lasting peace required co-operation 
between the individual States, and they warned the delegates against the break-up of their 
alliance. Through their combined efforts, the Powers took a greater interest in the region 
and considered them serious negotiating partners, a lesson soon forgotten. 
The London Conference adjourned without reaching any agreement at the end of 
January. This month also saw a coup d'etat in Constantinople, which brought the CUP 
36 Quoted in Laity, The British Peace Movement, 1870-1914,209. 
37 [Manifesto to the Peace Delegates], NBP, MS951, c24/1. 
38 Norman Angell, Peace Theories and the Balkan War (London: Horace Marshall & Son, 1912), 8-9, 
58. 
39 [Manifesto to the Peace Delegates], NBP, MS951, c24/1. 
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untrammelled power for the first time since the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Despite the 
revolution, the CUP and its followers did not have overwhelming control of the Ottoman 
government. Due to its occasional break-up into differing factions and so-called counter- 
revolutions, power had proved to be transitory and elusive. However, the defeat in the 
Balkans provided a unifying force and justification for the coup, together with the fear 
that the government would surrender Edirne as part of the peace settlement. As in 1908, 
the change in the Turkish power structure and the appearance of internal disarray caused 
the Empire's neighbours to look on covetously. The Treaty of London finally signed on 
30 May 1913, officially recognised Albania and assigned to Bulgaria a southern frontier 
running from Enos, on the Agean to Midiia on the Black Sea. 
The apparent unity of the Balkan states soon dissipated. The Serbian loss of the Albanian 
territories resulted in their unwillingness to accept the pre-war agreement to apportion 
Macedonia. Consequently, a conflagration of disputes erupted within Macedonia. At 
the beginning of June 1913, the Serbs and Greeks made an alliance against Bulgaria, 
which was increasingly being isolated. With Russia taking a firm stance against it, 
Bulgaria made a pre-emptive strike against Serbia and Greece at the end of June. During 
the ensuing chaos Rumania invaded Dobruja, which it had previously demanded as 
compensation for maintaining neutrality during the earlier disputes; the Ottomans also 
recaptured Adrianople. As D. K. Fieldhouse observes, this same Ottoman army that 
suffered decisively at the hands of its former subject states would, with just three years' 
further training, assisted by German officers, defeat the Allies in the Dardanelles, limit 
British progress in Mesopotamia, and drive out the French, Greeks and Italians from 
Anatolia. 40 
Bulgarian humiliation was enshrined in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 
1913. For the Bulgarians this had a double blow of losing Dobruja, its most productive 
region, to Rumania and the dissection of Macedonia to its disadvantage. Because of the 
40 D. K. Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 16. 
133 
loss of Dobruja, the Bulgarians had to secure sufficient financial aid to develop their 
backward areas in compensation and cover the general costs of the recent wars 41 This 
would have a significant bearing upon the attitude of Bulgaria during the First World 
War. Greece obtained Salonika, Kavalla and coastal Macedonia; Serbia gained northern 
and central Macedonia, leaving Bulgaria just the Strumnica region. 
Consequences of the Balkan Mir 
In his introduction to the Carnegie Inquiry into the recent wars, d'EstourneIles insisted 
that the neither the Balkan peoples nor the European governments were to blame. The 
real culprits were irresponsible nationalists who placed their particular interests above 
the general good of their fellow citizens. 42 While the decline of Ottoman-Turkish power 
and prestige was a critical factor behind the wars, strident nationalist propaganda was 
also significant. The primary agitators were the priests, schoolmasters, revolutionary 
movements as well as the press and officials. 43 True salvation for both small and large 
states lay in `union and conciliation. '' 
Following a visit to Macedonia in May 1914 David Starr Jordan, of Stanford University, 
and President of the World Peace Foundation reported to Noel Buxton that the greatest 
problem now faced within Macedonia was that of the volume of refugees. From his 
observation, the individual states were following a unifying policy through `the forcible 
conversion, assimilation or banishment of aliens within their borders'. " Consequently, 
the homeless and displaced invariably found themselves on the wrong side of an arbitrary 
boundary, the path of self-determination ultimately led to mass migration and ethnic 
cleansing. 
Matching the interests of the Armenians 
The liberal internationalists' concern for the subject peoples also extended to the 
41 For details of the position of Bulgaria in the Balkan conflicts see Richard J Crampton, Bulgaria 
1878-1918: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 427, 
42 Report... into the causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 19. 
43 Ibid., 50-51. 
44 Ibid., 19. 
45 David Starr Jordanto Noel Buxton, 12 July 1914, NBP, MS95I, c24/2. 
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Armenians whose homeland straddled the border between the Tsarist and Ottoman 
Empires. Some like Hobhouse saw this as a suitable extension for the BC as `I feel 
that the interests of the Armenians would be better served by that body than by any 
scratch crowd that is likely to be got together for the purpose. '46 Rather than broaden the 
BC's remit several of its leading members together with some of their former pro-Boer 
colleagues established the BAC in late 1912. The initial meeting took place in the House 
of Commons at the end of December, and amongst those MPs attending were Arthur 
Ponsonby, J. F. Whyte, George Greenwood, Sir Charles Swann, J. Allen Baker, and J. 
M. Dent. 47 The key players were notable by their absence from this initial meeting, but 
under the chairmanship ofAneurin Williams, the BAC became the political organisation 
`which protects the Armenian interest in this country'. 48 Noel Buxton, Gooch, and T. P. 
O'Connor soon joined Williams, with Bryce as de facto President. Operating very much 
as a political select committee it attracted many politicians and those with `first-hand 
knowledge of Armenia and the East. '49 
Only Bryce and Noel Buxton had direct experience of Armenia. Bryce had travelled 
extensively around the region in the 1870s and published his impressions in Transcaucasia 
and Ararat. Noel Buxton and his brother the Revd. Harold Buxton had explored both 
Russian and Turkish Armenia during the autumn of 1913 with their impressions published 
in 1914 as Travels and Politics in Armenia. The overriding perspective they reached 
would have a significant influence over the BAC. They believed that the peasants were 
increasingly reliant upon self-defence, and that their best hope lay in annexation by 
Russia. so 
The genesis of the BAC coincided with the arrival in London of representatives of the 
Ottoman government and the Balkan League in an attempt by the European Powers to 
46 L. T. Hobhouse to Noel Buxton, 8 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2. 
47 A. G. Symonds to Noel Buxton, 9 January 1913, NBP, MS951, c24/2. 
48 `Resolution of the Armenian committees of London, Paris and Manchester', 20 April 1915, quoted 
in Boghos Nubars Papers and the Armenian Question: 1915-1918, ed. by Vatche Ghazarian, 
(Waltham, MA: Mayreni Publishing, 1996), 39. 
49 Aneurin Williams letter to the Editor, The Times, 12 July 1913. 
50 Aneurin Williams to Boghos Nubar, 26 November 1913, Oxford University Bodleian Library: 
James Bryce Papers (henceforth JBP), MS201, f34. 
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conclude the ongoing Balkan Wars. A consequence of these negotiations appears to be 
the raising ofArmenian hopes and, in late 1913, a Russo-Turkish agreement was reached 
which included the introduction of new reforms for the Armenians. In response, The 
Times leader commented that the Armenians `must obtain safety for their lives and for 
their homes, they must be delivered from the constant fear of massacre and of plunder; 
they must be granted a reasonably just and enlightened administration [... ] this time the 
paper reforms must be translated into facts. 'S' Williams, on behalf of the BAC argued 
that the Armenians earnestly desired to remain subjects of the Ottoman Empire, provided 
some form of tolerable government was available to them. To ensure the implementation 
of reforms he insisted that the Powers should monitor and oversee them. 52 In November 
1913, Williams headed a deputation to the Foreign Office, where Sir Edward Grey failed 
to persuade him that the reforms could work. 53 Grey was confident that the Turks had 
learnt from their mistakes, but he claimed it would be impossible to exert any financial 
pressure on them. 54 This was in part due to the agreements already made relating to the 
Baghdad Railway. 
Despite these promises the BAC and others, watching events in eastern Turkey, 
continued to express concern over the fate of the Armenians. The Armenian Question 
was becoming more politicised with every passing moment. In March 1914, Williams 
and Bryce discussed the possibility of introducing a debate into the House of Lords over 
the issue of reform. " It would take another 19 months and the wholesale massacre of the 
Armenian people to enable the first real debate to take place. 
The importance of Macedonia cannot be underestimated. It provided a focus for the liberal 
internationalists' Gladstonian moralism, which saw the detachment - administratively 
or completely - of territories from the Ottoman Empire as the salvation of its subject 
populations. Force - diplomatic or military - would, they believed, have to be used by 
51 The Times, 31 October 1913. 
52 The Times, 12 July 1913. 
53 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 26 November 1913; JBP, MS201, f33. 
54 Aneurin Williams to Boghos Nubar, 26 November 1913, JBP, MS201, f34- 
55 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 12 March 1914; JBP, MS201, f65. 
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outside governments. It was fear of such force within the Macedonia-based Ottoman 
army that resulted in the Young Turk Revolution and ultimately the establishment of 
a CUP government. The subsequent nationalistic policies adopted by the Turks would 
result in a sea change in liberal internationalists thinking on self-determination. 
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Going out of the Lights, 1914-1915 
The First World Warwas in many ways the crucial turning point for liberal internationalism. 
While the groundwork for the development of an institutional approach was laid down 
in the preceding decades, it took the escalation of the `third Balkan war' into total war 
to put that approach at the fore of public debate on foreign policy. Paradoxically, the 
catastrophic breakdown of the international system in August 1914 ushered in a golden 
opportunity for the liberal internationalists to formulate their vision of the institution(s) 
needed to secure a `new world order'. The first nine months of the war would witness its 
rapid gestation before settling down to a more gradual but steady growth and eventual 
acceptance and embodiment in the form of the League of Nations. At the same time, the 
moral approach was not totally abandoned; it was employed on behalf of the Armenians 
who in early 1915 found their lives and liberty threatened by a policy of ethnic cleansing 
and ultimately genocide. This chapter will examine these contemporaneous issues: the 
origins of the League idea and the response to the Armenian massacres. Together they 
demonstrate the twin dimensions of liberal internationalism evolving simultaneously as 
the international anarchy reigned supreme. 
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Relics of barbarism 
In the period leading up to the declaration of war, the liberal internationalists continued 
to play an important role in criticising British foreign policy. ' They were also evident 
amongst the strident calls for reductions in naval expenditure on the Dreadnoughts. 
The view expressed by Aneurin Williams that this was `a shocking waste and a relic 
of barbarism' reflected the desire of many to divert the expenditure to further social 
reforms. 2 Their response to the impending conflict is illustrated in Aneurin Williams' 
correspondence with his wife. On 28 July, the news from the `East' regarding Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia provided `nothing but horrid confirmation of the outbreak of 
war'. 3 Consequently, he sought out Noel Buxton and other like-minded individuals in 
order to discus the possibility of organising sufficient Liberal MPs to protest against 
the government dragging Britain into the conflict. The following day Arthur Ponsonby 
initiated a series ofineetings ofthe Liberal Foreign Affairs Group in an attempt to mobilise 
opposition. " After listening to Sir Edward Grey's statement to the House, they issued a 
resolution stating that they were `of the opinion that no sufficient reason exists [... ] for 
Great Britain intervening in the War'. 5 Williams like many of his contemporaries was 
`not won over the Foreign Secretary's eloquence', and would subsequently speak out 
against the government's policy which he believed was merely pandering to the anti- 
German press rather than doing `all it could for peace'. ' 
1A discussion of the role of radical Liberals can be found in, H Weinroth, `The British Radicals & 
the Balance of Power, 1902-14', Historical Journal, XIII, no. 4 (1970), 681; G. R. Searle, The 
Liberal Party: Triumph and Disintegration, 1886-1929 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); Bentley, 
The Climax of Liberal Politics; Chris Cook, A Short History of the Liberal Party, 1900-1997, fifth 
edn (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Keith Laybourn and Jack Reynolds, Liberalism and the 
Rise of Labour, 1880-1918 (London: Croom Helm, 1984). 
2 Manchester Guardian, 24 January 1914; The dilema for Liberals such as Williams over the issue of 
expenditure on armaments rather than social reform is addressed by Gerald Jordan, `Pensions not 
Dreadnoughts: The Radicals and Naval Retrenchment', in Edwardian Radicalism, ed. by A. J. A. 
Morris, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 162-179. 
3 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 28 July 1914, AWP, AW/2/1/12. 
4 `Notes on Meetings', APP, c660, f64-65; for a detailed analysis of the events see Swartz, `A Study 
of Futility', Edwardian Radicalism, ed. by A. J. A. Morris, 252-259. 
5 `Notes on Meetings', APP, c660, f64-65. 
6 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 5 August 1914, AWPAW/2/1/12; Hansard, LXV, HC, 3 
August 1914, col. 1871. 
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The divisions within Parliament were also played out in the press with The Times calling for 
military intervention while the Manchester Guardian and other radical papers expressed 
a desire to see Britain acting as impartial mediator. The subsequent resignations of Lord 
Morley, John Burns and Charles Trevelyan from the government were applauded for 
making a stand `against this awful war fever'. ' Hastily organised campaigns to maintain 
British neutrality were initiated both in and out of parliament. Hobson and Wallas formed 
the Neutrality Committee, with the support of Lord Courtney, Ramsay MacDonald, 
Gilbert Murray, A. G. Gardiner, Hobhouse, F. W. Hirst and J. L. Hammond. At the same 
time, Angell launched an alternative Neutrality League. Both proved to be ineffectual 
and short-lived. 8 
Meanwhile, in the Commons thirty of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group formed a new 
parliamentary association `for the purposes of watching the progress of the European 
crisis and for taking such steps [... ] as shall relieve the distress resulting from the war 
and expedite a speedy settlement. " Trevelyan, free from his ministerial responsibilities 
was elected chairman and Ponsonby its vice-chairman. With the intention of it becoming 
a cross-party committee, a meeting was arranged with Labour's Ramsay MacDonald and 
Arthur Henderson. According to Williams this would mean that 80 to 100 Liberal and 
Labour MPs would join the group `to watch over the interests of peace'. 1° MacDonald's 
resignation as chairman of the parliamentary Labour Party, following the Party's 
decision to support the government's request for war credits, wrecked these plans. " This 
unnamed group continued to meet until at least 23 February 1915, to discuss and plan 
action with regard to the government's policy. The role of the group was constrained by 
its commitment not to do `anything to embarrass the Government in the conduct of the 
7 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 5 August 1914, op cit.; Aneurin Williams to John Burns, 
Burns Papers, British Library Add. MSS. 46303, fl 7; for a discussion on the resignations see K. 
Robbins, The Abolition of War: The `Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff. University 
of Wales Press, 1976), 36. 
8 For the role of the Neutrality Committee and League see Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists, 184-5; 
Laity, The British Peace Movement, 220; Robbins, The Abolition of War, 28. 
9 R. D. Denmann MSS, 4 4(3), fl. 
10 Aneurin Williams to H. E. Williams, 5 August 1914, AWP AW/2/1/12. 
11 Denman MSS, 4 4(3), fl -3; see also David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1977) 169. 
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war'. 12 Ultimately, its activities were subsumed within those of the UDC of which E. D. 
Morel, Trevelyan, Ponsonby, and MacDonald were the prime movers. 
Proposals for a League of Peace 
With Britain engaged in the war, the futility of protest soon became apparent to the 
majority who shared Hobhouse's belief that `our safety is at stake. "3 The proximity to 
the conflict was to prove to be a most effective stimulus for liberal internationalism. 
Despite Williams' associations with MacDonald, Angell and Trevelyan, he decided not 
to join the UDC, preferring instead to turn his mind to the development of an institutional 
mechanism to limit armed conflict. 14 He was not alone amongst liberal internationalists in 
considering how international relations could be organised to reduce potential conflicts. 
While a league of nations or states rapidly became their preferred means, its ultimate 
structure, functions and Modus operandi would remain under discussion for the duration 
of the conflict. 
In November 1914, Williams published `Proposals for a League of Peace and Mutual 
Protection, ' in The Contemporary Review. Subsequently described as the `first moderate- 
defencist scheme' published during the war, it outlined a `true' Concert of Europe. 15 His 
suggestion was that the League would be established as a mechanism for settling disputes 
by peaceful means, and provide support for the judgements of international tribunals. His 
scheme also included provision for mutual defence, or as it would later become known, 
collective security. His ideas were to undergo considerable revision and re-evaluation 
as the war progressed, but mutual protection remained an integral aspect of his league. " 
Williams' article gave a sharp impetus to the evolution of liberal internationalist ideas 
and according to Laity represented a major departure from traditional peace thinking. " 
12 Manchester Guardian, 7 August 1914. 
13 Cited in Robbins, The Abolition of War, 39. 
14 Williams had been invited to join the UDCs Council, but preferred to concentrate on the League as 
a distinct issue, Aneurin Williams to C. P. Trevelyan, 8 January 1915, AWP AW/3/1/26. 
15 M Ceadel, `Supranationalism in the British Peace Movement', 169-191 & 177. 
16 For a comparison of the components of the different proposals see Dackombe, `Aneurin Williams 
and the Development of the League of Nations Movement in Britain, 1914-1919', 51-55. 
17 Laity, The British Peace Movement, 234. 
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Others giving consideration to a league of nations during the first year of conflict included 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, a Fellow of Kings College, Cambridge; Hobson; the 
lawyer F. N. Keen; Brailsford; and Leonard Woolf. " Like Williams, Lowes Dickinson 
soon after the outbreak of hostilities had sought a way to avoid future wars. In early 
September 1914, he wrote to Wallas informing him that it was important that they 
should: 
Concentrate, on a few definite principles, the new European order we 
want to be introduced at the peace [... ] it is not necessary, nor even 
desirable, to work out in detail the whole machinery, and to meet 
beforehand all the difficulties and objections. The point is to convince 
those who are to act for us, that those are the principles and aims we 
want them to adopt when they work out a settlement. 19 
In order to formulate these principles and aims he brought together a small group of 
individuals which included the Liberal MPs Ponsonby, and Sir Willoughby Dickinson, 
together with Hobson, Wallas, and E. Richard Cross, solicitor to the Rowntree family and 
manager of The Nation. On the condition that the group's discussions were private, Bryce 
agreed to act as its figurehead, and prepared a discussion paper advocating national self- 
determination, limitation of armaments and a league of nations. 20 
18 For example see, G. Lowes Dickinson, `The Way Out', War and Peace, 1, no. 12 (September 
1914), 345-346; G. Lowes Dickinson, After the War (London: A. C. Fifield, 1915); HN 
Brailsford, `On Preventing Wars', Mar and Peace, 11 (1915), 71-72; Hobson, Towards 
International Government.; Frank Noel Keen, The World Alliance. A Plan for Preventing Future 
Wars (London: W. Southwood & Co, Ltd, 1915); Leonard Woolf, `Suggestions for the Prevention 
of War: An International Authority and the Prevention of War', New Statesman, 5, no. 118 (July 
1915), Special Supplement 1-24; Leonard Woolf, `Suggestions for the Prevention of War: Articles 
Suggested for adoption by an International Conference at the Termination of the present War by 
the International Agreements Committee of the Fabian Research Department', New Statesman, 5, 
no. 119 (1915), Special supplement 1-8. 
19 Goldesworthy Lowes Dickinson to Graham Wallas, BLPES: Graham Wallas Papers (henceforth 
GWP) 1/55, t21-22. 
20 A copy can be seen in WHDP, c. 402; see also Keith G. Robbins, `Lord Bryce and the First World 
War', The Historical Journal, 10, no. 2 (1967); Robbins, The Abolition of War, 49-50; Martin 
David Dubin, `Towards the Concept of Collective Security: the Bryce Group's "Proposals for the 
Avoidance of War" 1914-1917', International Organization, 24, no. 2 (1983), 290. 
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While its deliberations were in private, the Bryce Group sought the opinions of others 
with an interest in its objects. 21 Amongst those consulted were Williams whose recently 
published proposals were according to Bryce, `well worth our consideration. '21 The first 
version of the Group's `Proposals for the Avoidance of War' was privately distributed 
in March 1915, and underwent several revisions. ' However, it was only in April 1917, 
following America's entry into the war, that they were finally published. 24 
The Bryce Group and Williams' proposals both followed a practical approach in advocating 
a limited `league': they sought an association of sovereign states, which would agree to 
refer all disputes to a tribunal or council, while observing a cooling-off period, pending 
a decision. Any states not observing this process were to be subjected to `collective' 
diplomatic, economic or military action, but this fell short of the establishment of an 
international police force. Certainly, Lowes Dickinson took William's criticism of the 
original draft proposals into account and together with other Bryce Group members he 
was involved in subsequent LNS discussions which utilised Williams' proposals as the 
basis of its discussions. " 
At the same time, the Fabian Society commissioned Leonard Woolf to investigate the 
possibility of an international organisation to prevent future wars. Woolf's suggestions 
published in the New Statesman in July 1915, advocated an international organisation, 
comprising a high court and a secretariat to service a council, which would codify 
and amend international law, as well as having jurisdiction over economic and social 
questions. The three proposals displayed many similarities, but an important distinction 
was that of the three only the Bryce Group was unwilling to utilise sanctions against a 
member refusing to accept an award in justiciable disputes. 26 
21 See WHDP, c. 402 for details of the various comments received on the Group's proposals. 
22 Lord Bryce toAneurin Williams, 3 December 1914, AWP AW/3/1/2. 
23 `Proposals for the Avoidance of War with a Prefatory Note by Viscount Bryce' (As revised up to 
24th February, 1915); `Proposals for the Avoidance of War with a Prefatory Note by Viscount 
Bryce' (Amended after receipt of criticisms, August 1915); `Proposals for the Avoidance of War 
with a Prefatory Note by Viscount Bryce' (Amended after receipt of criticism, November 1915) 
AWP AW/3/1/2. 
24 Viscount Bryce, Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1917); Manchester Guardian, 12 April 1917. 
25 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Aneurin Williams, 16 June 1915, AWP AW/3/1/10. 
26 Such disputes are those which are capable of being decided by a court of law. 
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Founded in February 1915, the LNS was the culmination of Aneurin Williams' efforts 
to bring together like-minded men and women to consider the ideas outlined in his 
Contemporary Review article. While Williams' proposals formed the initial starting 
point for subsequent discussions, the Society sought to consider all relevant aspects, 
including the complete abolition of war. 27 They also demonstrated a natural caution in 
making any public pronouncements, as they had no wish to be considered an anti-war 
group. Additionally, they believed that the premature publication of their plans would 
be detrimental to the acceptance of its underlying premise. In addition, the rise in anti- 
German feeling following the sinking of the Lusitania, together with observation of 
how their associates in the UDC had been received, no doubt revived memories of the 
jingoistic attitudes of the public during the South African War. 
Williams was insistent that the League idea should be promoted as a distinctive aspiration 
rather than becoming subsumed within a pre-existing group. 28 The traditional peace 
societies were hardly likely to endorse the strongly pac jcistic approach adopted by the 
pro-leaguers. As it transpired, the groups formed in response to the war such as the LNS 
were to prove more successful than the older societies. Consequently Williams' select 
group of internationalists informally discussed amongst themselves ways of improving 
international relations. Finally, on Friday 5 February 1915, the LNS was formed at a 
meeting in Mrs Walter Rea's house in Westminster, `to popularise the principle that the 
eventual TREATY of Peace shall contain provision to ensure the judicial settlement of 
all international disputes. '29 In addition to Mrs Rea and Aneurin Williams, those present 
included Mr Allen of Bedford College, Sir Willoughby Dickinson and Senator La 
Fontaine of Belgium. 30 Over the coming weeks, those receiving invitations and joining 
27 `Note as to the origin of the League of Nations Union', WHDP, c406, f70; World-wide Support 
for a League of Nations, (London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 34,1918) WHDP, 
c406, f10I. 
28 Aneurin Williams to G. P. Gooch, 27 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13; Aneurin Williams to Dr. C. L. 
Lange, 4 June 1915, AWP AW/3/1/19. 
29 `Original Agenda', WHDP, c. 404, f7; Mrs Walter Rea to Gilbert Murray, 8 February 1915, GMP, 
MS178,03. 
30 Mrs Walter Rea to Gilbert Murray, 8 February 1915, GMP, MS 178,133; La Fontaine was a 
Professor in International Law, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1913, President of the 
International Peace Bureau and a strong advocate of internationalism. Williams had been 
appointed as a representative on the International Peace Bureau. 
144 
the discussions included Gilbert Murray, Lowes Dickinson, Ernest Rhys, Hobhouse, 
London County Councillor A. \V. Claremont and his wife, together with john Russell, 
headmaster of Hampstead's King Alfred School, and H. N. Spalding who during the 
war served in the Admiralty before becoming Director of Welfare within the Ministry of 
Munitions. By 12 February, they had formulated the new society's objects, which were: 
To secure the establishment of an International Court, and the federation 
of civilised nations [... ] which shall bind themselves, (a) to settle by 
peaceful means all disputes arising among themselves, (b) to defend 
any one of their number wh[ich] may be attacked by some state not 
willing to submit its quarrels to peaceful settlement, (c) to admit to 
membership on equal terms any civilised state desiring to join. " 
The influences ofAneurin Williams' proposals are evident in the various drafts prepared 
by the LNS, and those finally adopted on 3 May 1915.32 The main areas of contention 
amongst the discussants were when the League should actually be formed and the issue 
of mutual protection. While most agreed the League could only be instituted after the 
conclusion of hostilities, some were reluctant to preclude its earlier creation. 33 As the war 
progressed, this issue would become a major obstacle and would lead to the temporary 
disintegration of the LNS. 
The other issue, which nearly led to the stillbirth of the fledgling society, was that of mutual 
protection. For Aneurin Williams, this was a crucial issue. For as he informed Charles 
Gide, the French economist, at the end of May, it was important `to persuade my friends 
to concentrate their efforts on the one idea of Mutual Protection and the maintenance of 
International Law by an agreement among those powers which really desire peace. '34 
31 Sub-committee Report for meeting on 12 February 1915, AWP AW/3/1/3. 
32 `First Draft of the Basis of the Society', Thursday 25 [February 1915], AWP AW/3/1 /3; `The Union 
of States Society, Objects of the Society', 10 March 1915, AWP AW/3/1/3; `The League of 
Nations Society, adopted 3'd May 1915', AWP AW/3/1/2. 
33 Basil Williams to Aneurin Williams, 4 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/28; Aneurin Williams to Basil 
Williams, 19 May 1915, AWPAW/3/1/28. 
34 Aneurin Williams to Professor Charles Gide, 28 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13. 
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Ultimately, Williams accepted the compromise of League members making `provision 
for mutual defence' rather than see the whole scheme fall at its first hurdle. " Even this 
proved too strong for some of the more pacifist members of the committee: Mrs Rea, 
the hostess and convenor of the preliminary meetings felt this clause made it impossible 
for her to serve on the committee. 36 Mutual protection was also in the Bryce Group's 
proposals as without such a provision, Bryce argued, `the whole thing will seem pointless 
and ineffective. "' 
The preparation of the Society's aims fell to Williams, who expounded upon his belief, that 
without collective action `the League would become a farce: there would be no security 
against aggressive States. It does not follow that the force need always be military or 
naval: it is possible that in certain cases diplomatic pressure, or economic pressure, might 
be sufficient. '38 His address to the November General Meeting illustrated the idealistic 
assumption, common amongst his contemporaries, that the League could ultimately act 
as a mechanism for armaments reduction by providing security from aggression. 
Of the five significant groups launched within the first fifteen months of the war, only the 
LNS and UDC operated on truly pac jcistic lines. 39 The UDC leadership was more willing 
to identify itself with pacifism, while those of the LNS constantly strove to disassociate 
themselves from what they perceived as its negative connotation. 40 
3S League of Nations Society, Report of General Meeting [... ]November 29h, 1915 (LNS Publication 
no. 3,1915), 17. 
36 Mrs Claremont to Aneurin Williams, 22 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/8. 
37 `Memorandum on Mr J. A. Hobson's Notes', WHDP c. 402. 
38 Theodore Marburg to W. H. Short, 11 September 1916 in Development of the League of Nations 
Idea: Documents and Correspondence of Theodore Marburg, ed. by John H. Latane, 2 vols (New 
York: MacMillan, 1932), vol. i, 158 ; League of Nations Society, Report of General Meeting ... November 29th, 1915 (London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 3,1915), 7; League 
of Nations Society, Explanation of the Objects of the Society (Letchworth: League of Nations 
Society Publication No. 2,1916). 
39 Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists, 198. 
40 See A. Williams to G. P. Gooch, 27 May 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13" A. Williams to G. P. Gooch, 12 June 1915, AWP; A. Steel-Maitland to W. H. Dickinson, 19 June 1918, WHDP, c. 403, f115; W. H. Dickion to G. Murray, 24 August 1918, GMP, MS 178, f51. 
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The New Eastern Question 
The outbreak of war saw Williams' attention divided between his desire to build support 
for the new form of international machinery he and his fellow liberal internationalists 
were busy formulating, and his concern for the Armenians. This would remain a difficult 
but important balancing act. Noel Buxton too found an important outlet for his energies, 
a mission to obtain Bulgarian support undertaken at the behest of Lloyd George and 
Winston Churchill who dispatched him to Sofia in a vain attempt to secure Bulgaria's 
allegiance to the Allies. " In February 1915, Mark Sykes confided to Noel Buxton that 
the key to the war lay with the Bulgarians, whose help he hoped Buxton could obtain. 
`Of course we can wear Germany down, but a war of exhaustion is very deadly even to 
the winners [... ] The war has completely transformed our strategic position in the East 
and in the World. '42 The policy of keeping the Ottoman Empire intact had failed in many 
respects and for Sykes it had in particular failed to prevent the First World War. Buxton 
ultimately viewed the Bulgarians' decision to support the Germans, as being forced upon 
them by a series of diplomatic blunders, and as such they should not be punished in the 
post-war settlement 43 
While Buxton undertook his abortive mission, Williams and his BAC colleagues kept an 
ever-watchful eye on Turkey. Recent years had seen an extension of the `Turkification' 
policies, whereby the assimilation of non-Turkish groups within the empire took place, 
by force if necessary. The compulsory use of Turkish in commerce and education was 
essential for moulding a cohesive Turkish identity. Williams shared the Armenian 
leaders' fears that Turkey's entry into the war in November 1914 would be `the signal 
for a massacre of the Christians. "" For the Armenian community living in London there 
was the portent that `Armenia could be regarded as the Belgium of the Near East. '45 
41 He was supported by Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George but importantly not Sir Edward 
Grey; see Charles Raymond Zienius, `The Secret Mission of Noel Buxton to Bulgaria, September 
1914 - January 1915' (MA Thesis, McGill University, 1997); Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy 
from a Back Bench, 88-100; Anderson, Noel Buxton A Life, 62-70. 
42 Mark Sykes to Noel Buxton, 10 February 1915, NBP, MS951 c24/10. 
43 Noel Buxton, Outlines of a Lasting Balkan Settlement, NBP, MS951, c26/7. 
44 The Manchester Guardian, 5 November 1914. 
45 The Manchester Guardian, 6 November 1914. 
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Reinforcement of these fears came with the proclamation of a Jihad against Britain, 
France and Russia. 
In truth, the liberal internationalists had been making similar representations to Sir 
Edward Grey for some time: examples included those by the BC in November 1912, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury the following year, and another by Williams in September 
1914. On that occasion, he reported that the fear of a massacre was the result of a 
perceived Turkish policy to rid the country of its Christian subjects, who were viewed 
as weakening the Empire. 46 In the years leading up to the First World War the typical 
Foreign Office response was to do little more than make representations as an acquit 
de conscience (to salve our conscience). " All this changed in November 1914 when 
the Foreign Office's and the liberal internationalist's attitudes converged, and it rapidly 
became expedient to expose the situation publicly. As a result, a close collaboration soon 
developed between Bryce, Williams and the Foreign Office. Consequently, as Akaby 
Nassibian has observed, the BAC became `the most active and influential political group' 
engaged with the Armenian Question. " 
The change in government attitude was demonstrated by both Asquith and Lloyd George 
who publicly denounced the empire as a `blight' and a `cancer' upon a once fair land. 49 
The Times leader reporting on Asquith's Guildhall speech in November 1914 argued that 
Britain's promise to guarantee the integrity and independence of Asiatic Turkey following 
the Cyprus Convention was no longer valid. In addition the pledge that Turkey would 
introduce proper government within the Armenian provinces had never materialised as 
she had continued persistently to misrule and periodically massacre the Armenians. " 
Background to Genocide 
In the summer of 1915 news gradually reached Britain that the Armenians in Turkey 
were again being subjected to mistreatment at the hands of their Turkish and Kurdish 
46 Aneurin Williams to Sir Edward Grey, 18 September 1914, TNA FO 371/2116/51007. 
47 TNA FO 371/1773/4961 Jan/Feb1913. 
48 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 46. 
49 The Times, 10 November 1914,10; ibid., 11 November 1914,10. 
50 The Times, 10 November 1914. 
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neighbours. The reports of massacres and mass deportations would continue throughout 
the war and even into the 1920s. The actual number of Armenians and their fellow 
Christians who lost their lives has been difficult to determine, in part due to the differences 
in the number of Armenians as recorded by the Ottoman authorities and the Armenian 
Catholicos prior to the First World War. However, as the historian Richard Hovannisian 
points out, the figures provided by the Armenians are likely to be exaggerated but those 
of the Ottomans are `even more distorted. "' As a result he identifies the true number of 
Armenians to lie somewhere between the two, at between one and a half and two million. 
Of this, it is believed that at least one million lost their lives, in what is often referred to 
as the first genocide of the twentieth century. 
While most academics and authorities accept this as a historical fact, the Turkish 
government still refuses to accept the deaths of the Armenians as a genocidal act, instead 
claiming that there was no official organisation or sanction for the massacres. Those 
transportations that occurred were, they argue, for internal security purposes, which were 
justified by the fact that large numbers of Armenians died fighting for Russia. 52 
While the term `genocide' is now generally used to describe the Armenian massacres, 
it was first coined by Raphael Lemkin to describe the Nazi Holocaust of the Jewish 
people. For Lemkin, genocide referred to the destruction of a nation or ethic group 
as a result of a coordinated plan. 53 While such an evocative term was not available to 
Bryce and Williams, their statements in parliament and the press regularly described the 
treatment of the Armenians as being coordinated with the intention of `exterminating' 
and `extirpating' the Armenian race. 54 This view was supported by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury who saw the treatment of the Armenians as little more than `the attempted 
obliteration of a people. '55 Contemporaries described the unfolding events in Eastern 
51 See Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 34-37. 
52 A great body of Armenian genocide denial literature exists, for an analysis see Dadrian, `The signal 
facts', 269-279; and Charny and Fromer, `Denying the Armenian Genocide', 39-49. 
53 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, D. C: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1944), 79. 
54 For example see New York Times, 18 August 1915, letter from Aneurin Williams and 10 October 
1915, letter from Lord Bryce; see also Hansard, LXXV, HC, 16 November 1915, col. 1770-1776. 
55 Manchester Guardian, 16 October 1915. 
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Turkey in such a way that it is difficult not to accept that the massacre and mistreatment 
of the Armenians was an act of genocide. From the daily reports Bryce was receiving, he 
concluded there: 
Seemed to be an effort to exterminate a whole nation, without 
discrimination of age or sex, whose misfortune it was to be the subjects 
of a Government devoid of scruples and of pity, and the policy they 
disclosed was one without precedent even in the blood-stained annals 
of the East. "' 
Today, while the British government agrees that the events were `an atrocity of the first 
order' it does not believe that the `evidence is sufficiently unequivocal' to enable them to 
use the term genocides? This is in contrast to the statement made in 1915 to the House 
of Commons by Lord Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Here 
Cecil stated categorically `that no more horrible crime has been committed in the history 
of the world [... J The crime was a deliberate one, not to punish insurrection but to destroy 
the Armenian race. 'Is This was no spur of the moment reply, but a calculated response to 
a debate initiated with the prior approval from the Foreign Office. 59 An in-depth analysis 
by Donald Bloxham shows that the Armenians were subjected to `ethnic cleansing, or 
forced collective displacement, and direct physical annihilation [... therefore] the epithet 
genocide [is] applicable. '60 
A deliberate crime 
When news of the massacres was first received Williams sought to establish whether the 
government would consider securing for the Armenians some form of autonomy. Neil 
Primrose, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that the government would 
56 Bryce and Toynbee, The Treatment ofArmenians in the Ottoman Empire, 19. 
57 Lord Triesman, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
House of Lords Debate, 14 July 2005, Lords Hansard, 673 pt33, column 1212. 
58 Hansard, LXXV, HC, 16 November 1915, cols. 1770-1776. 
59 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 12 November 1915, JBP, MS201, f142. 
60 Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69. 
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`consider the interests of the Armenian people sympathetically; but it is not possible at 
this juncture to determine future political arrangements. '61 
According to Donald Bloxham, a systematic Turkish policy against the Armenians only 
emerged in the early summer of 1915.62 Prior to this, he argues, the treatment of the 
Armenians was regionally-controlled and developed in a piecemeal basis and only in 
response to circumstances. This distinction is evident in Aneurin Williams' statement to 
the House of Commons in November: `The Turkish authorities within the little time of five 
months proceeded systematically to exterminate a whole race out of their dominions 963 
He then went onto provide a graphic description of the events that occurred: 
Armenians [... ) were collected together at short notice, sometimes 
within a few hours [... ] It was not men of military age that were taken 
[... ] The Armenians of military age were already serving Turkey as 
soldiers in the ranks [... ] men from fifteen to seventy who had not been 
taken as soldiers were collected together and for the most part shot. 
The older men, women and children, were ordered to prepare to go 
away to a great distance. This did not take place simply in one town, 
but in practically every town where there was an Armenian population 
of any importance. It did not occur owing to the fanaticism of one 
particular magistrate or one particular population. It is what took place 
in obedience to the orders sent round from the central authorities. 
While it is possible to view the massacres and deportations of the Armenians in both 
ethnic and religious terms, Williams was at pains to point out that the Greeks and Syrian 
Christians as well as non-Christians were subjected to ethnic cleansing. With the British 
public's natural sympathies directed to their European neighbours, it would be easier to 
61 Aneurin Williams to Sir Edward Grey, 3 April 1915, TNA FO 371/2485,40247/30439/15; Hansard, 
LXXI, HC, 14 April 1915, Col. 2-3. 
62 Bloxham, Great Game of Genocide, 69. 
63 Hansard, LXXV, HC, 16 November 1915, cols. 1770-1776. 
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generate sympathy with the Armenians by stressing their religious similarity. The nature 
of the crime being perpetrated against them, however, required no embellishment. 
The first mass movements occurred in April 1915 and involved all Christians who lived 
in coastal areas, such as the Gallipoli peninsula where there were fears of their aiding the 
Allies. Armenian volunteer units were established with Russian encouragement, primarily 
manned by Russian Armenians, to aid incursions into Turkey. In April, the Russians 
captured the strategically important city of Van, and defended it against the inferior 
Turkish troops. The Armenians had fortified the town in order to protect themselves 
from attack by the Turks and, this according to Fridtjof Nassen, was misrepresented 
as an uprising. " While the plain of Van was under Tsarist control, Russian Armenians 
allegedly massacred the Turkish peasantry and this was followed by Turkish massacres 
of the local Armenians after the Russian withdrawal. 
In June 1915, the mass movement of the Armenians began on the death marches; consisting 
primarily of women, children and the elderly. Forced to leave behind their property and 
possessions, what little they could carry gradually diminished. The destination for many 
of these mass deportations was the deserts where as Williams informed The New York 
Times, `those who survive are doomed to certain death, since they will find neither house, 
work, nor food in the desert. 161 Those living in the more northern provinces were either 
massacred or fled into the mountains en-route to Russia. 
Soon after the news of the massacres and deportations reached Britain, Williams informed 
Boghos Nubar that the BAC was keeping a close watch on developments and was in 
`constant communication with the Foreign Office'. 66 During the next few years he also 
held meetings with Lloyd George during his premiership, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Curzon 
and Lord Robert Cecil. The latter was a long-term associate through the Labour Co- 
Partnership Association and a fellow advocate for the League of Nations. 
64 FridtjofNassen, Armenia and the Near East (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 301-2. 
65 `Letter from Aneurin Williams', The New York Times, 18 August 1915. 




Increasing public awareness led to several humanitarian relief organisations attempting 
to relieve the distress of Armenians within the affected areas. Unlike the BAC they were 
not explicitly political in nature, but they did receive the support of many of the BAC's 
members. As the wholesale deportations of the Armenian population grew apace, the 
existing organisations became overwhelmed with the sheer enormity of the task before 
them. Against this background the Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund (AR(LM)F) 
was inaugurated in October 1915, and became the `best organised, and most active and 
influential ofthe reliefagencies. '67 The reliefwas channelled through existing missionaries 
and the American Near East Relief, as well as the British Consulate in Batum. In 1916 
the AR(LM)F sent its own agents and medical staff to Van and the Caucasus. 69 
The inaugural meeting took place at the Mansion House in London with its President, 
the Lord Mayor of London, recalling the events of the 1890s and the generosity of the 
British public 69Also addressing the meeting were Bryce, Cardinal Bourne and the Bishop 
of Oxford and letters of support were read from, amongst others, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and A. J. Balfour. " The Fund was able to elicit support from a wide spectrum 
of British society and its Vice-Presidents included eminent representatives from most 
Christian denominations and public figures. In a reflection of the dilemma faced by the 
liberal internationalists, the Manchester Guardian commented `For the reply of politics 
we must wait, but not for that of our humanity. "' 
The AR(LM)F also functioned under the chairmanship of Aneurin Williams and had 
several of the BAC's members on its executive, including the Revd. Harold Buxton as 
its Secretary. Additionally, the Fund was unofficially an effective source of information 
on the situation in the Caucasus for the BAC. On occasions the AR(LM)F was even 
able to finance the publication of the BAC's memoranda and distribute them to its 5,000 
67 Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question, 63. 
68 The Martyrdom ofa Nation, (London: Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund, n. d. c. 1917). 
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subscribers. 72 The AR(LM)F continued in existence long after the end of the war and in 
1925 it was appointed by the then Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald to assist in the 
settlement of Armenian refugees under the League of Nations scheme. 73 
Crimes against Humanity 
With the continual arrival of news of the massacres and deportations Bryce, Williams and 
other concerned liberal internationalists constantly sought a government declaration that 
would influence the Turkish authorities to halt the proceedings. As early as May 1915, 
Williams had approached the Foreign Office and sought their assurance that the Turkish 
leaders would be made aware that Britain personally held them responsible for the fate 
of the Armenians. " Unbeknown, the Foreign Office had been negotiating with their 
French and Russian counterparts over a joint declaration holding the Turkish officials 
personally responsible. " Despite Sir Edward Grey's concern that there was `not sufficient 
trustworthy data on which to base such a message', and a fear that it could lead to further 
massacres, a joint declaration was published on 24 May 1915.76 This stated the Kurds and 
Turks had `been engaged in massacring Armenians with the connivance and often help of 
Ottoman authorities. ' The Allies would as a result of these `crimes' hold `all the members 
of the Ottoman government, as well as such of their agents as are implicated, personally 
responsible for Armenian massacres. '" There were some differences between the final 
wordings used by the Allies: Grey objected to the use of the term `crimes committed by 
Turkey against Christianity and civilisation'. As a result the British version dropped the 
phrase `against Christianity and civilisation', while the French and Russians substituted 
`against humanity and civilisation. "$ This would make it difficult for the declaration to 
be dismissed as merely pro-Christian propaganda. 
72 B. A. C. Minutes, 18 December 1919,23 March 1920 and BAC Propaganda Sub-Committee 
Minutes, 15 June 1920, Oxford University Rhodes House Library MSS British Empire 
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According to Vahakn Dadrian, this indicated an Allied desire to prosecute after the war 
those responsible, including the complicit Ottoman officials. He further identifies in the 
statement the introduction of the concept of `crimes against humanity' into international 
law and its subsequent use in the Nuremberg trials. 79 In the immediate post-war period a 
series of military tribunals were conducted as a cathartic act following the serious defeat, 
which was blamed upon the wartime CUP leaders, who fled the country before charges 
were brought. In addition to charges of military incompetence, two charges related to 
the Armenian massacres. In their absence Talfit Bey, Enver Bey, Cemel Bey and Dr 
Nazim were condemed to death; an act carried out by Armenian vigilantes in several 
cases. The rise of the Kemalists saw the end of the Court Martials and international trials 
under the Treaty of Sevres. 80 Certainly, in May 1915 it was important to both Bryce and 
Williams that the Turkish leaders realise that they were personally responsible for the 
massacres, although they never publicly called for an international trial. " For Bloxham, 
the declaration as initiated by Russia was little more than a cynical deception for the 
benefit of the Armenians; it was, he claims, Russia's way of playing lip service to the 
plight and future of the Armenians at a time when insurrection amongst its Caucasus 
territories would be most unwelcome. " 
The joint declaration was widely welcomed and for Boghos Nubar it suggested `the Allies 
are taking our cause seriously and are ready to offer us their complete collaboration. '83 
Its impact upon Turkey was likely to be limited; independent pronouncements from 
neutral states, such as America would be more effective. To this end, Bryce instructed 
Boghos Nubar to encourage the Armenians living in Paris to address President Woodrow 
Wilson and urge him to `issue an effective warning to the Turkish government against 
the attempt to annihilate a whole nation. '84 The previous week Williams had telegraphed 
79 Dadrian The History of theArmenian Genocide, 216-7. 
80 For further details on the Court Martials and trials see ibid. and TanerAkgam A Shameful Act: the 
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the American State Department in Washington urging them to take action. 85 He also 
approached the Foreign Office to ask them to persuade the Americans to intervene, and was 
informed that both the Americans and the Italians had made diplomatic representations 
in Constantinople. 86 Cecil was however sceptical of any influence that President Wilson 
could exert; he believed the Pope would be more effective. 87 Williams also approached 
Noel Buxton who had close contacts with Bulgaria with the view to getting them to 
exert similar pressure on Turkey. "' In this way, Williams and his BAC colleagues sought 
to utilise their political connections in order to keep the plight of the Armenians at the 
forefront of international attention. 
When the Turkish response came, it cited self-defence as the justification for any actions 
taken. The responsibility lay not with the Turkish government but, it claimed, was entirely 
the fault of the Entente Powers who had long been directing and organising the Armenian 
revolutionaries. 89 
Public Awareness or wartime propaganda? 
In his letter to the AR(LM)F, Balfour observed that `in the midst of all the horrors of 
this war nothing [... ] is more horrible than the treatment meted out to the wretched 
Armenians by the Turkish government' and condemned Germany for its failure to halt the 
atrocities, a point supported by Bryce. 90 Balfour and Bryce were not alone in observing 
that Germany bore some responsibility for the massacres, if only for its failure to halt the 
ongoing proceedings. Boghos Nubar, however, saw the German guilt extending much 
further; in a letter to Aneurin Williams, he confided `witnessing the barbaric acts of the 
Germans, it is no wonder that the Turks are trying to imitate their ally. '91 
85 Aneurin Williams to State Department, 3 May 1915, quoted in Ibid., 26. 
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For the British government, it was certainly expedient to stress Germany's moral 
responsibility in order to influence both British andAmerican public opinion. 92The German 
press confronted such attitudes by arguing, like their Turkish allies, that responsibility 
lay with the Allies who had falsely raised hopes and in so doing had fostered the enmity 
that now existed between the Turks and the Armenians. 93 
Throughout the war, Williams had privileged access to Foreign Office intelligence on the 
Armenian situation while he was also the chief intermediary between the Foreign Office 
and the Armenian Diaspora. A regular source of information was the British Consul at 
Batum, just over the border in the Russian Caucasus. Summaries of his reports to the 
Foreign Office were regularly forwarded to Williams, and on occasions the diplomatic 
telegraph service were used to send encrypted reports on Williams' behalf. 94 
While the BAC sought to raise public awareness in order to exert pressure upon the 
British government, the latter were more concerned to argue that the Armenians' only 
hope was an Allied victory, thereby exploiting the situation in order to strengthen the war 
effort. The BAC also sought to engage the American people: examples include Aneurin 
Williams' submission of a letter he had received from Bryce to the American press in 
September 1915. This carefully worded letter outlined the facts and was intended to 
appeal to the `hearts' of all Americans and persuade them through their government to 
exert influence upon the Germans to `check the Turkish government before their ghastly 
work is completed. '95 The leader in the Manchester Guardian supported this initiative to 
help form American opinion on the subject. 96 
In December 1915, Bryce had warned the BAC to be careful about publishing anything 
that could encourage the Turks to undertake further acts of aggression against the 
Armenian people. However, by February 1916, with the aid of Arnold J. Toynbee he 
92 Nassibian, 73-5; Bloxham The Great Game of Genocide, 129-32. 
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began the momentous task of collecting `in the interest of historic truth' all available data 
relating to the massacres and forced movement of the Armenians. 97 This was to be the 
most important collaboration between the pro-Armenian liberal internationalists and the 
Foreign Office. Both Bryce and Toynbee were pivotal figures in the BAC, and Bryce as 
an elder statesman and major figure during the 1890s massacres was a natural outlet for 
receiving first-hand reports from eastern Turkey. 
The resultant meticulous research was published as an official Blue Book, The Treatment 
of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16. Bryce was determined that it should be 
an `authentic record' of events and was careful to stress that all information was treated 
impartially; in spite of this it has since been subjected to Turkish claims that it was little 
more than British wartime propaganda. The contradictory statements as to the origin 
of the project made by the government in 1916 and Toynbee half a century later have 
in part fuelled speculation. In addition, Bryce's Report of the Committee on Alleged 
German Outrages was criticised for its uncorroborated anonymous statements collected 
by a team of barristers. 98 Certainly, Britain's wartime Ministry of Information, under 
the direction of C. F. G. Masterman, choreographed both reports. Known merely as 
`Wellington House', its inspiration according to Lucy Masterman came from the BAC's 
T. P. O'Connor. ' 
Masterman was certainly pleased with the reception the Belgian report received in 
America. "' In June 1916, he informed Bryce that he was very anxious to publish the 
Armenian report as soon as possible in order to influence public opinion, especially in 
relation to the post-war settlement of the Near East. 1°' Masterman also suggested the 
official presentation of the report to the House should be in response to a question placed 
by Williams. 102 The official version as outlined to the House of Commons by Cecil was 
97 Bryce and Toynbee, The Treatment ofArmenians in the Ottoman Empire, xvi. 
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that it was prepared at the suggestion of Bryce; Toynbee however would later record 
that Bryce had undertaken the work at the request of the government. 103 However, in 
October 1915 Toynbee recorded `They have turned over to me Bryce's evidence about 
the Armenians, to make up into a report. "" 
Regardless of the differences of opinion as to its origin, it remains a foundational body 
of testimony in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide. 105 While the original 
publication withheld the identities of his sources, for fear of reprisals, their identities 
were scrupulously recorded and were later published separately; additionally the primary 
sources and working copies of the book were specifically retained thereby enabling the 
methodology of the original to be scrutinised. 106 
At the time of its publication, the report was widely held up as an important source and 
liberal internationalists like Noel Buxton believed that it was instrumental in influencing 
American opinion. "" Further, from conversations with President Wilson's confidential 
advisor, Colonel House, he was under the impression that this was one of the motive 
factors in the President's decision to enter the war. Despite the United States never 
actually declaring war on Turkey, he still believed the Allies owed a special obligation to 
the Armenians. The 1924 memorial from former Prime Ministers Asquith and Baldwin 
to then Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald clearly supported this view. 101 
Certainly, there is no denying the British government and its Allies were prepared to 
utilise the Blue Book for propaganda purposes, but they were also willing to exploit 
all other suitable channels. These included forwarding information to the press and the 
pro-Armenian groups, and Aneurin Williams in his role as Chairman of both the BAC 
and AR(LM)F was a major recipient. When in November 1915 the British Consul in 
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Batum forwarded information on recent events to the Foreign Office, it was noted by an 
official that it might be useful to forward the official despatch directly to Williams with 
the understanding that `it may be published if considered necessary'. 10' This suggestion 
met with the approval of Cecil, who requested it be sent at once. This was followed by 
the regular transmission of information to Williams, invariably on the understanding that 
he was free to use the information as he saw fit. In this way, Williams was able to ensure 
that the latest news was brought before the public's attention. Similarly, when Bryce 
and Williams shared information with the Foreign Office there was the less than subtle 
suggestion that they should publish it immediately. A case in point occurred in January 
1917, when Cecil confided to Bryce that the information he had shared was `an appalling 
story', but `we could scarcely ask leave to publish, could not your society commit an 
indiscretion? "" 
While it is evident that there was a certain degree of manipulation by the Foreign Office, 
it did however serve both parties, since without access to these reports it would have 
been harder to stimulate the public's concern and elicit aid for the Armenians. This was 
of course not the only source of information as Williams and his associates also received 
detailed intelligence from missionaries and aid workers in the region, the most reliable 
source being the AR(LM)F's own field agents. 
The BAC was also able to ensure that the British press regularly reported on the Armenian 
Question. News items, which were based upon the BAC's press releases, appeared in a 
wide variety of papers, but it was C. P. Scott's Manchester Guardian, which showed 
most interest. Scott was a lifelong friend of Bryce, and shared many of the same ideals. 
Another outlet was the prestigious monthly journal The Contemporary Review, which 
was co-edited by two BAC members, the historian Gooch and the leading Methodist, 
Revd. Dr J. Scott Lidgett. 
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In August, Boghos Nubar forwarded a copy of a graphic description of the effects of 
the deportations from the Patriarch of Constantinople to Williams on the understanding 
that the information could be made public but not the identity of the author. "' Williams 
immediately forwarded it to the Daily News, and soon after it appeared in the New York 
Times. 12 While the BAC found new impetus, the BC struggled to find a role for itself. 
As long as the war raged, they could do little but appeal for small contributions to keep 
it going until the moment came again to demand `justice, liberty and peace for all the 
Balkan peoples. "3 
The first full year of total war had seen the liberal internationalist ethos challenged on 
several fronts simultaneously. Firstly, the genocide of the Armenians had reawakened 
the issue of nationality and the Eastern Question, and secondly it had given an important 
boost to institutional internationalism. With regard to Armenia, the links between the 
liberal internationalists, the Foreign Office and Wellington House were particularly 
strong; these connections would be important in the subsequent discussions over the 
League. Although the interconnectivity was not yet apparent to those involved, as the 
following chapter will demonstrate, the inextricable link would become evident over the 
next few years. 
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9 
Nationality and internationalism, 1916 -1918 
The first full year of war had seen both the LNS and the Bryce Group preparing their 
proposals, though the former was the more inclusive and undertook to educate the British 
public of the importance of the League. For Lowes Dickinson it was vital to work out 
and agree upon the `immense amount of very difficult controversial detail [... and] get 
together so strong a body of opinion that our government will have to take account of 
it'. ' 
Despite this original intention, Williams would nine months later inform Gooch that 
everyone was `very determined not to do anything to shock public opinion, or divert 
men's minds from winning the war. 'Z Consequently, they were at pains to stress they were 
not a `stop the war' organisation, nor were they advocating disarmament or criticising 
British foreign policy. ' In January 1916, Lord Bryce informed Theodore Marburg of 
the American League to Enforce Peace (LEP) that he was very keen that the League 
idea should be promoted as much as possible in the United States as `It is impossible to 
secure attention here at present for anything except the current events of the war. '4 Such 
cautiousness was not evident in the actions of Charles Buxton, who actively sought to 
promote the principles embodied in the League's programme and the settlement of the 
war on lines likely to promote peace. While some of the meetings at which he spoke 
1 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Graham Wallas, 8 September 1914, BLPES: Graham Wallas 
Papers (henceforth GWP), 1/55, f22. 
2 Aneurin Williams to G. P. Gooch, 12 June 1915, AWP AW/3/1/13. 
3 Lord Bryce to Theodore Marburg, 7 December 1916, in Development of the League of Nations 
Idea, ed. by Latand; F. N. Keen to Graham Wallas, 19 May 1915, GWP, 1/56, f55; see also 
Robbins, The Abolition of War, 53. 
4 Lord Bryce to Theodore Marburg, 11 January 1916, in Development of the League of Nations Idea, 
ed. by Latan6,91. 
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were organised by the UDC, he attached greater importance to organisations not easily 
identified as pacifist, such as the Workers Educational Association, suffragette groups, 
church groups and trades unions. 5 
While Sir Edward Grey expressed sympathy with the aims of the pro-Leaguers, he was 
reluctant to make any public pronouncement open to misinterpretation either by Britain's 
allies or by the Germans 6 Again, at the end of December 1916, he informed Gilbert 
Murray that it was difficult to do anything publicly because, `till a safe end of the war is 
in sight people can't be expected whole-heartedly to promote what they hope to realize 
after the war'' Thereby illustrating the greatest problem of the pro-leaguers, that of being 
identified as idealistic visionaries. 
Whereas the LEP initially had a free hand to discuss openly the League idea due to 
American neutrality, its British counterpart, the LNS had to work more circumspectly. 
Despite this constraint and the prevailing attitude, as expressed by Grey, the LNS's major 
task was `to get the public to understand the necessity for a League and its establishment 
in the peace treaty. '8 Obstacles to publicising the League idea were not restricted to 
external factors, but also thrown up by those engaged in its formulation. Bryce's insistence 
on keeping their proposals private frustrated Lowes Dickinson, as did Sir Willoughby 
Dickinson's reluctance to organise public meetings. ' 
A significant reason for their reticence was the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), which 
gave the government wide-ranging powers including censorship. As far as Hobson was 
concerned the emergency powers of suppressing leaflets and pamphlets discussing the 
war and the making of peace were a `process to strangle freedom of opinion. '10 Many 
5 Charles Roden Buxton to Theodore Marburg, 20 March 1916, Ibid., 98-99. 
6 Sir Edward Grey to Theodore Marburg, 7 April 1916, in Ibid., 103. 
7 Quoted in George MaCaulay Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon: Being the Life of Sir Edward Grey 
Afterwards Viscount Grey of Fallodon (London: Longman, Green & Co, 1937), 331. 
8 Leonard Woolf, Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the years 1911-1918 (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1964), 191. 
9 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Graham Wallas, 8 September 1914, GWP 1/55; Goldsworthy 
Lowes Dickinson to Aneurin Williams, 8 June 1917, AWP AW/3/1/10. 
10 J. A. Hobson to Gilbert Murray, 22 November 1917, GMP, MS 35, M. 
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of what Hobson termed the `unpopular' societies were raided, including the Council 
for Civil Liberties and, in August 1917, E. D. Morel was arrested under DORA and 
sentenced to six months imprisonment, where according to Marvin Swartz he `suffered 
malnutrition of the ego'. " As a consequence of the government clamping down on the 
activities of the UDC and other pacifist groups, it fell to the pro-league groups to work 
with `the grain of official and public opinion. ' 12 
An Inopportune Suggestion 
The real breakthrough came with President Wilson's public declaration in May 1916, 
which endorsed a `universal association of nations'. Whether British thought on the 
League influenced the President is unclear, but as Martin Ceadel points out, that did not 
stop many British activists claiming credit. " The President was certainly kept abreast of 
British attitudes by a wide range of individuals, including Angell, Lowes Dickinson and 
Noel Buxton who all travelled to America. Another informant was Theodore Marburg 
who acted as a conduit between the Bryce Group, the LNS, other interested parties in 
Britain and the President. 
Despite Lloyd George's October 1916 `knock-out blow' interview, which rebuffed 
American proposals for a negotiated peace, the LNS leadership still found sufficient 
encouragement to enable it to issue a statement to The Times. Published on the 3 November 
1916, the joint letter from Sir Willoughby Dickinson and Williams outlined their vision 
for a League of Nations. "' The premise of their proposal was that members would refer 
their judicial disputes to an international tribunal, with all other disputes being referred 
to a council of conciliation, and the security of League members protected through the 
provision of mutual protection. In response The Times devoted a leader article to the 
proposals, which it described as `An inopportune suggestion', since it believed that 
discussion at this point would be premature and unhelpful as it did little to promote 
victory over Germany and her allies. Pro-Leaguers, such as Dickinson and Williams, 
11 Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control, 179. 
12 Ceadel, Semi-detached idealists, 233. 
13 Ibid., 226. 
14 The Times, 3 November 1916, and 6 November 1916. 
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however, strongly believed that only through the discussion of the future of international 
relations would it be possible to ensure that the eventual peace settlement was along the 
correct lines. 
As a result, articles appeared in the London press, and more importantly the regional papers 
such as the Sheffield Independent, which expressed a far greater degree of willingness to 
contemplate their suggestion. In the paper's opinion, it was strange that those in London 
should consider it `inopportune to consider how we can secure and enforce peace when 
the great conflict has been brought to an end? "' 
While not totally dismissing the idea, The Times stressed the time was not yet right to 
discuss such proposals. However, Dickinson and Williams had patiently waited over 
eighteen months for a sign that the British public was ready to consider such a scheme. The 
signal had finally come through recent public pronouncements from President Woodrow 
Wilson and Sir Edward Grey, amongst others. Despite Grey's expressed sympathy for the 
pro-Leaguers aims, George Egerton has accused him of utilising the League idea in order 
to cultivate good relations with America. 16 Only six months earlier, he had informed the 
Chicago Daily News that he had long held the belief that there was a need for a League of 
Nations that would punish violations of international treaties and national independence, 
and arbitrate through an impartial tribunal. "According G. M. Trevelyan, Grey's original 
biographer, his advocacy of the League was not a cynical attempt to lure the Americans, 
but a sincerely held belief. '8 
Perhaps the most important signal came from Bryce: after several years of refusing to 
publicise his belief in the League idea, he finally agreed to speak publicly. On 3 October 
1916, he stated that it was time to consider `the grave questions which will arise when 
we come to make a treaty of peace. "9 The terms of peace should not be vindictive as this 
15 `To Enforce Peace', Sheffield Independent, 4 November 1916. 
16 G. W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations, 42. 
17 The limes, 15 May 1916. 
18 Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, 312. 
19 `Lord Bryce on Victory. The Conditions of Peace', The Times, 4 October 1916; NBP, MS951, 
c32/5. 
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would lead again to war; they should respect the principles of nationality, and secure a 
permanent alliance for peace. Although he did not say so directly, he hoped this alliance 
would be along the lines of a league of nations, to which he had been privately working 
for nearly two years. 
Late November and early December 1916 saw a political struggle between Asquith and 
Lloyd George over the future conduct of the war and control of a new war council. This 
culminated on 7 December with Lloyd George becoming Prime Minister of a coalition 
government, and Arthur Balfour succeeding Grey as Foreign Secretary. Within a week, 
the attitude of the new government became apparent when Arthur Henderson, chairman 
of the Parliamentary Labour Party and member of the newly formed War Cabinet publicly 
rejected the league idea. Britain was, he stressed, fighting for `a lasting permanent peace, 
peace based upon national right and national honour'; consequently, it was not right that 
the belligerents should discuss the League. 20 However, within a month the official line 
was in favour of the League. The change in attitude was in response to Wilson's request 
for publication of the war aims and peace objectives of the belligerents. The joint Allied 
response on 10 January 1917 outlined their aim of defeating Germany and restoring a 
European balance of power, but importantly for the first time they admitted they were 
`wholeheartedly with the plan of creating a League of Nations to ensure peace and justice 
throughout the world' backed by sanctions. " 
The League received increasing attention and its discussion was an integral part of the 
Imperial War Conference. With reference to the recent public debates over the British 
and American proposals for a league of peace or nations, Lloyd George informed the 
Imperial War Cabinet that `there is no doubt at all that we should endeavour to establish 
a league of that kind. '22 He added the proviso that Germany had first to be defeated and 
an example made of it. It fell to a sub-committee headed by Milner to throw `cold water 
20 The Times, 12 December 1916. 
21 Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals - December 1916 to November 1918, ed. 
by 
James Brown Scott, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), 35- 
36. 
22 Imperial War Cabinet Minute 1,20 March 1917, TNA CAB 23/43; see also David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, (London: Odhams, 1938), i, 1037-1041. 
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on the idea of the League of Nations', with its conclusions `that any too comprehensive 
or ambitious project to ensure world peace might prove not only too impracticable, but 
harmful. ' The debate continued within the Imperial War Cabinet, without reaching 
any real conclusion, thereby illustrating the government's difficulty in accepting such a 
scheme wholeheartedly. 
However, the pro-Leaguers could detect sufficient shift in official and national attitudes to 
contemplate the launch of the second phase of their campaign. The change ofpremier and 
restructuring of the coalition was a matter of concern because it brought so many hard- 
line imperialists, such as Milner, to the centre of power. On the 17 December 1916, Lowes 
Dickinson warned Gilbert Murray that he considered Lloyd George to be `indifferent and 
the rest of the new cabinet definitely sceptical or hostile' to the League idea. 24 However, 
the cabinet did include Cecil, one of the League's staunchest supporters in government 
and, following the Imperial War Conference, he was joined by South Africa's General 
Smuts, who had been close to key liberal internationalists since the South African War. 
In April 1917, Smuts summarised the situation as perceived by the pro-Leaguers, that 
`The war is lasting very long and there is a distinct tendency to weariness which only the 
realisation of high and inspiring ideas could effectively counteract'. " 
Public Attention 
With the anticipated entry ofAmerica into the war and increasing signs of war-weariness, 
the LNS drew up plans to organise a large public meeting at the Central Hall in 
Westminster. Bryce was persuaded to chair the meeting, his Proposals for the Prevention 
of Future Wars having finally been published in April 1917. They succeeded in gathering 
an impressive array of speakers, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and General 
Smuts. 26 The meeting on 17 May, on Bryce's insistence was to be `devoted to explaining 
& recommending the general notion & plan [for a League, and ... ] not to the putting 
23 Minutes and report of the Imperial War Cabinet Terms of Peace Committee (Economic and Non- 
Territorial Desiderata), TNA CAB 23/40; see also Ibid., 1066-1067. 
24 Quoted in Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations, 214, n19. 
25 General Smuts to Gilbert Murray, 5 April 1917, GMP, MS 34, f12. 
26 League of Nations Society, League of Nations Society: Report of a Meeting, May 14,1917 
(London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 11,1917). 
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forward of any one particular scheme as at this stage we want to get people to take in 
the idea'27 Bryce's desire was to restrict it to 200 `sensible men', rather than the major 
event Williams sought. The resultant meeting was hugely successful attracting in excess 
of 1,000 men and women and a good deal of press attention. 28 
Buoyed up by this success Lowes Dickinson and Williams directed the LNS's `most 
impressive' publication, The Project of a League of Nations, with articles from a variety 
of liberal internationalists. " Gooch traced the development of the concert of Europe and 
the balance of power; T. J. Lawrence, an international lawyer looked at the development 
of international arbitration; Williams compared the use of force between the schemes 
advocated by the LNS and its American counterpart, not surprisingly demonstrating 
a greater bias towards the English scheme; Willoughby Dickinson illustrated how a 
League of Nations could lead to disarmament; Woolf argued that periodic conferences 
of the League were essential for the development of international law and readjustment 
of the status quo; Noel Buxton outlined the role of America in securing a League, while 
Theodore Marburg outlined the plans of the American LEP; Dr De Jong Van Beek en 
Donk provided an outline of the League movement within the neutral European countries; 
and lastly Mrs Creighton summarised the links between the women's movements and the 
League. The customary selection of quotes from leading statesmen served to reinforce 
the importance of the whole scheme. 
Later in the year, they published two plans for a future league. The first by Williams, argued 
that in the short term it would be easier to establish a league consisting of the `minimum 
of machinery', a tribunal, council of conciliation and a conference or parliament. 30 To 
some this would be to leave too much to chance. 3' His Letchworth Garden City architect, 
27 Lord Bryce to Aneurin Williams, 24 April 1917, AWP AW/3/1/7. 
28 H. E. Williams to Iolo A. Williams, 14 May 1917, AWP ; The Times, Manchester Guardian, 
Westminster Guardian, 15 May 1917; Daily News and Leader, 17 May 1917. 
29 Henry R. Winkler, The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919 (Metuchen, 
N. J.: Scarecrow Reprint Corporation, 1967), 59; The Project of a League of Nations, (League of 
Nations Society Publication No. 15,1917). 
30 Aneurin Williams, The Minimum of Machinery. Schemes of International Organisation No. I 
(London: League of Nations Society, 1917). 
31 `Schemes of International Organisation', War and Peace, March 1918,216. 
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Raymond Unwin, prepared the second plan, which, despite its greater elaboration, was 
according to Henry Winkler merely Williams' scheme `writ large'. " 
Armenia and self-determination 
As the war progressed, the future of the Armenians evolved from an initial desire of self- 
government within Turkey to outright demands for complete autonomy under some form 
of Russo-Allied protection. Boghos Nubar presented the Armenian aspirations to French, 
British and Russian ministers as well as the BAC. 33 Armenian representatives believed 
the on-going debate over the future of Turkish territories and alternatives to European 
imperialism was a favourable context in which to state their case, though the main issue 
in this debate was the future of the German Colonies in Africa. 34 
An alternative to the historic practice of annexation was never high on the agendas of the 
British and French governments. The possibility of making new territorial acquisitions, 
while at the same time restraining German expansion beyond its European borders, 
was undoubtedly an attractive proposition. In contrast, the British radicals showed no 
reluctance in tackling the question and soon began debating alternative strategies for the 
territories of both Germany and Turkey. As a result of government silence on this issue, 
they were free to think the unthinkable and they ultimately made a significant impression 
upon the debate. 
While initial discussion was concerned with the fate of the German colonies in Africa, 
it ultimately developed into the ideas of trusteeship that were to characterise the liberal 
internationalist proposals for the new international system. Amongst the early advocates 
were E. D. Morel, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, C. E. Fayle and Brailsford. 35 For 
32 Williams was Chairman of First Garden City, the builders of the new Garden City; Raymond 
Unwin, Functions of a League of Nations. Schemes of if International Organisation no. II 
(London: League of Nations Society, 1917); Winkler, The League of Nations Movement, 63. 
33 Boghos Nubar ý Papers, ed. by Ghazarian, 71. 
34 See P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000 (Harlow: Pearson, 2002), 565- 
590. 
35 Winkler, The League of Nations Movement, 200-201. 
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Lowes Dickinson, equality between all nations with respect to economic opportunities in 
colonial Africa was required, while Morel saw the possibility of extending his campaign 
for the improvement of conditions of native Africans by calling for the preservation 
and enforcement of native rights. Fayle argued that, with the possible disintegration 
of Turkey's Asiatic territories, some form of international agreement was required to 
secure free trade. Brailsford, however, saw that a future League could regulate trade 
and competition to enable all member states to have equal access to the colonies of both 
member states as well as those acquired as a result of the war. 36 
In Towards International Government, Hobson attempted to introduce proposals that 
are more explicit. Again, he sought equality between nations over opportunities relating 
to capital and trade, which would be under the supervision of an international council. 
This would, he argued, reduce the potential for conflict between nations, which had 
historically clashed due to the demands of `political and economic expansion. "' In a 
similar vein to Brailsford, he too called for the proposed scheme to include all the existing 
colonies of member states, thereby enabling equal economic access to all, the 'open- 
door' principle. 38 He proposed that the former colonies should come under the protection 
of an international League as either a joint international protectorate or a single nation 
at the League's instigation. The potential for the new system to be extended to existing 
colonies would also be taken up later by Noel Buxton who saw trusteeship as eventually 
undermining the traditional basis of imperialism by forcing the Western nations to stop 
viewing the mandates and colonies as private property. 39 
Liberation from tyranny 
The liberal internationalist vision was buoyed-up by the Allies' claim they were `fighting 
not for selfish interests but, above all, to safeguard the independence of peoples, right, 
36 Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, 335-336. 
37 Hobson, Towards International Government, 138-142. 
38 J. A. Hobson, `The Open Door', in Towards a Lasting Settlement, ed. by C. R. Buxton, (London: G. 
Allen & Unwin, 1915), 105-107. 
39 Noel Buxton and T. P. Conwell-Evans, Oppressed People and the League of Nations (London: J. M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd, 1922), 54. 
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and humanity. 940 Woodrow Wilson reinforced this in his message to the provisional 
government of Russia, when he declared they were not fighting for any material profit 
or aggrandisement, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from aggression and 
autocratic force! ' In addition, he stated that the liberated should not be forced under 
an undesired sovereignty and that there should be no transfer of territory, except for 
the purpose of securing the life and liberty of its inhabitants. However, in a House of 
Commons debate a month earlier Cecil had stated that any change - even `imperialistic 
annexation' - would be of benefit to Armenia, Syria, Palestine and Arabia in order to 
release them from Turkish misgovernment-" While the German colonies had not been 
attacked for the purpose of rescuing the natives, he nevertheless viewed with horror the 
idea that they should be returned to German control. 
The Foreign Office's original lukewarm response over the future of Armenia was 
transformed by the Allies' war aims, which stated their desire for `the liberation of 
Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the 
enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion 
from Europe of the Ottoman Empire. "' The significance for the liberal internationalists 
was the intention not to just liberate the Armenians from the tyranny of the Turk, but to 
guarantee them autonomy through the process of enfranchisement. That such schemes in 
the past had proved worthless was conveniently passed over. 
However, by June 1917 the policy of `enfranchisement' had become one of `liberation', 
with the War Cabinet agreeing to this being one of Britain's war aims. 44 Two days later 
Lloyd George revealed the change in British policy to a meeting in Glasgow, where he 
outlined Britain's peace terms: 
40 official Statements of Mar Aims and Peace Proposals - December 1916 to November 1918, ed. by 
Scott, 35-36. 
41 'Mr Wilson to Russia', The Times, 11 June 1917. 
42 Hansard, XCIII, HC, 16 May 1917, col. 1668-69. 
43 official Statements of Mar Aims and Peace Proposals - December 1916 to November 1918, ed. 
by 
Scott, 35-36. 
44 War Cabinet Minutes, 27 June 1917, TNA CAB 23/3 171. 
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What will happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the Peace Conference 
when it meets, but there is one thing that will never happen to it - it 
will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk. At best he 
was the trustee of this far-famed land on behalf of civilisation. He has 
been false to his trust and the trusteeship must be given over to more 
competent and more equitable hands, chosen by the Congress, which 
will settle the affairs of the world. The same observation applied to 
Armenia, a land soaked with the blood of the innocent massacred by 
people who were bound to protect them45 
In the House of Commons, statements to this effect were made on 6 November by Balfour, 
as Foreign Secretary and by Lloyd George on 20 December. 41 The following month, 
during Lloyd George's Trades Union speech he stressed Armenia could not remain under 
Turkish sovereignty. 
Armenia and the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
The Tsar's abdication in March 1917 resulted in the formation of the Provisional 
government, the so-called `dual power' between the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, 
and their incompatible visions for a post-Tsarist Russia. The replacement of the Tsarist 
regime with a much weaker democratic one encouraged long-suppressed nationalist 
aspirations. Despite all of its Polish provinces being under German occupation, the 
Russian Provisional government proclaimed an independent Poland on 30 March (NS) 
1917. Demands for full autonomy also came from the Finns and the Baltic provinces. In 
the Caucasus, the Armenians affirmed their loyalty to the new government and in return 
received support for their aspirations in Turkish Armenia. 47 
The military, economic and social problems inherited by the Provisional government 
however proved insurmountable, culminating on 7 November 1917, with the Bolshevik 
45 `British Peace Terms. Prime Ministers Firm Speech', The Times, 30 June 1917. 
46 Hansard, XCVIII, HC, 6 November 1917, col. 2042-2050 and C, 20 December 1917, col. 2220. 47 Hovannisian, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 69-80. 
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coup. An assembly held later that day called for a `just and democratic' peace without 
annexations or indemnities and repudiated secret diplomacy, and in particular, the 
agreements made to apportion the spoils of war. Amongst these was the so-called Sykes- 
Picot agreement which allotted Syria, Cilicia and three of the Armenian provinces to 
France; Mesopotamia was to come under British control and Russia was to achieve its 
long-term goal of gaining Constantinople and the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus, 
together with the province of Trebizond, the remaining three Armenian provinces. 
The Armenians appear to have been aware of the agreement, since in October 1916 
Boghos Nubar had several meetings with both Sir Mark Sykes and Mr Picot, and soon 
after informed Bryce of their proposals. " With this in mind, Bryce attended the BAC's 
meeting in November 1916, to outline the proposals of the agreement in relation to 
Armenia and urged the committee not to undertake any form of propaganda in support 
of Armenian autonomy. In his view once the war was over the conditions would be 
more favourable to achieve their desires or at least sufficient to guarantee their security. 49 
Nevertheless, the Russian release of the full terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was 
a severe blow to Armenian desires for the creation of an autonomous and neutral state 
under the control and protection of the Allies, consisting of the six Armenian provinces 
together with western Cilicia to secure free access to the sea. so 
The Balfour Declaration 
The publication of the Sykes-Picot agreement altered the situation in the Middle East, as 
there no longer appeared to be aneed for Britain to support a large French sphere of interest. 
Balfour's declaration on 2 November 1917 that the British government `viewed[ed] with 
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people' ensured 
the support of Zionists for British control of the region. " Alternative explanations for 
48 Meeting of Boghos Nubar and Lord Bryce, 26 October 1916, in Boghos Nubars Papers ed. by 
Ghazarian, 387. 
49 BAC minutes, 14 November 1916, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506. 
50 The Armenian Question (A Brief Memorandum) by Boghos Nubar, in Boghos Nubar'r, ed. by 
Ghazarian, 71. 
51 There is an extensive body of literature on the genesis of the declaration, see for example Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958. 
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the declaration include Britain's acceptance of the Zionists' moral claims, the use of 
the Zionists to block French and Russian access to an area critical to British interests 
in Egypt and India, or as a means to gain support of Jews in Russia and America. " In 
contrast, while the Armenians could argue they too had a moral claim upon Britain, their 
territory was deemed expendable as the Sykes-Picot agreement had clearly illustrated. 
New impetus 
`A veritable Peace Bomb' 
The second Russian revolution of 1917 led to the clarification of the aims of the belligerents 
in an attempt to prove that despite appearances their intentions were not `imperialistic. ' 
However, before these official responses were made the following January, Lord 
Lansdowne issued a letter to the Daily Telegraph. This appeared on 29 November 1917, 
as a request for moderate war aims rather than the more disastrous `knock-out blow' 
favoured by Lloyd George. As foreign secretary to the earlier Conservative government, 
Lansdowne could command a certain degree of respect and had a year earlier circulated 
a memorandum to the Cabinet outlining his concerns over the situation in which Britain 
and her allies found themselves and advocating a negotiated peace. 53 
The timing of Lansdowne's letter coincided with the inter-Allied Conference that had 
just convened in Paris, with Colonel House as President Wilson's representative. The 
President was careful to stress that House was not on a peace mission as, despite his 
sympathy with the pacifists, Wilson was opposed to what he saw as `their stupidity. My 
heart is with them, but my mind has a contempt for them. I want peace, but I know how 
to get it and they do not. '54 On his return from the conference, Lloyd George informed the 
War Cabinet that `The Lansdowne letter had rendered it difficult to make any declaration, 
because a wrong impression might be conveyed to the country. '55 
52 Ibid., 130-147. 
53 For text of Lord Lansdowne's memorandum of 13 November 1916 and the Cabinets reaction see, 
Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 1,514-522. 
54 Quoted in The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. by Charles Seymour, (London: Ernest Benn 
Ltd, 1928), iii, 279. 
55 Quoted in Swartz, The Union of Democratic, 193 n76. 
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In the country, however, the Lansdowne letter was greeted with great enthusiasm, 
especially amongst the more radical and pacifist liberals. Ponsonby believed that the 
views of despised pacifists could now be seen to be the `rational view of an experienced 
statesman. '56 For Lady Courtney, it was `a veritable Peace bomb, ' consisting as it did 
of `sane discussion & suggestion'. 57 One response was the formation of a Lansdowne 
Committee by F. W. Hirst, who had been campaigning for a negotiated peace through 
his periodical Common Sense. Many leading internationalists, including Noel Buxton, 
and Hobson, signed an Address of Thanks to Lansdowne. 58 A series of public meetings 
followed, the first inFebruary 1918, was described as `the Lansdowne-Labour Conference', 
under the chairmanship of Lord Beauchamp. 59 Amongst those present were Wallas, Noel 
Buxton, Ponsonby, Gooch, Sir Arthur Pears, Lowes Dickinson, Hobson, and Nevinson, a 
gathering which demonstrated a degree of support for the Conservative peer's viewpoint 
amongst the liberal internationalists. 
The League and War Aims 
By the beginning of January 1918, Thomas Jones, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet 
Secretariat, observed that the atmosphere had `completely changed. Everybody is talking 
of peace. '6° The publication of war aims was seen to be more imperative as a counter- 
offensive to the vindictive peace proposals being made by Germany to Russia. On 5 
January Lloyd George outlined Britain's war aims to the Trades Union Conference. They 
included a great deal that found favour with the liberal internationalists, including support 
for the national aspirations of the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian, German and 
Turkish Empires, and his acceptance that an international organisation was required to 
settle international disputes, limit armaments and diminish the probability of war. 61 
56 Quoted in Ibid., 193. 
57 Catherine Courtney, Extracts from a Diary during the War (London: Printed for Private Circulation, 
1927), 141. 
58 Common Sense, 2 February 1918; For a discussion on the role of the Lansdowne letter see Robbins, 
The Abolition of War: The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919,151. 
59 Common Sense, 2 March 1918. 
60 Thomas Jones. Whitehall Diary, ed. by Keith Middlemass, (1969), I: 1916-1925,42. 
61 `British War Aims. Mr Lloyd George's Statement', The Times, 7 January 1918. 
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Wilson, long the champion of liberal internationalism, was to surpass this with his 
famous Fourteen Points speech on 8 January. He outlined a just and moderate settlement 
based upon the principles of open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, freedom and non- 
discrimination in trade, arms limitation, self-determination and an end to colonisation. 
The fourteenth point provided direct support for the League of Nations idea, through 
its call for the formation of an association of nations to provide mutual guarantees of 
political independence and territorial integrity to all states. 
With the added impetus provided by both the Lloyd George and Wilson speeches, the 
liberal internationalists actively engaged in the promotion of the league idea to the British 
public. They sought to get the backing from as many non-league groups as possible, 
and during 1917 and the early part of 1918, they had presented their vision to over 170 
meetings throughout the country. One of these was Williams' speech to the Co-operative 
Congress held in Liverpool in May 1918, which secured a unanimous resolution in favour 
of the League. As a sign of the times, the Labour Leader saw more significance in the fact 
that `not a single pro-war speech was made, while references to peace were vigorously 
applauded. '62 In response, the LNS prepared a series of publications to demonstrate 
public support, including resolutions issued by labour organisations, religious bodies, 
and the views of statesmen, from Allied, neutral and enemy countries who had expressed 
sympathy with the League idea. 63 
Official Consideration of the League 
Bryce had unsuccessfully attempted to get Wilson to convene an international group of 
jurists, diplomats and historians to study the various plans for a league. For Bryce, as 
for many liberal internationalists, it was imperative to consider all the options; Wilson 
however would not consider such an approach. 64 It fell to the individual groups officially 
62 The Labour Leader, 23 May 1918; for the attitude of Labour to the League see Winkler, The 
League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919,167-198. 
63 Examples include The Demand ofLabour for a League of Nations, (London: League of Nations 
Society Publication No. 25,1918); The Demand of the Churches for a League of Nations, 
(London: League of Nations Society Publication No. 33,1918); World-wide Support for a League 
of Nations.; see Winkler, The League of Nations Movement, 64-65. 
64 Viscount Bryce to Theodore Marburg, n. d [1 May 1918] & Woodrow Wilson to Theodore Marburg, 
6 May 1918, Development of the League of Nations Idea, ed. by Latan6,436-442. 
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sanctioned by the various governments, and groups such as the LNS to formulate how a 
League of Nations could and should function. 
The government in response to the changing attitudes set up the Phillimore Committee to 
consider a variety of schemes including those of the LNS, the Bryce Group, the American 
LEP, Leonard Woolf's Fabian Society proposals, the UDC, and L'Organisation Central 
pour une Paix Durable (The Hague). It considered none of these schemes as completely 
acceptable or practical. On 20 March, its interim report consisting of a draft convention 
for a league and an explanation of its provisions was presented to the Foreign Secretary. 
The final report was presented on 3 July 1918, but neither was published during the war 
because of opposition from President Wilson. " Despite this, copies of the report were 
made available to certain individuals, including Williams. 
The scheme proposed by the Phillimore Committee effectively incorporated the league 
within existing diplomacy. The result was little more than an alliance of nations or 
states based upon the existing wartime allies rather than the far-reaching vision of the 
internationalists. While the members would agree not to go to war with one another 
without submitting the dispute to arbitration, there was the possibility of being relieved 
of this provision, and no international court or tribunal was envisaged. This was a matter 
of concern to many pro-Leaguers, but as far as Cecil was concerned, any attempt to 
bind nations to submit to a tribunal would end in failure, as it would be impossible to 
construct one that could command sufficient confidence. 66 The Phillimore Committee 
envisaged a league that only came together at times of crisis, had no permanence and was 
in reality little more than a regulated Concert of Europe. Despite this, some parts of the 
report can be detected in the League of Nations Covenant, such as not resorting to war 
before arbitration, and economic sanctions. 67 Although never officially adopted by the 
government, it is indicative of the increasing attention the League idea was attracting. 
65 Winkler, The League of Nations Movement, 236. 
66 Lord Robert Cecil to Aneurin Williams, 29 June 1918, AWPAW/3/1/1. 
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Despite the grand statements made by President Wilson, Lloyd George was convinced 
that the British government had done far more than the Americans. In conversation 
with Lord Riddell, he cited the examples of the proposals prepared by the Phillimore 
Committee and also those by General Smuts. Apparently, `Wilson is very pleased with 
these and proposes to make them the basis of the constitution of the League. '68 
The 'Jingoes'and the `Cranks' 
A consequence of the increased support for the League idea was the rapid increase in LNS 
membership from around 400 in 1917 to 2,000 a year later. "' Amongst those attracted to 
the league idea and the LNS were a group of what Martin Ceadel terms `Government 
Supporters. 7° This group included the influential Major David Davies, a millionaire coal- 
owner and Liberal MP, former Parliamentary Private Secretary to Lloyd George, and 
`one of the peace movement's quirkiest figures. '" 
The arrival of Davies and fellow Liberal MP, Charles McCurdy, was to rekindle the 
debate over when the League should be formed. At the end of December 1917, Davies 
expressed his enthusiasm for the League to Thomas Jones, and demanded that `the Allies 
should immediately call a Convention, charged with the job of framing the machinery 
for the League. 7' Such a suggestion, however, was viewed as impracticable as those who 
would be competent for the job were fully engaged with winning the war. Undeterred, in 
January, Davies and McCurdy put their views to a private meeting of the LNS. While some 
prominent members were won over to their argument for the immediate establishment 
of a League of Nations between the Allies and the neutrals, it was decided to continue 
the current programme of building support for the League idea without committing to an 
exact date for its formation. 
68 The Riddell Diaries, 1908-1923, ed. by J. M. McEwen, (London: The Athlone Press, 1986), 254. 
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This attempt at compromise failed to satisfy Davies and his associates, who in April 
organised a `League' lunch at the Carlton Club, to which were invited various influential 
reporters and MPs. During the discussion his frustration over his failure to `galvanise 
[the LNS] into greater activity' became all too apparent as did his dissatisfaction with 
its `leading lights, ' Willoughby Dickinson and Williams. 71 Davies, it became apparent, 
had offered £5,000 for propaganda purposes and outlined a plan for an international 
scheme that would require around £20,000 per annum. However, the LNS were reluctant 
to undertake such a scheme as it feared being viewed as pacifist and had no desire to 
weaken the fighting spirit of the country. According to Thomas Jones, who was present 
at the luncheon, Davies' financial support convinced him that he was gaining control of 
the LNS, a prospect that alarmed many of its members. 74 
Another new addition to the LNS committee was the novelist H. G. Wells, who devoted 
his energies to preparing a general declaration of aims, which was to be presented to the 
forthcoming annual meeting. 75 This declaration was to exacerbate further the tensions 
within the LNS, with many of its founding members expressing concern over its tone 
and content, particularly its anticipation of the creation of a super state. 76 It advocated 
the immediate establishment of a League of free peoples for the ending of war, with the 
exception of defensive wars, and consequently, the establishment of a permanent Council 
to supervise and control the military and naval forces as well as the armament industries 
of the world. " This League of Allies and neutrals was to be a prelude to the ultimate 
formation of a worldwide league once the German people were free from their militarist 
government and had clearly relinquished their dreams of imperial conquest. 
73 Thomas Jones. Whitehall Diary, ed. by Middlemass, 61-2. 
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There was additionally the fear that the adoption of this declaration would irrevocably 
commit the LNS to the immediate formation of a League of Nations. '' Attempts to get 
Wells to redraft the more controversial sections of the declaration were not received 
favourably. 19 Events came to a head at the annual meeting on 14 June, with Hobson 
leading the opponents to amending the LNS constitution and structure. Following a very 
heated debate, which he lost, Wells `struck out as wildly as he could, and spat sarcasms 
at Williams and Hobson, ' enabling Virginia Woolf to state approvingly that `the jingoes 
were defeated by the cranks. '8° According to Margaret Cole, such a response from Wells 
was commonplace; over the years he resigned indignantly from the Fabians and the 
Labour Party as well as the League groups, as he was totally incapable of collaborating 
with others for a common goal. 81 
The annual meeting served to illustrate the tensions that had long existed within the 
League movement, between those willing to continue the painfully slow process of 
building support for an idea that to many seemed an idealistic or `utopian' aspiration, and 
those who saw the League as merely the Allied and Associate Powers incarnate. In an 
attempt to placate the disaffected parties, the LNS agreed to make significant changes in 
the procedures for electing its Council and Executive. Ultimately, this failed to appease 
either faction. Hobson, Brailsford and some other members feared that the new procedures 
would be undemocratic and effectively undermine the self-government of the society; 
they actively canvassed for Council members who would be acceptable to them. 82 At 
the same time, Wells, David Davies and McCurdy separated from the LNS and formed 
their own League group. It seems likely that the seeds for this new group were sown 
long before the `League Lunch' at the Carlton Club and that the annual meeting was the 
final straw since, after a dramatic exit, Wells was found `caballing' with McCurdy and J. 
78 Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson to Willoughby H. Dickinson, 4 June [1918], WHDP, c403,118. 
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A. Spender. 83 Just ten days later, the League of Free Nations Association (LFNA) came 
into being. The new rival society advocated the immediate formation of the League of 
Nations amongst the Entente Powers. In the run-up to the formation of the LFNA, Davies 
and his colleagues did all they could to foment dissatisfaction and suspicion amongst 
the League's supporters. Consequently, many previously supportive of the LNS and its 
objective increasingly sought to dissociate themselves. The Conservative, Arthur Steel- 
Maitland, was led to believe that `the direction of the Society was practically collared 
by the Pacifist section of it. '84 On further enquiry the source of his information became 
apparent when he naively admitted, `I have not the least doubt that David Davies is quite 
candid and honest in what he tells me. '85 
While the LNS had failed on at least two occasions to persuade the Oxford classicist, 
Gilbert Murray to become a member, the LFNA succeeded in securing his support as its 
chairman. 86 Its direction and finances were clearly under Davies' control and one of its 
first actions was to issue Wells' rejected declaration under the LFNA's name and initiate a 
campaign for the immediate formation of the League. 87 The Association however, shared 
similar aims to the LNS and not surprisingly, the structure of their League reflected the 
ongoing discussions within both the LNS and other interested parties. 
The LFNA plans contained several significant oversights: firstly, the immediate formation 
of an Allies-based League would make it difficult if not impossible for the Central Powers 
to join after the war, additionally neutral states would be unable to join a League of Allies 
while the war was still ongoing. Secondly, the very fact its members were at war would 
require a completely different constitution from the one they were advocating, which was 
more suitable for a world at peace with itself. 
Hobson made some of these points to Gilbert Murray in the run-up to the disastrous 
June meeting: if `we claimed that our Alliance be now constituted a League of Nations, 
83 The Diaries of Virginia Woolf, ed. by Bell, 157. 
84 Arthur Steel-Maitland to Willoughby H. Dickinson, 19 June 1918, WHDP, c403, fl 15. 
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we virtually force the Central Powers into regarding as a permanent necessity their 
own Central Europe, & we declare a state of economic war between these two leagues 
afterwards. '88 Germany, he concluded, would never be able to join such a league; the only 
real possibility of future security was if she was included from the beginning. The 
day 
after the annual meeting, he again outlined his concerns to Murray: while he regarded 
Germany's `actions in the summer of 1914 as criminal in the extreme [... ] I have not 
been able to accept your defence of British and French diplomacy before the war. '89 
Consequently, he admitted `I see Germany black, but other Powers not white but varying 
shades of grey. ' 
The division was potentially disastrous; the sending of mixed messages to the British 
public could seriously dilute or even weaken opinion in favour of a League of Nations. 
However, even before the Association held its first public meeting on 13 September in 
Northampton, a meeting of representatives of the LNS and LFNA had been convened; 
Willoughby Dickinson, Raymond Unwin, Woolf and Williams represented the former, 
while Murray, Spender, McCurdy and Spalding represented the latter. The intention was 
to form either one amalgamated society or close co-operation and joint propaganda. 90 
The conflict over when to form the League remained. The LNS's willingness to delay its 
formation until after the war was supported by Balfour and Cecil. 91 Cecil's position was 
that the mechanics of the League needed to be fully considered first and that impulsive 
action now could frustrate its universal extension. Despite this, a joint statement was 
prepared which would be acceptable to both groups, the conclusion of which was that a 
true League could only be formed after the war was concluded, but a similar organisation 
among the allies could be formed beforehand provided it did not call itself the `League 
of Nations. ' This approach was supported by Balfour, on 1 August, in a statement to the 
House of Commons: `do not call your Allied combination a League of Nations; otherwise 
you will never have a League of Nations at all. '92 For Hobson the `League now' advocates 
88 J. A. Hobson to Gilbert Murray, 19 May 1918, GMP, MS36, f183-6- 
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were being naive to assume that it would not be seen as a League of victors, especially 
by the Germans. 93 
The principal argument supporting amalgamation was the prospect of obtaining the 
patronage of influential individuals and providing one coherent voice. While the LFNA 
was able to command strong Conservative support, the LNS had at its disposal the left- 
wing `services of such able exponents of the League policy as Mr Lowes Dickinson, Mr 
Brailsford and Mr J. A. Hobson. '94 David Davies once again demonstrated his frustration 
by questioning the need for the amalgamation discussions, while continuing to plan the 
LFNA's inaugural public meeting. On 28 August, he instructed Murray to stop laying too 
much stress upon the importance of the LNS, and that the work of the LFNA should not 
be hampered by `endless discussion with Sir Willoughby and Aneurin Williams. '95 
Of the two, it was Williams that Davies particularly targeted, regularly complaining he 
was difficult to work with and incorrectly stating that he had killed `more good movements 
than any one person. '96 It is difficult to identify exactly what Davies was referring to 
since Williams, as well as being instrumental in the development of the British League 
movement, was a leading figure in a variety of other organisations that showed no sign 
of a premature demise. By 1932 his opinion was more complementary; he now described 
Williams as an optimist `whose enthusiasm, zeal and self-sacrifice knew no bounds. 
He set us all a noble example of devotion to duty and faith in the ultimate destiny of 
mankind. '97 
However, in 1918 Williams was closely associated with Hobson, Brailsford and the 
Buxton's, whose left-wing credentials were viewed as undesirable to Davies' grand vision. 
This association may have led to a misunderstanding of his motives, but as Willoughby 
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Dickinson pointed out `the feeling against him is very ill-founded. People seem to think 
he is a Pacifist (whatever that may mean) but that is quite untrue. He is as militant in this 
war as D[avid] D[avies] himself "I Despite this Davies was insistent that his `sphere of 
activities in the new body will I trust be carefully curtailed. ' 
The major driving force behind the merger of the two societies was former Foreign 
Secretary, Viscount Grey of Fallodon. The LFNA sought his consent to be their President, 
however he insisted he would only do so if they were united as a single organisation. His 
position as an elder statesman and early advocate of the League idea made him an ideal 
candidate. '°° In September a joint amalgamation committee consisting of Willoughby 
Dickinson, Lowes Dickinson, F. N. Keen, Raymond Unwin, Williams and Woolf for the 
financially weak LNS, and Davies, Murray, McCurdy, J. A. Spender, Wickham Stead and 
H. G. Wells for the financially secure LFNA met to discuss merger terms. These were 
to lead to the formation of the League of Nations Union (LNU), which to all intents and 
purposes was essentially the LFNA: the chairman, acting secretary, office and the aims 
and objects were all from the LFNA while the LNS provided the bulk of the membership. 
Despite Davies' assertions that the LNS were pacifists, a ballot of the membership 
produced an overwhelming 93 percent in favour of accepting these terms. '°' 
One of the final acts of the LNS was the publication of its Scheme of Organisation, which 
as Henry Winkler points out was the nearest the LNS came to issuing an official proposal 
for a League of Nations. "' Their League was to consist of a Supreme Court, Council 
of Conciliation, a Conference, and an administrative committee, thereby incorporating 
aspects of the earlier Williams and Unwin Schemes of International Organisation, 
together with those of the Bryce Group. At the same time, a meeting was organised 
under the auspices of both the LNS and the LFNA with Viscount Grey in the chair. The 
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meeting held on 10 October attracted more people than the Central Hall and the adjacent 
Caxton Hall in Westminster could accommodate. 103 During his speech, Grey outlined his 
support for the establishment of a League of Nations, but said this should occur as soon 
as possible after the termination of the present conflict. For this reason discussion over 
its structure, functions and powers should commence immediately in order to ensure 
its swift establishment. This speech was of great importance for the League of Nations 
movement; virtually all the press covered it and, importantly, it was received favourably. 
This was in effect the last curtain call for the two societies, which would just three days 
before the Armistice unite as the LNU. It also marked the first public appearance of Grey 
since the start of Lloyd George's premiership. '°4 
Afterthreeyears ofcautious campaigning and discussions, the LNS's liberal internationalist 
vision for a League of Nations was closer to reality; the impending Peace Conference had 
rendered the dispute over the timing of its formation irrelevant. The LNU successfully 
persuaded high profile individuals to become honorary presidents, including Asquith, 
Balfour and Lloyd George and subsequently became one of the most successful interwar 
peace groups. 
The General Election 
Before more thought could be given to the formation of a League of Nations and a 
world influenced by President Wilson's Fourteen Points, Lloyd George announced the 
forthcoming general election. The Liberal government elected in December 1910 had 
in effect ceased in May 1915, with the creation of a coalition government. Asquith had 
continued as Prime Minister until displaced by Lloyd George in December 1916, though 
he remained leader of the Liberal Party. In December 1918, Lloyd George therefore 
sought the approbation of the Country as leader of a coalition with the Conservatives. 
Lloyd George and the Conservative leader Andrew Bonar Law subsequently jointly 
103 `League Of Nations, Viscount Grey On The Problem', The Times, 11 October 1918. 
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endorsed their preferred candidates, which included only 159 Liberals. 
Neither Williams, 
Noel Buxton nor many of the liberal internationalists received the `coupon' as 
it became 
dubbed. 
On the 12 November Lloyd George had announced to a specially selected audience 
of Liberals at 10 Downing Street that `In my judgement, the League of Nations is an 
absolute essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the Peace Conference to guarantee 
that the League of Nations is a reality705 He also stated that the League would be required 
to protect the small nations, which had been reborn from covetous neighbours. Ten days 
later in their joint manifesto, Lloyd George and Bonar Law promised that it would be `the 
earnest endeavour of the Coalition government to promote the formation of a League of 
Nations. "" Despite this, it rapidly became relegated to the background as the electorate 
responded more favourably to calls for the prosecution of the Kaiser and stringent 
reparations. Interestingly, Lloyd George's speech on 12 November had also insisted that 
the British delegation to the Peace Conference would be one in favour of a `just peace, ' 
and not for revenge and greed. 
The electorate had more than doubled by the extension of the franchise to all adult males 
and women over 30 years of age who satisfied a modest property qualification. This 
increase was in response to the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform, to which both 
Williams and Willoughby Dickinson belonged. Williams successfully contested his seat 
against the coalition candidate as well as Labour, while Buxton stood unsuccessfully as 
a Lib-Lab candidate. 107 
The importance of the League was never a major issue during the election; all the parties 
supported it, the majority of the British public and even the press. The LNU issued a 
great deal of literature during the election period, explaining its objectives, outlining the 
various schemes and clearly explaining the need for the League of Nations. They also 
105 The Times, 13 November 1918. 
106 The Times, 22 November 1918. 
107 His return to Parliament would have to wait until 1922, when he regained his old seat of North 
Norfolk as a Labour candidate. 
186 
surveyed 1,500 Parliamentary candidates, to ascertain their views and this indicated that 
538 were in agreement with the League idea, with only one against. "' Also a high-level 
deputation was received by President Wilson at the American Embassy in London on 
28 December, headed by Grey, and consisted of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Asquith, 
Bryce, Willoughby Dickinson and Gilbert Murray. Everything appeared to be in place 
for the forthcoming Peace Conference; the League idea was widely accepted and had the 
backing of leading statesmen who had also made public pronouncements in favour of 
liberating the oppressed Armenians. 
108 The Times, 14 December 1918; World-wide Support for a League of Nations. WHDP, c406, f133 
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10 
A new international order? 1919-1922 
With the election over, the attention of the government and the liberal internationalists 
turned to the forthcoming Peace Conference in Versailles. Also converging on Paris 
were the representatives of those nationalities that wanted independence based upon the 
notion of self-determination, and various international League groups. The latter sought 
to arrive at a joint programme to present to the Peace Conference. Groups from France, 
Britain, America, Italy, Belgium, Romania, Serbia and China met under the presidency 
of M. Leon Bourgeois, who had headed the French governmental Commission that 
recommended a `Societe des Nations. " The proposals, which emerged from five days of 
discussion, called for the establishment as soon as possible of a League of free peoples 
for submitting disputes, and preventing war. ' Much of the agreed programme reflected 
the existing LNU policy, including the control of the armaments industries. A deputation 
headed by Bourgeois then presented these to the `Big Four'. 
The LNS had encouraged such international co-operation from its earliest days. Cross- 
fertilisation was especially strong between the British and American groups, which helped 
establish a similarity in approach through the sharing of ideas and the fostering of an 
intellectual debate over the merits of the League. As much as possible it also developed 
the frank exchange of views with similar societies in other countries. As chairman of 
the International Co-operation Alliance Williams was able to promote the League idea 
amongst co-operators within both Allied and neutral countries, and the International Co- 
1 `League of Nations Union, Joint Programme for the establishment of a League of Nations', Paris, 
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operative Bulletin readily promoted the League idea. At the same time, Lowes Dickinson 
worked closely with a Dutch anti-war society to ensure its policy closely resembled those 
of the British pro-league groups-' In February 1918, Williams had travelled to Paris in an 
attempt to popularise the League idea in France. His presentation to an audience organised 
by the Ligue pour une Societe des Nations was well received, but as George Noble 
observes the Ligue was neither very representative nor properly organised! However, on 
10 November 1918 the Association Francaise pour la Societe des Nations was formed 
along similar lines to the British and American groups. 
Cecil was one of the liberal internationalists' greatest assets who had long shown far more 
interest in the League's potential than his ministerial colleagues. His position within the 
British section of the League of Nations Commission ideally placed him to support those 
promoting the League idea in Britain. As George Egerton has observed, Cecil's careful 
manipulation ensured the Covenant was closer to the `Wilsonian' League than the British 
government ever envisaged. ' 
The League of Nations Covenant 
The majority of liberal internationalists welcomed the Draft Covenant as a significant 
step forward for international co-operation and the fostering of peace among nations. The 
LNU's executive declared itself satisfied since the Covenant was: 
Capable of bringing about such a world government as will guarantee 
the freedom of nations, act as trustee and guardian of uncivilised races 
and underdeveloped territories, maintain international order, and, 
finally, liberate mankind from the curse of war. 6 
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The League consisted of an Assembly, a Council and a Permanent Secretariat. The 
Assembly was composed of representatives of all member states, while the Council 
consisted of two types of members: the Great Powers as permanent members and 
rotating non-permanent members. Each state had one vote in the Assembly, the members 
of the Council also had one vote, and unanimity of the members present was required 
for political decisions. This meant in practice that the Great Powers could ensure the 
Council's decisions were not detrimental to their own national interests. Its real strength 
lay in its working in unison as a collective body; however where the interests of one of 
the Powers were affected the division rendered it ineffectual. 
Liberal internationalists and the Covenant 
Despite Cecil's best endeavours, the Covenant ultimately fell short of the expectations 
of large numbers of those who had long championed the League idea. Ironically, the 
Covenant had emerged from secret negotiations, the very thing they had hoped the League 
would eradicate. Added to this was its integration into a vengeful Peace Treaty and the 
exclusion of both Germany and Soviet Russia, thereby dashing hopes of an inclusive 
League of all nations. The League sought to maintain the territorial status quo but there 
was to be a procedure for changing frontiers peacefully. Two key principles of the League 
were its intention to prevent a revival of German militarism and self-determination. 
However, without the guiding hand of America, the League was subjected to the differing 
whims of Britain and France and their interpretations of these twin principles. Liberal 
internationalists had long recognised the importance of America joining the League, 
without it there was the danger that `a League would be at best a revived concert of the 
Great Powers of Europe, liable at any time to split into rival groups. '' 
Liberal internationalists were particularly critical of what had been created at Versailles. 
As far as Hobhouse was concerned, Wilson should have put a bullet through his head 
rather than sign, while Bryce could `remember few cases in history where negotiations 
7 Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, 351. 
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might have done so much good, and have done so much evil. '$ H. G. Wells who called 
the League a `sham world parliament' was particularly disappointed that it had failed 
to live up to the ideals he and others had set it. 9 While, in The International Anarchy, 
1904-1914, Lowes Dickinson outlined the view of many internationalists that the Treaty 
of Versailles was: 
Conceived on the traditional lines aiming at the weakening of the 
defeated enemy and the strengthening of the victors by transferences 
of territory and the indemnities which, in this case, were (... ] so 
absurd. " 
He concluded that salvation was only possible through the establishment of a truly 
international League, which could oversee the equitable distribution of raw materials, 
abandonment of protective policies, genuine disarmament and protection for `discontented 
minorities'. 1I The liberal internationalists were not alone in their criticisms of the League; 
even the leading statesmen behind its creation were sceptical. In August 1919, Lloyd 
George confided to Lord Riddell that `The League, I am sorry to say, is a humbug and 
a sham. "2 While Wilson, shortly before his death, confided to his close friend Barney 
Baruch that `Countries like France and Italy are unsympathetic to such an organisation. 
Time and sinister happenings may eventually convince them that some such scheme is 
required. It may not be my scheme. It may be some other. I see now, however, that my 
plan was premature. The world was not ripe for it. '13 
8 The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 1911-1928, ed. by Trevor Wilson, (London: Collins, 1970), 374 
& 380. 
9 H. G. Wells, Experiment in autobiography : discoveries and conclusions of a very ordinary brain 
(since 1866) (London: Victor Gollancz, 1934), 611. 
10 G. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 1904-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1926), 489. 
11 Ibid., 492. 
12 The Riddell Diaries, 1908-1923, ed. by McEwen, 289. 
13 Ibid., 389. 
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Self-determination and the Mandate System 
One particular hope the liberal internationalists expressed was that the League of Nations 
could untangle centuries of suspicion, mistrust, and provide a lasting settlement that took 
notice of what indigenous people actually wanted. Two conflicting possibilities were 
open now to settle the Eastern Question: the first was to redistribute the former Turkish 
provinces amongst those states, which had supported the Allies; or, second, recognise 
the rights of the different ethnicities within these provinces and enable them to determine 
their own destinies. Naturally, liberal internationalists favoured the latter option based as 
it was upon the idea of nationality and self-determination, which they believed would be 
a guiding principle of the peace settlement. 
Mandates 
The historiography relating to the development of the Mandate System is particularly 
rich, but is primarily concerned with the former German colonies in Africa, and clearly 
illustrates that its purpose was to diminish the imperialistic competition of the old 
order in an attempt to help keep the peace. 14 The official statements in favour of the 
liberation of `peoples everywhere' were important to the formulation of trusteeship and 
international mandates. Such ideas were not entirely new and examples can be found in 
various international agreements made during the nineteenth century, such as that of the 
Berlin Africa Conference of 1885.15 
By the end of 1916, liberal internationalists had achieved a consensus regarding trusteeship. 
Working together with the Labour movement, they ensured it enjoyed sufficient currency 
for it to be taken up by General Smuts, and subsequently by President Wilson. 16 Smuts 
was introduced to the idea of trusteeship through the liberal imperialist Round Table, 
14 For a detailed study of the operation of the Mandate system in Africa see, Michael D Callahan, 
Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931 (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 1999); see also, Quincy Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations 
(Chicago, IL.: The University of Chicago Press, 1930) and H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, 
Dependencies and Trusteeship, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Studies in the 
Administration of International Law and Organisation (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1948). 
15 See Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, 18,92-3. 
16 Smuts was a friend of Hobson and was an important figure in the acceptance of liberal 
internationalist thought; see also Winkler, The League of Nations Movement, 206-19. 
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whose editor, Lionel Curtis, was a former member of Lord Milner's kindergarten in 
Southern Africa, and member of the League of Nations Union's research committee. In 
The League of Nations, a Practical Suggestion (1918), Smuts proposed the introduction 
of an international system of mandates over the former territories of the vanquished 
Powers, a system animated by the concept of a moral duty to develop them in the best 
interests of the indigenous peoples. "An important aspect of this scheme was the notion of 
tutelage for those areas, which were unable to govern themselves. Self-government was 
applicable to the former territories of Turkey and Austria-Hungary, but not Germany's 
former colonies as they were considered to be in too barbarous a state. Perhaps from 
direct experience he did not advocate a policy of annexation, but a system based upon 
self-determination or supervision with the consent of the people. His vision was for the 
League of Nations to assume international authority for these territories, but delegate the 
everyday administration to another state, which would act as its agent or mandatory. This 
was to incorporate the ideas of trusteeship, and equal opportunity for all. 
For President Wilson, the prospect of the Allies absorbing the conquered German and 
Turkish territories was not acceptable. For a staunch anti-imperialist, the policy of 
annexation was one to be avoided at all cost. His stubborn refusal to accept the extension 
of European imperialism, forced the Allies to consider suitable alternatives to outright 
annexation. The only real options were the products of liberal internationalist ideas and 
discussion: trusteeship administered by a League of Nations. Wilson therefore suggested 
that Smuts' Practical Suggestion should form the basis of the discussions at the Peace 
Conference, but with the addition of the German colonies outside Europe. '8 As a result, in 
March 1918, Sir Mark Sykes reported that, without the President's support, agreements 
such as the one made with his French counterpart M. Picot would not carry much weight 
at the forthcoming Peace conference. Importantly, `The consent of the governed and the 
consent of the world are essential to any form of foreign influence or control over an 
emancipated people. " 
17 J. C. Smutts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1918). 
18 Ibid., 227. 
19 Quoted in Andrew J Crozier, `The Establishment of the Mandates System, 1919-1925: Some 
Problems created by the Paris Peace Conference', Journal of Contemporary History, 14, no. 3 
(July 1979), 484. 
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On 30 January, the Council of Ten adopted a resolution, which utilised Smuts ideas as a 
starting point from which to prepare its own text 2° Interestingly, this resolution contained 
the explicit statement that due to: 
The historic misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the 
terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied 
and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, 
and Kurdestan, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from 
the Turkish Empire. 
Significantly, the final text did not incorporate this particular paragraph. The resolution 
envisaged the tutelage of those peoples unable to stand by themselves, by `advanced' 
nations as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations. It also recognised that certain 
parts of the Turkish Empire were in such an advanced state that given relevant advice and 
assistance they could become independent nations in their own right. The latter point was 
viewed as a favourable signal towards Armenian aspirations. 
For liberal internationalists, the mandates system logically complemented the 
establishment of a new system of international co-operation and would provide the ideal 
mechanism for territories to be administered and protected from undue exploitation, and 
ultimately lead to their full independence. The final mandates system was by necessity 
a compromise between the joint idealism of British radicals and socialists, supported 
by the Americans, and the desire of the French who wished to retain control over the 
recently conquered middle-east territories. " The former German colonies, together with 
the Ottoman Empire's Middle Eastern provinces would become `Mandates', administered 
by individual Allied countries that were in turn accountable to the League of Nations 
Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), comprised of ten members, four of which 
were from the mandatory Powers. 
20 The full text is quoted in David Hunter Miller, `The Origin of the Mandates System', Foreign 
Affairs: An American Quarterly Review, 6, no. 1/4 (1927), 284-285. 
21 See Crozier, `The Establishment of the Mandates System, 1919-1925', 483. 
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The League Council created the PMC to supervise the mandates system through the 
analysis of the annual reports provided by the mandatory Powers. The report was in 
reality a questionnaire to which the mandatory Powers answered in a yes/no fashion or 
with very vague responses. While it nominally represented the principle of international 
supervision, in practice the ambiguities allowed the Mandatory a great deal of latitude 
in their interpretation. In addition, the influence the PMC was able to exert upon the 
Mandatory Powers was limited to the threat of public criticism and utilising the inherent 
ambiguities to its own advantage. 22 
In January 1919, the Council of Four approved the Mandate system, which was 
subsequently enshrined in Article 22 of the League Covenant. The aims of mandation 
were to: a) assist the people so that at some future point they would be able to govern 
themselves as an independent nation, and b) to ensure that the Mandatory Power would not 
undertake the economic exploitation for its exclusive benefit, the `open-door' principle. 
As the former colonial or dependent territories were in different stages of development, 
three different forms of Mandates were recognised based upon European definitions of 
development or modernisation. 
Class `A' mandates were those territories, which had `reached a stage of development 
where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised. ' The 
mandatory power would offer administrative advice and assistance as required, but not 
direct government. All were former Ottoman territories: Britain overseeing Mesopotamia 
(Iraq) and Palestine, and France being responsible for Lebanon and Syria. There were 
some similarities with the earlier Sykes-Picot agreement, but one notable exception was 
Armenia. 
Class `B' mandates were primarily former German territories in Central Africa. As these 
had not reached an advanced stage of development, the Mandatory Powers would be 
responsible for their administration, subject to guarantees of freedom of conscience and 
22 See Callahan, Mandates and Empire, 6. 
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religion while abuses such as slavery, arms and liquor trafficking were to be outlawed. In 
addition, they were to ensure that trading was open to all League members and that land 
transfers were conducted in the interests of the indigenous people. These undeveloped 
territories included the British mandates of Tanganyika and parts of Togoland and the 
Cameroons, while the French mandates covered the remainder of Togoland and the 
Cameroons. Ruanda-Urundi became the responsibility of Belgium. In practice, this 
acknowledged the wartime partition of German territories amongst Britain, France and 
Belgium. 
Class `C' mandates were territories in South-West Africa and the South Pacific islands. 
These were deemed to be even less developed than those in Class `B', and as a result it 
was believed they `can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral 
portions of its territory. ' They were to be subject to the same safeguards as Class `B' 
mandates. This administration as integral to the Mandatory was seen as a compensation 
to the British dominions for their vital role during the war. New Guinea and Nauru passed 
to Australia; Samoa to New Zealand; South-West Africa (now Namibia) went to South 
Africa; and Germany's former Pacific island possessions north of the equator came under 
the control of Japan. 
The different classes came into force over a twenty-month period, the less controversial 
class `C' mandates were approved in December 1920, Class `B' followed in September 
1921 and class `A' despite being assigned at the San Remo Conference in May 1920 had 
to wait until the conclusion of the Turko-Greek war in July 1922. The delay was also in 
part caused by the United States, as a non-League member, attempting to ensure it had 
equal rights to the mandates and in particular the potential oil in Mesopotamia23 
Criticism of the Mandate System 
In Oppressed People and the League ofNations, Noel Buxton together with T. P. Conwell- 
Evans give an in-depth analysis of the role of the League in establishing the Mandates 
23 See Crozier, `The Establishment of the Mandates System, 1919-1925', 497. 
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System in relation to the principles of self-determination. Having witnessed the `evils 
of imperialism', they saw the principle of self-determination as the primary method 
by which the exploited peoples could remove the shackles of empire. In line with the 
anti-imperialist views of their pro-Boer predecessors, they recognised that imperialism 
was inherently an infliction of both physical and moral cruelty upon subjected peoples, 
whose resources of labour and raw materials were regarded as the private property of the 
imperialistic power. 24 
Despite President Wilson and other liberal internationalists' desire to prevent the 
annexation of territory, the Mandate System had allowed this to happen in all but name. 
Brailsford observed it was hardly surprising that it should operate imperialistically when 
the League's `Council is dominated by the great imperial powers [... ] When you compose 
your governing council of the empire themselves, inevitably the interests of empire, the 
assumptions of empire, the ethics of empire will govern [... ] its decisions. '21 As a result, 
many Americans believed that the Mandates system was being manipulated in such a way 
to allow the Europeans to annex new territory under the guise of self-determination. 26 
Why, they asked, was Britain so willing to assume new burdens in Mesopotamia, 
Palestine, and elsewhere, where there was a promise of material advantage, but not to 
take the burden of Armenia. 
One issue of great concern to Arnold Toynbee was the `Western Question': that is the 
influence of Western attitudes upon traditional non-Western societies. " In the Mandate 
System, he recognised the imposition of western legal institutions and western conceptions 
of identity upon the rest of the world. Self-determination was creating nationhood along 
ethnic lines. As a result, Toynbee claimed, the Middle East was emulating the Western 
24 See Buxton and Conwell-Evans, Oppressed People and the League of Nations, 21. 
25 Quoted in Quincy Wright, `The Mandates System and Public Concern', Southwestern Political and 
Social Science Quarterly, 9, no. 4 (March 1929), 395. 
26 For example see Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin co, 1921), 149-61. 
27 See Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of 
Civilisations (London: Constable & Co. Ltd, 1922), 5. 
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European ideal of nationality based upon religious and linguistic homogeneity. 28 The 
liberal internationalists recognised certain inherent dangers of such a change. The most 
compelling recent examples were the Balkan Wars and the `Turkification' policy, which 
had resulted in massacre, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Where once the populations 
were intermixed and interdependent upon each other, now they were estranged, each 
competing for self-government. 
For Buxton, the role of the League was to ensure that the interference by the imperial 
powers was kept within `legitimate limits, ' that is the avoidance of cruel practices and 
the exploitation of the people and their resources. 29 Without an international mechanism, 
there were fears that narrow nationalistic aims would soon supersede the higher moral 
aspirations proclaimed by the Allied leaders during the war, and ultimately a return to the 
historic practice of annexation. 
In his pamphlet Mandates and Empire, Woolf recognised in Article 22 the potential 
to revolutionise the relationship between the western industrial nations and the less 
developed ones. 30 Primarily concerned as it was with Africa, his pamphlet stressed 
the points that would become LNU policy, namely the protection of indigenous land 
ownership and the investment of profits in the education of the population to ensure the 
eventual achievement of self-government. 
The lack of safeguards within the system was of serious concern to those with an interest 
in the peoples it was supposed to help. Both Williams and Noel Buxton independently 
suggested the use of `inspectors' who were well acquainted with the mandates to undertake 
periodic inspections and report to the League directly, thereby introducing a form of 
supervision that the current system lacked. 31 For Williams this would help establish the 
League as a guardian of the oppressed, while Buxton envisaged the extension of inspection 
28 Ibid., 15-16; This issue is taken up further in Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality & the War, (London: J. 
M. Dent & Sons, 1915). 
29 Buxton and Conwell-Evans, Oppressed People and the League of Nations, 52. 
30 See Leonard Woolf, Mandates and Empire (London: League of Nations Union, 1920). 
31 Aneurin Williams, `Armenia, British Pledges and the Near East', Contemporary Review, 121 (1922) 
424; Buxton and Conwell-Evans, Oppressed People and the League of Nations, 67 & 69-70. 
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to include `all weak peoples under alien sway', thereby overseeing the colonial `native' 
policies of Britain, France and Japan amongst others. 
Liberal internationalism and the Mandate System 
While the BAC and the BC were primarily concerned with how self-determination could 
be applied to Armenia, the LNU sought to influence how the system would work for 
the benefit of all the Mandated territories and not just for the Mandatory Powers. As a 
result, in June 1920 the LNU set up a mandates committee to prepare what it considered 
model legislation for the administration of the mandates. Amongst its members were 
Gilbert Murray, Arnold J. Toynbee, J. H. Harris, and Leonard Woolf. Its first chairman 
was Major W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, who was to be Britain's initial representative on the 
PMC. His successor at the PMC was Lord Lugard, an advisor to the LNU's mandates 
committee. 
The function of the sub-committee was to prepare its own mandate texts with the view of 
getting the League to accept them instead of the drafts prepared by the Allies. This was 
an attempt to inject a degree of impartiality into the system, a system controlled by the 
Supreme Council and not the League Assembly. Their hopes were to develop a system of 
international administration that would help maintain the post-war peace and provide the 
basis for the ultimate reformation of European imperialism. 
The LNU concern for the indigenous peoples within the mandates was primarily of a 
humanitarian nature. Concerns were expressed relating to improvements in their social 
and economic status particularly within the `B' mandates. Through the process of 
education and training, they hoped a system of self-government could be developed for 
the benefit of all inhabitants in a mandated territory, regardless of race. 32 
They also stated that all land not legally held, be considered indigenous land to be 
managed solely for the benefit of the people. They further suggested that all revenue 
32 Executive Committee Minutes, 1920-1921,13 Jan. 1921, BLPES: League of Nations Union Papers 
(henceforth LNU) f2/3,29-30. 
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generated in the mandate be used to improve conditions within it, and not for the benefit 
of the mandatory power. 33 The idea that the indigenous people should be responsible for 
their own resources but aided and protected from exploitation by the Mandatory Power 
was in line with Hobson's views of two decades earlier. In Imperialism, he offered the 
observation that if left to exploit their natural resources: 
Undisturbed by the importunate and arrogant control of foreign nations 
[... ] they would let loose a horde of private adventurers, slavers, piratical 
traders, treasure hunters, concession mongers, who, animated by mere 
greed of gold or power, would set about the work of exploitation under 
no public control and with no regard to the future; playing havoc with 
the political, economic, and moral institutions of the peoples, instilling 
civilised vices and civilised diseases, importing spirits and firearms as 
the trade of readiest acceptance, fostering internecine strife for their 
own political and industrial purposes, and even setting up private 
despotisms sustained by organised armed forces. '3a 
The presence of MPs within their executive committees allowed the various groups to keep 
the pressure on the government. For the LNU, the former Cabinet minister Lord Robert 
Cecil and W. A. G. Ormsby-Gore regularly raised questions in the House of Commons as 
to why the League had not yet issued the mandates. On 24 June 1920, Cecil attempted to 
get Lloyd George to outline the situation regarding the position of the Supreme Council 
in the setting up of the Armenian mandate. 35 The lacklustre response led to his publicly 
outlining his concerns with the government's professed policy towards the mandates and 
his fears that a blatant disregard for the League's supervisory role would lead to a return 
to `the bad old days of conquest and exploitation. "' 
33 Executive Committee Minutes, 1920-1921,13 Jan. 1921, LNU f2/3,29-30. 
34 Hobson, Imperialism, 230. 
35 Hansard, 130, HC, 24 June 1920, col. 2363. 
36 `Mandates: A Duty to the League of Nations', The Times, 25 June 1920. 
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Armenian representation in Paris 
Failure to obtain representation was one of the greatest frustrations to the Armenians 
gathered in Paris. The disappointment felt over their exclusion was outlined by Boghos 
Nubar, who contended that, as a consequence of the massacres and their fighting, with 
France in Anatolia and Russia in the Caucasus, `Armenia's tribute to death is thus 
undoubtedly heavier in proportion than that of any other belligerent nation. '37 In outlining 
the important part they had played in the war he stressed that `having of their own free 
will cast in their lot with the champions of right and justice, the victory of the Allies 
over the common enemies has secured to them a right of independence. ' Their failure to 
gain admittance however, was according to Robert Cecil, because they `represented an 
aspiration and not an established state. '38 The only options open to them were to present 
their case individually to the various delegations in Paris and the Secretariat General. The 
presence of different bodies attempting to speak for the Armenian people complicated 
the situation. Not only did a delegation headed by M. Aharonion represent the Russian 
Armenians of the Erivan Republic, there were initially two representing the Turkish 
Armenians. The first was Boghos Nubar's AND and the second headed by `General' 
Torcour who had unilaterally issued a declaration of Armenian independence in Erzerum 
in February 1918.39 In an attempt to avoid the dilution of the Armenian message, Williams 
had a meeting with General Torcom in December 1918 while he was in London seeking 
international recognition. The possibility of two voices claiming to speak for Turkish 
Armenia would, he felt, be fatal, especially as it would be difficult enough getting 
the most moderate claims accepted. 40 Ultimately, just two delegations represented the 
Armenians in Paris, those headed by Boghos Nubar and M. Aharonion. In February 1919, 
the Armenians submitted a joint memorandum to the Peace Conference, which outlined 
their territorial claims and a request for economic and financial support. The extent of 
this claim can be seen in Figure 10.1, and included the Erivan Republic plus a significant 
proportion of Anatolia, stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. 
37 `The Rights of Armenia', The Times, 30 January 1919; `Letter to The Times', 24 January 1919, 
ADNA, Masse 1/14. 
38 Quoted in Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 4 February 1919, JBP, MS205, f14. 
39 For a translation of Torcom's declaration see `Armenian Independence Proclamation Act', 31 
Januaryto 13 February 1918, JBP, MS204, f178-182. 
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Figure 10.1: Proposed boundaries for an Armenian homeland, 1919 
Mandate for Armenia 
One important limitation of the Mandate System was the Allies' fixation upon the future 
of the German colonies and the more profitable parts of the Turkish Empire. In a House 
of Commons debate on 18 November 1918, Williams had outlined the aspirations of the 
Armenians and the countless numbers of refugees who, he argued, looked to Britain and 
her Allies `to repay the debt we owe them'. 4' He also warned that the failure to establish 
a mandate and encourage its development as an independent nation under the tutelage of 
the Great Powers would be to `put a premium upon massacre'. " 
While the Allies were preoccupied with other issues, the Armenians were becoming 
increasingly 'hypnotised' by the notion of self-determination. 43 Their hopes were initially 
buoyed up by the strong commitment given to them during the war and ultimately the 
presence, within Article 22 of the League Covenant, of an explicit statement to certain 
41 Hansard, CXI, HC, 18 November 1918,3239-3270. 
42 Hansard, CXI, ibid. 
43 P. Tonapetean, `Armenia in the Wheel of British Policy', The New Europe, (1 Jan. 1920), 372. 
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communities within the former Turkish Empire, stating they were sufficiently developed 
that they could be recognised as independent nations and offered assistance from a 
Mandatory Power. As far as the liberal internationalists were concerned, Armenia would 
provide the `acid-test' for the newly inaugurated Mandate system. 4' For unlike the other 
`A' mandates of Syria and Mesopotamia, the Europeans had little reason to covet an 
area lacking in mineral or agricultural wealth. This meant it was likely to prove to be a 
millstone around the neck of its Mandatory Power, especially as the PMC only sanctioned 
the reimbursement of the necessary expenses required for administration. Armenia would 
then provide a true test of how effective the new system was, and more importantly, it 
would clearly demonstrate the sincere commitment of the Allies to supporting fledgling 
nations where there was no obvious reward. 
Armenia's supporters in the west hoped America would accept the mandate, but failing 
this Britain would have been an acceptable alternative, though with serious reservations. 
One major apprehension was the willingness of Britain to compromise Armenian interests 
in order to assuage Moslem opinion within the Empire. 41 Especially as in February 1920, 
Lloyd George confirmed that his statement in favour of Armenia and the other Turkish 
territories in January 1918, was made to reassure British workers that the government 
was not fighting for `some aggressive, imperialistic purpose, ' and also to pacify the 
Moslems in India and encourage them to enlist. 46 Another anxiety was Britain's inherent 
unwillingness to retreat from areas where she had raised the flag. However, during the 
protracted search for a suitable and willing Mandatory other countries considered included 
France, Italy, Australia, Canada, and even the League of Nations itself . 
4' Archdeacon G. 
E. Lloyd of Canada, commented that nothing was more likely to stimulate American 
interest in accepting the mandate than the possibility of it going to Canada. 48 However, 
even this was insufficient to stir the Americans. 
44 `The Reform of Turkey before the Peace Conference', NBP, MS951 c. 24. 
45 `American Military Mission to Armenia', International Conciliation, no. 151 (June 1920), 49. 
46 Hansard, 125, HC, 26 February 1920, col. 1961-2. 
47 See for example Estelle Blyth, `Australia and the Mandate for Armenia', The Near East, 24 June 
1920); BAC, Propaganda Committee minutes, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506; Lord Bryce to Aneurin 
Williams, 5 February 1920, JBP, MS206, f21. 
48 BAC Minute Book, 23 January 1920, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506 f41. 
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The liberal internationalists' hopes ofthe Americans accepting the mandate were constantly 
in flux. In January 1919, Arnold J. Toynbee unexpectedly found during his meetings 
with both the American delegation in Paris and the representatives of the American 
pro-Armenian groups that they were more inclined to undertake the responsibility for 
Armenia than he expected. 49 By September, Grey was reporting that while the Americans 
would not take the responsibility for Armenia they would hold Britain responsible for 
the consequences that would follow a British withdrawal from the region. 5° At the end of 
1919, a US delegation headed by General James G. Harbord spent thirty days in Armenia 
and Transcaucasia. The situation they discovered was one of terrible deprivation, with 
little food, currency and a large influx of refugees from neighbouring Turkey. The mission 
concluded that the remedy for Armenia's current situation was for mandatory control by 
a single great power. Such a policy needed to take into account the question of Turkey 
and the response of Russia; therefore, the mandated area should include Transcaucasia, 
Anatolia and Constantinople. While presenting the arguments for and against an American 
mandate, particularly the financial burden, Harbord concluded that if America refused to 
assume the mandate, `we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left 
unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their hopes. 's' 
British troops had occupied the key cities and strategic communication lines between 
Baku and Batum immediately following the Mudros Allied-Turkish Armistice, signed 
on 30 October 1918. The Mudros agreement also included provision for Allied troops to 
occupy the six Armenian vilayets in case of disorder. With Britain the dominant power 
in the region, enforcement was assumed to be part of its remit. In addition to British 
troops in the Caucasus, they had garrisons at Alleppo and Mosul in the south, plus parts 
of Persia. However, by the summer of 1919 the need to demobilise together with what 
Lloyd George would later describe as Britain's `overwhelming' responsibilities, led to 
British troops in the Caucasus being withdrawn. 52 
49 Arnold J. Toynbee to Lord Bryce, 29 January 1919, JBP, MS205, f13. 
50 Lord Grey to Balfour, 9 Sep 1919, House of Lords Record Office: Lloyd George Papers (henceforth 
LGP), LG/F/12/1/43b. 
51 James G. Harbord, `American Military Mission to Armenia', International Conciliation, no. 151 
(June 1920), 54. 
52 `Memorandum for Submission to H. M. Government by the BAC. `Armenia and the Turkish 
Settlement", JBP, MS210, f131-136. 
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As far as those with an interest in Armenia were concerned, a stable and secure Armenian 
Republic was the best solution. Consequently, both Williams and T. P. O'Connor made 
representations on behalf of BAC to the War Office and the Foreign Office. " Sir M. P. 
A. Hankey, the Secretary to the War Cabinet, in a letter to Lloyd George in September 
1919, reported that only the British were in a position to intervene in Armenia and that 
withdrawal of the troops demonstrated `a certain callousness. "' However, he concluded 
that it was in the national interests to demobilise the conscript soldiers before discipline 
was strained to breaking point, and British interests were purely sentimental anyway. 
For Lloyd George, unless there was a firm commitment from America or some other 
nation to assume responsibility the situation would quickly deteriorate, thereby making 
Britain's withdrawal all the more difficult. " 
Increasingly, an already weary British public was struggling to maintain an interest in 
Near Eastern affairs. With its attention drawn to Ireland, unemployment and trade union 
demands, Armenia and the Middle East were pushed into the background. By 1920, 
Aneurin Williams observed that it was now impossible to get the Press to take any notice 
of events in Armenia, unless it was a new development. 56 Because it was not a mandate, 
Armenia even fell below the radar of the LNU, for the organisation had adopted the 
strategy of using the Mandatory Powers' responses to the PMC questionnaire as a way of 
subjecting them to public scrutiny. Armenia became something of a `black hole'. 
Following the San Remo Conference, Lloyd George reported to the House of Commons 
that despite agreement over the mandates for Syria and Mesopotamia, that for Armenia 
was proving problematic. " As a result of ethnic cleansing, large parts of the proposed 
Armenian territory contained no Armenians. On military advice, Lloyd George believed 
the Armenians would be incapable of defending more than the existing Republic of 
Erivan. Instead, he reiterated the hope that America would accept the mandate, and 
53 BAC Minute Book, 18 August 1919, MSS Brit. Emp. s22/G506, f33. 
54 Sir M PA Hankey to Lloyd George, 4 September 1919, LGP, LG/F/1/10. 
55 Lloyd George to Sir John Davies, 3 Sep 1919, LGP, LG/F/85/1/10. 
56 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 26 March 1920, JBP, MS206, f19. 
57 Hansard, 128, HC, 29 April 1920, col. 1470. 
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that President Wilson would arbitrate on the country's boundaries. A month later Lloyd 
George privately admitted to Williams, that the American Senate would stand in the way 
of the President undertaking a full mandate for Armenia. " 
Following a request from the Supreme Council meeting at San Remo, on the Italian Riviera, 
President Wilson appealed to Congress on 24 May 1920, to authorise the undertaking 
of the Armenian Mandate. A week later, the Senate passed a resolution declining the 
mandate, in part influenced by the findings of the American Military Mission. " The 
findings related to more than just Armenia, but the estimated $756 million required 
within the first five years raised serious concerns. " Significantly, it was the Supreme 
Council and not the League of Nations that had issued the request. This was part of what 
Quincy Wright describes as a `sustained propaganda [... ] in favour of the United States 
assuming mandates over Armenia [... which] would be a constant financial burden. '6' 
The preservation of peace with its `warlike neighbours, ' would require a stronger military 
presence than America or her allies would be willing to contemplate. 
While awaiting the United States Congress' decision onArmenia, the-poisoned chalice was 
speculatively offered to the League of Nations itself. The LNU had passed a resolution in 
April calling upon the League to accept the mandate. 2 Ultimately, the League had little 
choice as it was not a state and had neither an army nor the finances required to undertake 
such a responsibility. 63 
The apparently callous attitude of the western leaders was, according to Arnold Toynbee, 
akin to treating Armenia as a property, which would increasingly bring in diminishing 
returns and as a result its `owners' sought to liquidate its assets. 64 Despite this, Cecil felt 
58 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 20 May 1920, JBP, MS207, V. 
59 `American Military Mission to Armenia', 5 1-3. 
60 `The United States and the Armenian Mandate: Message of President Wilson to the Congress, May 
24,1920', International Conciliation, no. 151 (1920), 274; see also British report `Erzerum and 
the Western Boundary of Armenia' 1920, LGP, LG/F/206/4/14. 
61 Wright, `The Mandates System and Public Concern', 377. 
62 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 4April 1920, JBP, MS153, f66. 
63 Reply of the League of Nations, LGP, LG/F/206/4/24 & Turkish Peace Treaty, LGP, LG/F/206/4/22. 
64 Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations, 60. 
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the British obligations to the Armenians were more compelling than most, and in addition 
they were in `imminent danger of final extinction. "' Cecil nevertheless recognised that 
it was impossible for Britain to maintain an army of occupation, but suggested that the 
Americans should provide the necessary finances for the policing of Armenia. 
Impediments to a solution 
By secretly agreeing to divide the Turkish Empire amongst themselves, Britain, France 
and Tsarist Russian had placed significant impediments in the way of an Armenian 
settlement. The subsequent repudiation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolsheviks 
put this in a flux, but did not necessarily mean the end of Anglo-French ambitions in the 
region. The major obstacle to the creation of a unified Armenia was France, because of 
its territorial expectations and attitude towards the Armenians. 66 In early 1919, Williams 
travelled to Paris where he held meetings with Boghos Nubar, Cecil and other officials 
to discuss the future of Armenia and the League. The unofficial attitude of the French 
foreign office he found particularly disturbing: the Armenians where informed that unless 
they appealed for French protection they would abandon them; neither prospect being 
very appealing to the Armenian delegations. "' The following year, Bryce observed that 
Clemenceau was angry at the attitude of the Armenians to the French mandate and as a 
result, Boghos Nubar was cautious of making any move that would give further offence 
to France. 8 
Another complication in the way of Armenian aspirations arose in May 1919 with the 
Greek invasion of Smyrna, again fuelled by the indifference and misplaced interference of 
European politicians. The resultant massacres of Armenians and Greeks by the resurgent 
Turks were the responsibility of M. Venzelos and Lloyd George, who had together played 
off the Armenians against the Turks and the encouraged the Greek invasion of Smyrna. 69 
The invasion dealt a deathblow to the possibility of establishing an acceptable peace 
65 Lord Robert Cecil to Austen Chamberlain, 13 August 1919, LGP, LG/F/7/2/37. 
66 A. Safrastian, `The Armenian Settlement', The Balkan Review, III, no. 1 (Feb. 1920), 30. 
67 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 4 February 1919, JBP, MS205, f14. 
68 Lord Bryce to Aneurin Williams, 5 February 1920, JBP, MS206, f21. 
69 See Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, 312. 
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settlement in the East and ultimately encouraged a resurgence of Turkish nationalism. For 
Toynbee the Turkish nationalist movement then set out to recover by force `all territories 
inhabited by non-Arab Moslem Ottoman majority. '10 The resultant conflict was to have 
serious repercussions on the future composition of Turkey in both Europe and Asia. 
Turkish Peace Treaty 
Reporting to the House of Commons in August 1919, Lloyd George stated that the delay 
in setting peace terms with Turkey was wholly due to the United States. " In the run-up 
to the London Conference with Turkey, T. P. O'Connor's questioned whether the Prime 
Minister's pledges `still held good that none of the Christian communities shall be again 
put under the yoke of a power that has periodically butchered and plundered them. ''' The 
response was unequivocally positive. 
The Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920 and obliged the Turks to agree to 
the creation of an Armenian state. Rather than tackling the position of the non-Turkish 
minorities at a time of Turkish weakness, the Allies had instead concerned themselves 
with other matters. 73 Ultimately, Turkey had re-established itself along nationalistic lines 
and achieved far more than was originally envisaged; the Treaty of Sevres was to all 
intents and purposes a'dead letter' or `still-born'. 74Amonth later the invasion ofArmenia 
began and with it the end of the Armenian nation. 
Under threat 
With the increasingly despairing news reaching him through his contacts in Armenia, 
Williams anxiously attempted to use his parliamentary connections to get British support 
for the besieged Armenians. The British government's decision to provide sufficient 
arms and equipment for a 40,000 man Armenian army in early 1920 was particularly 
welcomed. " In May 1920 Williams held a series of meetings with Lloyd George, 
70 Ibid., 84. 
71 Hansard, CIX, HC, 18 August 1919, col. 2016. 
72 Hansard, CXXIII, HC, 18 December 1919, col. 676. 
73 Williams, `Armenia, British Pledges and the Near East', 418-9. 
74 Ibid., 419; Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, vii. 
75 `Provision of Arms for Armenia', PKP, GD40/17/40, f345. 
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Chamberlain, Curzon and Churchill, who all expressed their sympathies with the situation 
Armenia found herself in. 76 Churchill, however, openly expressed his pessimism due 
to the poor communications within the region. Despite this on 10 June S. S. Homsea 
was despatched with guns, rifles, accoutrements, army clothing and medical supplies to 
Batum, at a cost to the Armenians of £829,634 9s. 4d. " Its eventual arrival was too little 
and too late, especially with the Georgians claiming a percentage of the armaments to 
enable their safe passage. 78 
News that the Erivan Republic had succumbed under the combined pressure of Turkish 
and Bolshevist forces and accepted Soviet rule was in line with Churchill's advice. He had 
informed Williams in May that Britain could do nothing for Armenia and her only chance 
was `to make the best terms she can with the Bolsheviks. "' The liberal internationalists 
reluctantly recognised that this was the Armenians only chance of avoiding complete 
extinction. 80 As Williams explained to his American counterpart, the Armenians would 
be forced to make a pragmatic decision in order to secure their survival: 
The position of the Armenians in the Caucasus has been a cruel one: 
practically abandoned, except for the charitable relief of private 
individuals, by all the Great Powers whose allies they had been in the 
war. They have had to choose, apparently, between extinction at the 
hands of the Turks, Tartars, Georgians and Bolsheviks, or making such 
terms with their enemies as they could. I do not know who can blame 
them if they have come to terms with those at whose mercy they were 
left. " 
76 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 20 May 1920, JBP, MS207, f7-8; Aneurin Williams to Nubar 
Pasha, 21 May 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/21. 
77 War office Cypher, 14 June 1920. ADNA, Liasse 1/22. 
78 James Malcolm to Boghos Nubar, 10 July 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/22. 
79 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 20 May 1920, JBP, MS207, f7-8; Aneurin Williams to Nubar 
Pasha, 21 May 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/21. 
80 See Buxton and Conwell-Evans, Oppressed People and the League of Nations, 171. 
81 Aneurin Williams to James L Barton, 15 May 1920, JBP, MS207, f6. 
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In a last ditch attempt to elicit support for the besieged Armenians the BAC submitted 
a memorandum to Lloyd George through the agency of Bryce. 82 In order to aid the 
Armenians, the BAC requested that the British Navy be more vigilant in preventing 
the passage of arms and supplies through the Black Sea for use by the Turks. They 
also called for the ratification of the Treaty of Sevres and its immediate enforcement; 
however should it be necessary to revise the treaty regarding Smyrna and Thrace it 
should only be contemplated on condition that the Turks withdrew from the area to 
be awarded to Armenia by President Wilson and some form of reparation be awarded 
for recent sufferings. The end of Armenia came with its formal incorporation into the 
Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on 29 November 1920. 
President Wilson c Award 
Ironically, at the same time as Armenia lost its last vestiges of independence, President 
Wilson published his declaration on the boundaries of Turkish Armenia. As can be seen in 
Figure 10.2 this was much smaller than the 1919 proposals submitted by the Armenians 
themselves (Figure 10.1) and mostly consisted of the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Trebizond 
and Erzerum. These also corresponded to the award made to the Armenian Republic of 
Erivan under Article 88-93 of the now dormant Treaty of Sevres. Incongruously, John H. 
Harris informed Boghos Nubar that he saw the award as a `triumph' as it represented a 
mandate `in all but name. 
"' 
The following month at the London Conference, the Supreme Council rejected the 
President's award as the recent events had made his decisions superfluous. The Bolsheviks' 
territorial concessions made to Turkey, together with the advance of its troops into the 
designated area was therefore accepted as a fait accompli. This abandonment of any 
prospects for Turkish Armenia was finally confirmed with the restoration of Turkish 
sovereignty over large parts of Asia Minor, in March 1922. At the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, this proposal was offered in an attempt to achieve peace between Greece and 
82 Lord Bryce to Lloyd George, 26 November 1920, LGP, LG/F/7/4. 
83 John H. Harris to Boghos Nubar, 9 December 1920, ADNA, Liasse 1/24. 
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Turkey; in addition to the potential Armenian homeland, Smyrna, Constantinople, and a 
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Figure 10.2: Proposed boundaries for Armenia as delimited by President Wilson, 1920 
In a report prepared by Cecil and Williams on the current state of the Armenian Question 
for the 1921 Imperial Conference, they stated that: 
The Turks had treated the charter of Armenian independence 
incorporated in the Treaty of Sevres as a scrap of paper, and the Allies 
had acquiesced [... ] The sacrifices and sufferings of the Armenians in 
the common cause and the repeated pledges of liberation given to them 
by British and Allied statesmen surely require that the British Empire 
should not entirely desert them. 84 
When in 1921, Aneurin Williams spoke to Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, 
about fulfilling these wartime pledges, Kerr responded by asking what the pledges were 
and what the Armenians had done in consideration. 85 Apparently the Prime Minister `did 
not think so much of a mere statement of policy made during the war, but that he took the 
84 `Note on the Armenian Question to Members of the Imperial Conference from the Rt. Hon. Lord 
Robert Cecil, M. P, and Mr Aneurin Williams, M. P. ' 16 June 1921, JBP, MS208, f9-10. 
85 Aneurin Williams to Lord Bryce, 3 February 1921, JBP, MS207, f104. 
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Lawyer-like view that where actual considerations had been given to us in consequence 
of a pledge made by us that we must strictly fulfil it. ' The Armenians discovered that 
just like the Sultan before them, the wartime promises of the Allied leaders were just as 
hollow; moral commitments were not contractually binding. 86 While a degree of blame- 
shifting took place, for Williams the `balance of criminality' was to be equally shared by 
Britain, America and France. 87 
86 `Obligations', TNA CAB 24/5, G203; see also Artin H. Arslanian, `British Wartime Pledges, 1917- 
18: The Armenian Case', Journal of Contemporary History, 13, no. 3 (July 1978), 523. 




By the 1920s, the hopes of the liberal internationalists for a world united in peace and 
co-operation were embodied in the League of Nations. Although regularly dismissed as 
utopian, and identified even by sympathetic critics as intellectual idealists rather than 
practical realists, the liberal internationalists were not blind to the inherent weaknesses 
in the new internationalism, nor the difficulties of their own position. They operated at 
an important juncture in the transition between the elitist politics of the late nineteenth 
century and the mass democratic politics of the early twentieth, the `professionalization' 
of international relations critique by academia, and a significant period of heightened 
international tension. Throughout the period under review, the Eastern Question pre- 
occupied liberal internationalists and provided the formative context in which they 
developed the concept of moral responsibility in foreign policy. It would be harsh to 
upbraid them for failing to provide an `answer'to that `question' : in its contemporary guise, 
it still has the power to destabilise international relations. The unravelling of the Balkans 
during the 1990s and the responses to the 2008 Kosovan declaration of independence 
and the possibility of Turkish integration into the European Union, demonstrate how 
intractable an issue it remains. Additionally the reaction of Turkey to the 90th anniversary 
of the Armenian genocide does not augur well as to the possibility of reconciliation on 
that still contentious issue. ' 
Three separate events during 2005 serve to illustrate the political sensitivity of the genocide: 
in June Time magazine inadvertently distributed a DVD on behalf of the Ankara Chamber of 
Commerce purporting to promote tourism in Turkey (in addition to the thirteen minute tourist 
video it contained a 70 minute feature denying and distorting the accepted facts of the genocide); 
in September, an international conference organised by Istanbul's Bogazici University on the 
`Armenian Question' was banned; and in December the leading Turkish novelist Orphan Pamuk 
was charged for `denigrating Turkishness' by referring to the Armenian genocide in an interview 
with a Swiss magazine. 
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Continuity or change? 
There is a natural tendency to view innovations as the rapid introduction of something 
new. In doing so the gradual adoption of the subtle and minor changes are overlooked in 
favour of the apparently sudden and dramatic arrival of a supposedly new phenomenon or 
political thought. The development of institutionalism as the dominant post-war form of 
liberal internationalism has similarly tended to occlude its earlier variants. Consequently, 
historians have tended to exaggerate the advances of the institutional aspects of liberal 
internationalism as being distinct from those of the preceding epoch. In their survey 
of liberal international thinking over the previous three hundred years, Mark Zacher 
and Richard Matthew have demonstrated that liberal international theory has been 
undergoing a continual evolution. ' Integral to this is the liberal internationalists' belief 
in international cooperation, which has proven to be resilient and capable of adaption to 
changing circumstances. While the institutional arguments within liberal internationalism 
can trace their origin to antecedents such as Kant's Perpetual Peace, the League ofNations 
was undoubtedly a product of the cataclysmic effects of total war. 
Nonetheless, the progenitors of the League of Nations movement in Britain, Goldsworthy 
Lowes Dickinson and Aneurin Williams, had long-term involvement with causes of an 
international nature, and their inspirational move towards institutional internationalism 
occurred within weeks of Britain's entry into the European conflict and long before the 
dreadful toll of war became apparent. The rapid adoption of such ideas by these two pivotal 
figures demonstrates that such a transition was a natural continuation of the trajectory of 
international thinking and actions of the liberal internationalists. Their ability to garner 
the interest of others to discuss such ideas further demonstrates the overall continuity of 
such ideas within liberal internationalism. 
The perception of many liberal internationalists was that the pre-war international 
situation was anarchical, in the form of ongoing competition between states for resources, 
culminating in escalating tension and ultimately conflict. They sought the promotion 
2 See Zacher, Mark W., and Richard A. Matthew, `Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, 
Divergent Strands', pp. 111-117. 
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of international cooperation and the fostering of international institutions to administer 
various aspects of international relations. Heavily influenced by individuals as diverse as 
Richard Cobden, W. E. Gladstone and John Stuart Mill, they sought to promote an ethical 
foreign policy in relation to the Eastern Question, but also the need for intervention 
on behalf of the subject peoples. The gradual drift towards institutionalism, in part 
stimulated by The Hague Peace Conferences which focused attention on international 
law and politics as well as arbitration, could trace its origin back to Immanuel Kant 
and John Stuart Mill amongst others. The role of war and international conflict was 
a significant factor in the adoption and dominance of institutional ideas into liberal 
internationalism during the early twentieth century. The First World War was pivotal in 
the rapid advance and acceptance of such ideas, nevertheless the role of moral arguments 
was not completely subsumed. Consequently, liberal internationalists sought to balance 
the moral and institutional arguments in the rapidly changing world after August 1914. 
While the institutional aspects of liberal internationalism were evident in pre-1914 
thinking, their primary concern had been directed towards the prevailing conflicts of 
internationalism, viz. the problems of nationality and nationhood. By the early twentieth 
century liberalism's historical sympathy for the small `nations' and Mill's notion of 
nationality as a cohesive force were viewed positively, whereas patriotism and nationalism 
were increasingly becoming associated with the more sinister aspects of jingoism. These 
were integral to their concerns over the treatment of the Boers, the Macedonians and the 
Armenians. The belief that international cooperation could foster shared values ofmorality 
and justice was central to the liberal internationalist ethos. A long-term association with 
the Eastern Question demonstrated the futility of balance of power politics to intervene 
on behalf of the oppressed. The development of international law and international 
collaboration provided the means by which national self-determination could flourish. 
The post-war period however confirmed their fears that the problems of nationality and 
nationhood could not be so easily resolved. 
The immediate post-war period as well as witnessing the ascendancy of liberal 
internationalism also saw the terminal decline of the Liberal Party. Another process 
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accelerated by the First World War, but for many liberal internationalists its origin could 
be traced to Asquith's rejection of Campbell-Bannerman's radicalism, which according to 
Noel Buxton had found a voice in the pro-Boers, in favour of the pursuit of respectability. ' 
Ironically, it was during the premiership of the doyen of the pro-Boers, Lloyd George 
that the final conversion of many National Liberals to a Conservative point of view, and 
the eventual drift of the radicals to Labour occurred. 4 
Effectiveness of the groups 
Looking back, the liberal internationalists could feel pride and satisfaction as well as 
disappointment and regret. Bryce had observed at the time of his departure to America 
in 1907 that they had assisted `at the birth of new nations'. ' Unfortunately, it became 
evident in the post-war period that several of these births had been either premature or 
failed to reach infancy, let alone maturity. Consequently, many of Buxton's `lost causes' 
feature strongly in this period, amongst them was his disappointment over Armenia and 
Macedonia. " 
In the form of Mandates, the League, initially at least, offered the prospect of evolutionary 
progress to national self-determination for `native' populations in the colonial empires. It 
introduced a new type of international accountability and institutionalised the principle 
of trusteeship, which the United Nations would develop further. The flaws in the system, 
however, meant that the `underdeveloped' nations were subjected to colonial annexation 
in a new guise, albeit one legitimised by the League. 
Armenia demonstrates the greatest failure of the liberal internationalists and the 
international community. The danger for Armenia was that by the time it was obvious 
nothing would be done, nothing could be. Self-determination ultimately proved to 
be a double-edged sword, which Turkey turned against the very people the liberal 
3 MS Autobiography, Politics draft chapter, NBP, MS951 c7 
4 Ibid; Aneurin Williams, 'The General Election and the Future of the Liberal Party', Contemporary 
Review, CXV, (February 1919), 143 
5 'The Balkan Committee: Farewell Speech by Mr Bryce', The Times, 23 December 1905. 
6 Anderson, Noel Buxton A Life, 173 
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internationalists envisaged it helping. As a result, within eighteen months of the Greek 
invasion and subsequent massacres at Smyna, the post-war map of the Near East had 
been redrawn in contradiction to the wartime promises and post-war expectations. The 
new map represented the military capacity of the Turkish and Bolshevik armies and 
the national chauvinism of the new regimes. Turkey had reclaimed Constantinople and 
the whole of Anatolia while Soviet Russia had extinguished the short-lived flame of 
independence in its wayward Transcaucasia territories. 
After seven years of appeals for financial and moral support, public opinion had 
become apathetic, and to some extent indifferent from prolonged exposure. While the 
new international system was found seriously wanting, it was the initial reluctance of 
the Allied leaders to engage seriously with the issue that ensured President Wilson's 
demarcation of Armenia's boundaries remained mere squiggles on a map. For Bryce, 
the policy of the allied and associated powers had exacerbated the `initial blunder of a 
weak and improvident armistice' by following it with an ill-conceived policy lacking in 
`foresight and of energy'. ' 
It would however be a mistake to view the groups as ineffective. Their achievements 
were many and varied and at times hard to quantify due to their subtle nature. The liberal 
internationalists were moved by their conscience to speak out on issues of importance; 
consequently, they were drawn to a wide variety of causes, domestic as well as foreign. 
The plethora of groups they represented were in the main preoccupied with one particular 
overarching area of interest, whether it was British militarism in southern Africa, the 
rights of the `Macedonians' and Armenians, or the need for an institutional form of `world 
government'. In attempting to promote their particular interests they naturally adopted 
many of the characteristics of pressure groups, however, they were more comparable to 
parliamentary select committees in their organization. In general terms, as the SACC 
and LLAAM demonstrate, without some form of tacit government approval or support 
the groups were rendered impotent in their ability to engage with government officials 
7 James Bryce, `The Revision of the Turkish Treaty', Contemporary Review, 119, no. May/June 
(1921), 580 
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and ministers. Denied the status of insider groups they were forced to rely upon the 
outsider strategies of rousing public opinion, to which the government proved reasonably 
impervious. 
Despite this, the pro-Boer groups were an important rallying point for liberal 
internationalists at the turn of the century. Many of those subsequently involved in 
the early twentieth century groups studied here `cut their political teeth' through their 
engagement with the issues raised by Britain's entanglement in Southern Africa. The 
other groups reveal that by working with the grain of government approval they could 
achieve so much more, and in doing so were in effect accorded insider status. This 
enabled them to gain interviews with government officials and ministers, such as those 
with the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. Sometimes these meetings would be in 
the form of a delegation to the Foreign Secretary, headed by an eminent figure such as 
the Archbishop of Canterbury or a member from the House of Lords. Those with the 
Prime Minister however, were reduced to a select group or on occasions to individual 
private and informal meetings. In this way, the liberal internationalists were able to 
bring the gravitas of their message directly to those wielding power. The influence of the 
groups can also be seen in the reaction of foreign governments. In particular the BC was 
viewed by the newly emergent CUP as a body worth befriending while the neighbouring 
Powers (particularly the Austro-Hungarians) viewed it with suspicion. In both cases the 
BC served as an effective organisation which was able to project an image of influence 
far beyond its ability. 
The groups also fully utilised the outsider strategies of arousing public opinion. They 
achieved this through the silent methods of supplying information to the press in the 
form of memorandums, letters to the editor, press releases and through their journalistic 
members. The importance of the latter should not be overlooked, as all the groups had 
a symbiotic relationship with sympathetic journalists and in particular J. A. Hobson and 
H. N. Brailsford. This enabled the group's ideas to reach a wider audience than those 
directly attributable to the individual groups. 
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In addition to the silent methods the groups utilised more direct approaches such as those 
of public meetings, that with careful timing could generate both public support and much 
needed column inches in the press. Timing was always a difficult issue as the debates 
within the LNS over when to hold a high profile meeting clearly demonstrate. They were 
not averse to try alternative and novel methods to help spread their message, as the BC's 
involvement with the Balkan States Exhibition and the LNU's sponsorship of the Auction 
of Souls film clearly show. Although the latter was released in Britain under the auspices 
of the LNU it ultimately fulfilled the aims of the BAC, whose chairman and de facto 
president (Williams and Bryce) were the pivotal figures behind the LNU's involvement. 
The Auction of Souls was in part a dramatisation of Lord Bryce and Arnold Toynbee's 
Blue Book for the British government on the atrocities carried out against the Armenians. 
That this film should provide embarrassment demonstrates the change in circumstances 
and expediency of the Armenians to Britain's post-war government. It also highlights 
the role of the liberal internationalists and their ability to work with the government. 
The Blue Book served the propaganda purposes of the government and desire of the 
BAC to raise awareness of the atrocities taking place in the former Ottoman Empire, and 
ultimately as a rallying point to support their calls for the right of self-determination. 
Ultimately, despite the success of the groups their impact on the British government was 
ephemeral. The shifting of British interests at times worked in their favour but often the 
government's half-heartedness proved the undoing of their hopes. That this should be the 
case was undoubtedly a disappointment, but the transformation of government policy is 
not something that can be achieved overnight. Despite setbacks their determination to 
speak out on issues of importance remained undeterred. Perhaps their greatest weakness 
was that while they were imbued with Gladstonian moral and humanitarian principles 
neither Bryce, Buxton nor Williams were powerful and engaging speakers who could 
command an audience's attention. Collectively, they lacked the great oratorical power 
and commanding presence of Gladstone. Even Bryce one of their greatest assets could 
never profess to be of the same calibre. As Buxton admitted, speaking was one of his 
greatest fears, but like his fellow internationalists, he looked to Bryce and Gladstone 
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for inspiration! They were part of a venerable history of dissent over British foreign 
policy, advocating a liberal internationalist approach to foreign affairs, which firmly 
places them within the trouble makers tradition. Despite their inability fully to persuade 
the government of the merits of adopting an ethically sound foreign policy, nevertheless 
they continued to hold `aloft the torch of idealism, [thereby] keeping the light burning in 
the midst of darkness. '9 
Inter-war liberal internationalism 
To use Hoffman's analogy, the domestic side of the Liberal coin was highly polished; 
the international side has come to seem decidedly lacklustre in the light of calamitous 
breakdown of the international order in the 1930s. 1° Nevertheless, the catastrophe of the 
Second World War should not blind us to the achievements of liberal internationalism, 
both in capturing the centre ground of British political opinion and in helping shape 
international institutions that promoted collective security and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes. The centrality of liberal internationalism to British political argument can be 
found in The Next Five Years: An Essay in Political Agreement, published in July 1935. 
Its fundamental tenets being that: 
We can and must master international anarchy and get rid of the war 
system by organised collective action; and that the community can and 
must deliberately plan, direct, and control - not in detail but in broad 
outline - the economic development to which innumerable individual 
activities contribute. " 
Prepared by the Next Five Years Group, an association of individuals belonging to all 
political parties and none, this roll-call of `progressive' opinion included Conservative 
back-benchers on the left of the party, such as Harold Macmillan, internationalists like 
Norman Angell, radical liberals, such as Hobson, journalists, such Nevinson and A. G. 
8 See Biographies of Living Members of Parliament - questions from Committee on History of 
Parliament NBP, MS951, c10/8 
9 Anderson, Noel Buxton A Life, 173; of the main figures Buxton was increasingly becoming the 
sole torch bearer, Bryce died in 1922 and Williams in 1924. 
10 Hoffmann, `The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism', 161 
11 The Next Five Years: An Essay in Political Agreement, (London: MacMillan & Co, 1935), 7 
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Gardiner, the Rowntree brothers, Arnold and Seebohm, the Cadbury siblings, Elizabeth 
and Laurence, and liberal academics, such as H. A. L. Fisher and Gooch. 
The book was written in two parts, the first concerned with economic policy and the second 
international relations: the latter being the nearest we have to a liberal internationalist 
manifesto. Avoidance of another descent into the international anarchy of the pre-war 
years required the creation of `an organic structure of international government which 
comprehends all those competing and conflicting activities that transcend national 
frontiers. "2 The objective of British foreign policy then should be peace through the 
`building up a world commonwealth of all the nations, assured of peace, sure and not 
too slow in affording international justice, efficient in promoting the fullest use of the 
world's resources for the general advantage, and sustained by a free and informed public 
opinion. "3 In comparison to the anarchical conditions of 1914, those opposed to war 
were `now better organised and immeasurably stronger', but as they readily admitted 
the forces making for war were undeniably strong. The League had an important role 
to play in positively organising for peace, and despite its failings it had `proved itself 
by far the best instrument yet evolved for world cooperation and the safeguarding of 
peace. '" The post-war record of the League and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes far surpassed the poor record 
of pre-war years. The Next Five Years Group advocated what it called the Collective 
Peace System - the League of Nations' pacific machinery backed up by guarantees of 
collective security - as the only policy offering `a prospect of real security for the British 
Commonwealth and the world's peaceful development. "5 It is beyond the scope of this 
study to discuss the Group's proposals in greater detail, but the continuity with the earlier 
liberal internationalism is quite striking. Indeed, on this evidence it is not far-fetched to 
say that liberal internationalism had become part of the `common sense' of the political 
class. It would be easy to accuse the liberal internationalists of the Next Five Years Group 
of being dangerously detached from reality, but that is rather facile. Before the Italian 
12 Ibid., 2 
13 Ibid., 215 
14 Ibid., 216 & 217-8 
15 Ibid., 226 
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invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935, it was reasonable to believe there had been real 
progress towards the peaceful resolution of disputes. 
The liberal internationalists had made considerable contributions to the new international 
order. However, the plethora of causes to which the progressive and liberal-minded 
were drawn encouraged a process of selective engagement. Liberal internationalism 
as exemplified by the single-issue groups failed to project itself as an all-embracing 
comprehensive doctrine. This failure resulted in its apparent fragmentation into disparate 
elements, however as this thesis has demonstrated at its heart was a small but constant 
core, the `stage army of the good' to use Nevinson's analogy. To the British Government 
the liberal internationalists' apparent single-mindedness precluded the possibility of their 
fully appreciating or understanding the wider issues involved. Conversely, the liberal 
internationalists' approach was more holistic in nature than the government's promotion 
of national interests above the welfare of others. 
The liberal internationalists were no longer starry-eyed idealists; their institutional 
arguments regarding the peaceful resolution of disputes, and those in favour of self- 
determination as a means of settling issues of nationality without recourse to force, had 
won the day. The liberal internationalist `scratch crowd' then forms an important part of 
thinking on international relations. In many ways, this thinking has as much relevance 




Appendix 1: Liberal internationalist biographies 
The following biographies are of the main individuals associated with the extra-parliamentary 
groups being studied. The information is collected from a variety of sources, including Dictionary 
of National Biography, Who's Who, The limes, as well as the memoirs, biographies, and auto- 
biographies listed in the bibliography. Titles received after, or during, the study period are 
indicated by square brackets. 
ALDEN, [Sir] Percy (1865-1944) was born at Oxford. After attending Balliol College, Oxford, 
he devoted himself to settlement-work, serving as warden of Mansfield House in Canning 
Town. He was Liberal member for Tottenham division of Middlesex, 1906-1918. He stood 
unsuccessfully as a Liberal in 1918 and re-entered the House of Commons in 1923 as 
Labour member for South Tottenham (1923-24). During the First World War he was a 
strong opponent of conscription and was associated with the LNS, especially during the 
early discussions. 
ANGELL, [Sir] Norman (1872-1967) was born Ralph Norman Angell Lane. He was educated 
at the Lycee de St. Omer in France and later at Geneva. Between 1905 and 1914 he was 
general manager of the Paris Daily Mail. His writings on international affairs were widely 
read, especially The Great Illusion. During the war he was a founding member of the 
UDC. After the war he joined the Labour party and served on its Advisory Committee 
on International Questions and was Labour member for North Bradford (1929-1931). He 
actively campaigned for a policy of collective security primarily through the LNU. 
BAKER, Joseph Allen (1852-1918) stood unsuccessfully for East Finsbury in 1900 but 
successfully contested the seat in 1905 as a Liberal. He held the seat until his death in July 
1918. Before the outbreak of the First World War he organised exchange visits between 
British and German churches as a means of fostering closer friendship and understanding. 
BARNETT, Canon Arthur T. (1858-1941) was educated at St John's College, Cambridge. 
A Church of England minister, he was chaplain at Bordighera, Italy and chaplain to the 
Bishop of Gibraltar. He was also Vicar at various parishes including Stoke Poges in 
Buckinghamshire (1912-1926). He was a member of the SACC, LLAAM, and LNS, vice- 
president of the BC, and a member of the LNTJ's general council. 
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BARNETT, Canon Samuel Augustus (1844-1913) was educated at Wadham College, Oxford. 
He was instrumental in the Charity Organisation Society and in London's Whitechapel 
he became renowned for social reform and the establishment of the university settlement 
Toynbee Hall. Although not actually a member of the extra-parliamentary groups, his 
position at Toynbee Hall enabled him to provide a guiding influence to many of the 
individuals listed here; particularly James Bryce, Noel Buxton and Aneurin Williams. His 
wife Henrietta was a member of SACC, BC and on the LNU general Council. 
BARNETT, Mrs Henrietta (1851-1936) was the wife of Samuel Augustus Barnett. Together 
they worked at reforming the social conditions for the residents of the East London. Her 
work in Hampstead Garden Suburb served to reinforce her links with Aneurin Williams, 
a former Toynbee resident and now Chairman of First Garden City, whose architects 
Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker helped in creating the suburb's social blueprint. She 
was a member of the BC, SACC & LNU 
BOURCHIER, James David (1850-1920) was educated at Trinity College, Dublin and King's 
College, Cambridge. After a spell teaching at Eton he took up an appointment as special 
correspondent for The Imes and from 1892 as its Balkan correspondent. His engagement 
with Balkan politics and nationalism made him an ideal conduit of information to the BC. 
Like the Buxtons he was dismayed by Bulgaria's decision to align itself with Austria- 
Hungary and Germany in 1915. 
BRAILSFORD, Henry Noel (1873-1958) was educated at Glasgow University, where he came 
to the attention of Gilbert Murray. He enlisted in the Philhellenic Legion which fought 
alongside the Greeks against the Ottoman Turks. On his return he took up an appointment 
as special correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in Crete and Thessaly. A regular 
correspondent for a series of anti-imperialist papers, he earned a reputation as a critic of 
British foreign policy. He was involved with the SACC, LLAAM, LNS, LNU and BC, 
spending many months in Macedonia distributing relief and reporting on the situation. He 
served on the Carnegie commission of inquiry into the Balkan wars and in 1914 published 
The War of Steel and Gold. He was involved with the UDC and joined the Labour Advisory 
Committee on International Questions. 
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BRYCE, (John) Annan (1843-1923) was the younger brother of James Bryce. He was educated at 
Glasgow University and Balliol College, Oxford. His early career for East India merchants 
was based primarily in Burma and Siam. He sat as Liberal member for Inverness Burghs 
(1906-1918). He played a less prominent role than his brother but was active in the SACC, 
LLAAM, BC and BAC. 
BRYCE, James [Viscount Bryce] (1838-1922) was educated at the Glasgow University and 
Trinity College, Oxford. He successfully contested Tower Hamlets in 1880 and worked 
with Canon Samuel Barnett in the establishment of Toynbee Hall. In 1885 he became 
Liberal member for South Aberdeenshire. He served in several Liberal Governments and in 
1907 was appointed ambassador to the United States. His visit to western Anatolia in 1876 
coincided with the Bulgarian atrocities and brought him into contact with the Armenians 
of the region and began his life-long interest in their plight. He was the first President of 
the BC, but had to resign following the formation of the Liberal Government in December 
1905. He retained close contact with its members and in particular Noel Buxton, an old 
family friend. During the First World War he chaired the Bryce Group, whose Proposals 
for the Prevention of Future Wars was published following America's entry into the war in 
1917. He provided behind the scenes guidance to both the LNS and the BAC. He initiated 
the first debate in the House of Lords regarding the Armenian genocide, and with Arnold 
Toynbee was responsible for the Blue Book The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1915-1916. He was elevated to the peerage in 1914. 
BUXTON, Charles Roden (1875-1942) was a member of a prominent anti-slavery family. He 
was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, and served as private secretary 
to his father Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton during his Governorship of South Australia. 
He unsuccessfully contested East Hertfordshire in 1906 and Ashburton division Devon 
in 1908. He sat as Liberal member for Ashburton, Devon from January to December 
1910, stood unsuccessfully for Labour in 1918 and re-entered the House of Commons 
as a Labour member for Accrington (1922-1923) and Elland division of West Riding of 
Yorkshire (1929-1931). Together with his brother Noel he initiated the BC and in 1914 
they both travelled to Bulgaria, at the request of Winston Churchill, in an attempt to induce 
it to support the Allies. He also served on the BAC executive committee and was an early 
member of the LNS. During the war he was associated with calls for a negotiated peace and 
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was an active member of the UDC. After the war he was a member of Labour's Advisory 
Committee on International Questions. 
BUXTON, Harold Jocelyn (1880-1976) was educated at Harrow School and Trinity College, 
Cambridge. He was Vicar at Horley, Oxfordshire (1914-1918), and a Chaplain in Jerusalem 
(1926-1927) and Nicosia, Cyprus (1927-1931), Archdeacon of Cyprus (1928-1933) and 
Bishop of Gibraltar (1933-1947). With his brother Noel he travelled to both Turkish and 
Russian Armenia in 1914 (Travel and Politics in Armenia). He was an active member of 
the BAC and Secretary of Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) Fund (1918-1926) 
BUXTON, Noel [Baron Noel-Buxton of Aylsham] (1869-1948) was educated at Harrow and 
Trinity College, Cambridge. He was Liberal member for the Whitby division of Yorkshire 
(1905-1906) and North Norfolk (1910-1918). In 1918 he stood unsuccessfully as a Lib-Lab 
candidate, later regaining his North Norfolk seat for Labour (1922-1930). As a member of 
the Whitechapel Board of Guardians be came into contact with Canon Samuel Barnett of 
the Toynbee Hall Settlement. He resigned his directorship of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton 
Brewery in order to pursue his political ambitions. He was chairman of the BC and wrote 
extensively on the region. In 1914 he travelled to Bulgaria with his brother Charles in their 
abortive attempt to persuade them to support the Allies. During the war he supported the 
work of the LNS, but was closely associated with calls for a negotiated peace. He was 
reticent to be associated with the UDC unlike his brother Charles. After the war he joined 
the Labour Party and served on its Advisory Committee on International Questions. He 
was Minister of Agriculture (1924) and President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(1929-1930). He was elevated to the peerage in 1930. 
CECIL, Lord (Edgar Algernon) Robert Gascoyne [Viscount Cecil of Chelwood] (1864- 
1958) was educated at Eton and University College, Oxford. Conservative member for 
Marylebone East (1906-1910), and for Hitchin division of Hertfordshire (1911-1923). He 
entered Asquith's coalition government in May 1915 as parliamentary under-secretary of 
state for foreign affairs and in February 1916 also took on the role minister of blockade. 
A long association with Aneurin Williams through their involvement in the Labour Co- 
Partnership Association ensured a fruitful relationship. He became the leading ministerial 
advocate for a league of nations, and after the war played an important role in the League's 
formation as part of the British delegation at the Paris peace conference. He went on to 
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represent South Africa at the first League of Nations assemblies (1920-1922). Following 
the formation of the LNU he became its chairman, and later in 1923 its president. He was 
elevated to the House of Lords in 1923. 
CHANNING, Francis Allston [1" Baron Channing of Wellingborough] (1841-1926) was 
educated at Exeter College, Oxford. He sat as Liberal member for East Northamptonshire 
(1885-1910). He was involved with the LLAAM. He was elevated to the peerage in 1912. 
CLIFFORD, Dr John (1836-1923) was educated at University College London. His Doctor of 
Divinity was an honorary award. A nonconformist Baptist minister became a prominent 
pro-Boer and executive member of the SACC and LLAAM. He also served on the executive 
committees of the BC, BAC, LNS and LNU. 
COURTNEY, Leonard Henry [Baron Courtney of Penwith] (1832-1918) was educated at St 
John's College, Cambridge. His early career involved spells as a barrister, a leader writer for 
The Times, and political economy lecturer at University College, London. He was Liberal 
member for Misheard (1876-1885), and Bodmin (1885-1900). He was an anti-imperialist 
and denounced British policy in Africa, and was a vigorous president of the SACC. 
DAMES, David [1` Baron Davies] (1880-1944) was educated at Edinburgh and Kings College, 
Cambridge. Liberal member for Montgomeryshire (1906-1929), but resigned the Whip in 
1926 and sat as an Independent until his retirement in 1929. He was Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to Lloyd George while Minister of Munitions and Prime Minister (1916-17). He 
became interested in the establishment of a league of free nations and was instrumental in 
the break-up of the LNS into two rival factions. Under pressure from Viscount Grey the 
two groups soon joined together as the LNU, and Davies became one of its Vice-Presidents. 
He was elevated to the peerage in 1932. 
DICKINSON, Goldsworthy Lowes (1862-1932) was educated at Charterhouse and King's 
College, Cambridge. His position at Cambridge and interests in philosophy and history 
exerted a tremendous influence on the pre-war students, including Aneurin Williams's son 
Iolo. During the war he was particularly active in the formulation of plans for a league 
of nations through both the Bryce Group and the LNS. After the war he joined Labour's 
Advisory Committee on International Questions and in 1926 published The International 
Anarchy. 
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DICKINSON, Willoughby Hyett [11 Baron Dickinson of Painswick] (1859-1943) was the son 
of an MP for Stroud. He was educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was 
Liberal member for St. Pancras, North (1906-1918) and was Chairman of the London 
Liberal Federation (1896-1918). He was one of the LLAAM preferred candidates for the 
National Liberal Federation during the South African War. During the First World War he 
was an active proponent of a league of nations through the Bryce Group and LNS, of which 
he was Chairman. He was a member of the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform 
1916-17. After the war he worked closely with the LNU, of which he was a vice-president 
and the World Alliance for Promoting international Fellowship Through the Churches. He 
joined the Labour Party in 1930 and was elevated to the peerage in the same year. 
EVANS, [Sir] Arthur John (1851-1941) was educated at Harrow and Brasenose College, 
Oxford. He travelled extensively through the Balkans and his letters from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the 1875 insurrections were published in the Manchester Guardian. He 
became keeper of the Ashmolean Museum in 1884, and travelled and lectured widely. He 
is best known for his excavation of Knossos in Crete which began following the Ottoman 
withdrawal. His knowledge of the Balkans and Ottoman Empire was of great benefit to 
the BC and he was one of the members to be invited to Constantinople in 1908. He was 
knighted in 1911. 
FRY, Isabel (1869-1958) was the daughter of Sir Edward Fry (1827-1918) a judge with 
extensive experience of international arbitration, particularly at The Hague. Isabel was an 
educationalists and social activist who founded and was headmistress of two experimental 
schools. She was a member of the SACC, BC and LNS; regularly acting as a conduit for 
her father's opinions to the executive committees. 
GARVIE, Rev. Alfred E. (1861-1945) was educated at Glasgow University and Mansfield 
College, Oxford. A Congregational minister, he was an outspoken critic of British policy 
in South Africa and the treatment of conscientious objectors during the First World War. He 
was a member of the SACC, BC, the BAC's executive committee, and the LNU's general 
council. 
GOOCH, George Peabody (1873-1968) he was educated at Kings College, London and Trinity 
College, Cambridge. He was Private Secretary to James Bryce, when Chief Secretary for 
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Ireland. He was Liberal member for Bath (1906-Jan. 1910) and unsuccessfully contested 
Bath (Dec. 1910) and Reading (1913). He published several historical works, and was co- 
editor of The Contemporary Review. He was active with the BC and BAC 
GREENWOOD, [Sir] Granville George (1850-1928) was educated at Eton and Trinity College, 
Cambridge. He unsuccessfully contested Peterborough (1886) and Central Hull (1900), 
before being elected as Liberal member for Peterborough (1906-1918). He was a member 
of the SACC, LLAAM, BC, BAC and LNS. He was knighted in 1916. 
GRINLING, Charles Herbert (c1861-1947) was educated at Hertford College, Oxford. On 
graduation he became a resident of Toynbee Hall, working closely with Samuel and 
Henrietta Barnett. Soon after his arrival he was ordained and later become rector of 
Woolwich and an active councillor. During his lengthy residency he was closely associated 
with a wide variety of projects to improve public services and social conditions, such as 
housing, education and health care. He published several books on local natural history and 
social work. He was a member of the SACC, BC and LNS. 
GURDON, Sir William Brampton (1840-1910) was educated at Eton and Trinity College, 
Cambridge. Originally a civil servant and private secretary to W. E. Gladstone (1865- 
1866 and 1868-1874) and served on the Transvaal inquiry commission (1881). He stood 
unsuccessfully as a Liberal for South West Norfolk (1885), Rotherhithe (1886) and 
Colchester (1888). He was elected as Liberal member for North Norfolk (1899-1910); a 
seat subsequently won by Noel Buxton. He was a prominent member of the LLAAM. He 
was knighted in 1882. 
HARRIS, John H. (1874-1940) together with his wife spent many years working as a Baptist 
missionary in Africa. He was secretary to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society and worked closely with the Congo Reform Association. He was a member of 
LLAAM, and was on the executive committees of the BC, BAC and LNU. 
HERBERT, Aubrey (1880-1923) was educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford. Beginning 
his career in the diplomatic service, his interest in the Middle East was fired by an 
appointment in Constantinople. He travelled extensively through the region; he worked 
for the cause of Albanian nationalism, and joined the executive committee of the BC. He 
was also a member of the LLAAM and general council of the LNU. He was Conservative 
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member for South Somerset (1911-1918) and Yeovil (1918-1923). During the First World 
War he served in the Irish Guards. 
HOBHOUSE, Leonard Trelawny (1864-1929) was educated at Marlborough School and 
Corpus Christi College, Oxford, where he developed a friendship with Gilbert Murray. He 
tutored at Oxford before joining the Manchester Guardian in 1897. He was an outspoken 
critic of the government's imperialist policies, especially in Southern Africa. In 1902 he left 
Manchester to embark on an academic career but continued to write for the Guardian as 
well as The Nation. He occupied the chair of sociology at the London School of Economics 
(1907-1929). He served on the executive committee of the BC. 
HOBSON, John Atkinson (1858-1940) he was educated at Derby and Lincoln College, Oxford. 
As a journalist he reported for the Manchester Guardian during the South African War. His 
experiences led to the publication of Imperialism and The Psychology ofJingoism. During 
the First World War he was active with the LNS, the Bryce Group as well as the UDC. 
In 1918 he stood unsuccessfully as an Independent candidate and shortly after joined the 
Labour Party. 
LAW, Hugh (1872-1943) was educated at Rugby and University College, Oxford. The son of the 
former Lord Chancellor of Ireland, he was Nationalist member for West Donegal (1902- 
1918). During the War he served in the Ministry of Munitions and News Department of 
the Foreign Office. He was a member of the SACC, the executive council of the BC and 
general council of the LNU. 
LAWSON, Sir Wilfred (1829-1906) stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal for West Cumberland in 
1857, but was elected for Carlisle (1859-1865 and 1868-1885), Cockermouth division of 
Cumberland (1886-1900 and 1906), and Camborne division of Cornwall (1903-1906). He 
was a long-standing critic of British foreign policy, especially secret treaties and played an 
active role in the LLAAM. 
LEHMANN, Rudolph Chambers (1856-1929) was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. 
He stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal for Cheltenham (1885), Central Hull (1886), and 
Cambridge (1892), before being elected for Harborough division of Leicestershire (1906- 
Dec. 1910). A strong critic of British policies during the South African War and was 
Chairman of LLAAM and served on the executive committee of the SACC and was a 
supporter of the BC. 
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MACKARNESS, Frederic Coleridge (1854-1920) was educated at Marlborough and Keble 
College, Oxford. He held many legal appointments including that of Advocate of Cape 
Supreme Court in 1882. He was a founder of SACC a member of the LLAAM and LNS. 
MADDISON, Fred (1856-1937) was a trade unionist who stood unsuccessfully as a Lib-Lab 
candidate for Central Hull (1892 and 1895), before being elected for Sheffield Brightside 
(1897-1900) and Burnley (1906-1910). His opposition to the South African War and 
militarism was not popular with his constituents, many of whom were employed in 
armaments manufacture. He was active executive committee member of the LLAAM and 
SACC. His involvement with the Labour Co-Partnership Association brought him into 
close contact with Aneurin Williams. In 1908 he became secretary of the International 
Arbitration League. 
METHUEN, [Sir] Algernon Methuen Marshall (1856-1924) changed his surname from 
Stedman in 1899. He was educated at Wadham College, Oxford. He was founder and 
chairman of the successful publishers, Methuen & Co., and unsuccessfully contested 
the Guildford division of Surrey (1910). A resident of Hindhead he was a close friend of 
Aneurin Williams and a member of the Haslemere Friends of Conciliation, the SACC, 
LLAAM and LNS. He wrote Peace or War in South Africa (1901) and The Tragedy of 
South Africa (1905). He was created a baronet in 1916. 
MEYER, Rev. Frederic Brotherton (1847-1929) was a Baptist minister, who from the 1880s 
became a prominent free-church campaigner in south London. An outspoken critic of the 
South African War, the treatment of Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and the 
rights of conscientious objectors during the First World War. He was a member of the 
SACC, BC, the executive committee of the BAC, a vice-president of the LNS and member 
of the general council of the LNU. 
MOLTENO, Percy Alport (1861-1937) was educated at the University of Cape of Good Hope 
and Trinity College, Cambridge. He was the son of Sir John Molteno the first Premier of 
Cape Colony. He was a member of LLAAM and one of the founders of the SACC and 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
MOORE, William Arthur (1880-1962) was secretary of BC, he travelled to the Balkans were 
he was taken on as a correspondent for one of the British papers. He travelled extensively 
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throughout the Balkans, Middle East, and India; reporting on nationalist movements in 
Persia, Albania. During the First World War he reported from the front, working for The 
Times and other leading papers. 
MURRAY, (George) Gilbert Aime (1866-1957) was educated at St John's College, Oxford, and 
a fellow of New College, Oxford. Elected to the chair of Greek at Glasgow University in 
1889, a post he held for ten years. On his resignation, due to ill health he moved to Churt, 
Surrey and came into contact with Aneurin Williams and the Haslemere Liberals. In 1905 he 
took up a fellowship at New College, Oxford, and in 1908 was appointed regius professor 
of Greek. While at Oxford he taught his future son-in-law Arnold Toynbee. He was a 
member of both the SACC and LLAAM during the South African War, and subsequently 
supported the BC. After several years of persuasion he became a Vice-President of the LNS 
and Chairman of the LFNA and the LNU which arose from a merger of the two groups in 
1918. He worked closely with Lord Robert Cecil on League matters until its demise. 
NEVINSON, Henry Woodd (1856-1941) was educated at Christ Church, Oxford. He developed 
an interest in Christian Socialists and went to work at the Toynbee Hall settlement in 
Whitechapel. In 1897 he reported on the Graeco-Turkish war for the Daily Chronicle and 
subsequently regularly reported from war zones and civil disturbances. These included the 
South African War, the First Balkan War, and the western front and Dardanelles during the 
First World War. He assisted in aid relief for the Macedonians and Albanians and was an 
important member of the BC and supported the LLAAM during the South African War. 
NUBAR, Boghos (1851-1930) was the son of a former Egyptian prime minister was educated 
in Paris. He became engaged in the Armenian Question during the 1895-6 massacres 
when as chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Armenian Diocese in Alexandria where 
he helped provide shelter and work for fleeing Armenians. In 1913 he was appointed by 
the Catholicos as his representative in Europe. As President of the Armenian National 
Delegation he worked closely with Lord Bryce and Aneurin Williams in order to raise 
awareness of the genocide being perpetrated against the Armenians within Turkey. 
O'CONNOR, Thomas Power (1848-1929) was educated at Queen's College, Galway. His early 
career was as a journalist in Ireland before successfully transferring to London; setting up 
a series of evening and weekly papers in the 1880s and 1890s. He stood as a home-rule 
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candidate for the borough of Galway (1880-1885) and an Irish Nationalist for the seat 
at Liverpool Scotland (1885-1929). As an ardent supporter of home-rule for Ireland he 
equally believed in Armenian self-determination, and was an active member of the BAC. 
PERCIVAL, Rev. John (1834-1918) was educated at Queen's College, Oxford. Former 
headmaster of Rugby School he was during the period of study the Bishop of Hereford. He 
was an early supporter of the Workers' Educational Association and educational reform. He 
was a member of the SACC, vice-president of the BC and LNS, an executive committee 
member of the BAC, and general council member of the LNU. 
PONSONBY, Arthur [Baron Ponsonby of Shulbrede] (1871-1946) was the son of Sir Henry 
Ponsonby, Queen Victoria's private secretary. He was educated at Eton and Balliol College, 
Oxford. He originally served in the diplomatic service and Foreign Office, and was private 
secretary to Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1905-1908). He was 
a strong critic of the Liberal Government's foreign policy; he was chairman of the Liberal 
Foreign Affairs Group, member of the BC and a founder of the UDC. He was elected as 
Liberal member for Stirling Burghs (1908-1918). He stood unsuccessfully in 1918 and 
subsequently joined the Labour Party. He returned to parliament as Labour member for 
Brightside division of Sheffield (1922-1930). He held several posts in the post-war Labour 
Governments and was elevated to the peerage in 1930. 
ROBERTS, Charles (1865-1959) was educated at Marlborough and Balliol College, Oxford. 
He married Lady Cecilia Howard, daughter of the 91h Earl of Carlisle. He was Liberal 
Member for Lincoln (1906-1918), Borough of Derby (1922-1923). He was a member of 
the SACC, the general council of the BC and executive committee of the LNU. 
ROBERTSON, John M. (1856-1933) joined the staff of the Edinburgh Evening News before 
moving to London. He reported from South Africa during the war as `Scrutator' for the 
Morning Leader. He was Liberal member for Tyneside division of Northumberland (1906- 
1918). He was a member of the SACC, an associate of the BC and served on the LNU's 
general council. 
ROWNTREE, Arnold (1872-1951) was educated at the Quaker's Bootham School in York. 
He was Liberal member for York (1910-1918) and part of the well-known chocolate 
manufacturers. He was a member of LLAAM, the BC and the LNS. 
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SCOTT, Alexander MacCullum (1874-1928) was educated at Glasgow University, where 
he was a contemporary of H. N. Brailsford. He was actively engaged in Liberal politics 
and was Liberal member for Glasgow Bridgeton (Dec. 1910-1922). He was the secretary 
of LLAAM, after the South African War he became secretary of the New Reform Club 
following its merger with the now defunct LLAAM. He joined the executive committee 
of the BC, a founding executive member of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group. He was 
parliamentary private secretary to Winston Churchill at the Ministry of Munitions and 
later in the War Office. He wrote several books based on his travels and observations of 
Scandinavia and Russia, as well as political columns for several newspapers. 
SCOTT, Charles Prestwich (1846-1932) was educated at Corpus Christi, Oxford. In 1871 he 
joined the Manchester Guardian, and the following year began his 57 year editorship. 
Amongst the distinguished writers attracted by Scott were James Bryce, J. A. Hobson, H. 
N. Brailsford and Arnold Toynbee. The paper opposed British imperialism, and armaments 
as well as providing the main (and sometimes only) outlet for liberal internationalism. He 
was Liberal member for Leigh (1895-1906). He was an executive member of the LLAAM 
and SACC and was a supporter of the BC. 
STOW, [Sir] Frederic Samuel Phillipson (1849-1908) a resident of the Orange Free State, he 
became connected with the diamond fields in Southern Africa in 1869 and also practiced 
law until 1885. He was one of the founders of the de Beers Mining Company and one of 
the first Life Governors of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. Before the outbreak of the 
South African War he had settled in Haslemere, Surrey and was one of the founders of the 
SACC. Baronetcy created in 1907. 
SWANN, Sir Charles Ernest (1844-1929) was educated at the University College, London. In 
1913 he changed his name from Schwann by Royal licence. He was Liberal member for 
Northern division of Manchester (1886-1918). His wife was a member of the SACC and 
BC. 
SYMONDS, Arthur G. (c. 1855-1924) stood unsuccessfully as a Liberal candidate for the 
High Peak division of Derbyshire. He was secretary of several political organisations and 
following William Arthur Moore's departure became secretary of the BC and later the 
BAC. He was a regular visitor to the House of Commons and worked in the Secretaries 
Room from 1875 to 1918. 
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THOMAS, Frederic George (1872-1937) was educated at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge 
and trained as a barrister. In 1911 he represented the Secretary of State for the Colonies at 
the reception of the Prime Ministers of the Dominions. He was a member of the SACC, the 
executive committee of the LLAAM, the general committee of the BC and LNS. 
TOYNBEE, Arnold Joseph (1889-1975) was educated at Balliol College, Oxford where he 
caught the attention of Gilbert Murray (his future father-in-law). His travels through Italy 
and Greece gave him a deep understanding of the region, before taking up the role of an 
Oxford tutor. During the First World War he was engaged at Wellington House in the 
preparation of propagandist material. While there he collaborated with Viscount Bryce in 
the preparation and publication of the Blue Book The Treatment of the Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916. He later joined the foreign intelligence department and was 
a member of the British delegation to the Paris peace conference. These positions ensured 
that he played an important role in the BAC. 
WALLAS, Graham (1858-1932) was educated at Corpus Christi, Oxford. He was a member 
of the Fabian Society (1886-1904) and was a university extension lecturer before taking 
up a position at the London School of Economics. He was involved in early discussions 
regarding the formation of the LNS and consulted by Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson. He 
joined the general Council of the LNU. 
WELLS, Herbert George (1866-1946) was educated at Midhurst Grammar School and the 
Royal College of Science. He is best known as a highly successful novelist. He was a 
member of the Fabian Society (1903-1908) but resigned over a difference of opinion. An 
active supporter of Britain's participation in the First World War, he joined the LNS and 
formulated a policy for a league of Allies which was instrumental in the LNS' break-up. 
After the war he joined the Labour Party and unsuccessfully stood as a candidate in 1922 
and 1923. 
WESTLAKE, John (1828-1913) was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge and later trained 
as a barrister. He gained a reputation in international law where his opinion was highly 
valued. His parliamentary career was short-lived, as MP for Romford division of Essex 
(1885-1886). In 1888 he was appointed to the Whewell chair of international law at the 
University of Cambridge, where he published several important works. He sat on the 
International Court of Arbitration at The Hague (1900-1906). An original member of the 
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BC's general committee, he took on the role of president in 1905, following James Bryce's 
appointment as Irish chief secretary. 
WILLIAMS, Aneurin (1859-1924) was educated privately and at London University and St. 
John's College, Cambridge. He stood unsuccessfully for the Medway division, Kent (1906) 
and was Liberal member for Plymouth (Jan-Dec. 1910), North West division of Durham 
(1914-1918) and Consett division, Durham (1918-1922). During the South African War 
he was actively involved with the SACC and LLAAM. Afterwards he joined the BC and 
became chairman of the BAC when it was formed in 1912. His interest in internationalism 
led to his publication of `Proposals for a League of Peace and Mutual Protection Among 
Nations' in November 1914. He brought together a body of like-minded individuals and 
established the LNS. Despite the personal animosity of David Davies he remained active 
with the LNU following its formation. During the war he was closely associated with the 
Armenian Question and raising awareness of the ongoing genocide, both in parliament and 
the country. He was a member of the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform 1916-17, 
and chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (1921-1922) 
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Appendix 2: Extra-parliamentary group membership 
Abbreviations used 
Membership categories 
Ordinary members denoted by date of first appearance on membership lists' 
A Associate (similar to Vice President) PC Provisional Committee 
EC Executive Committee member P President 
GC General Council VP Vice President 
LS Local Secretary for Balkan Committee 
Liberal internationalist groups Comparative groups 
SACC South Africa Conciliation Committee ARCF Armenian Red Cross Fund' 
LLAAM League of Liberal Against Aggression AR(LM)F Armenian Refugees (Lord Mayor's) 
and Militarism Fund' 
BC Balkan Committee BWRF Balkan War Relief fund2 
BAC British Armenia Committee CRA Congo Reform Association' 
LNS League of Nations Society LFAG Liberal Foreign affairs Group" 
LNU League of Nations Union UPG Un-named Parliamentary Groups 
UDC Union of Democratic Control' 
University Colleges 
All St. All Saints College 
Bal. Balliol College 
Bras. Brasenose College 
Camb. Cambridge University 
Christ Ch. Christ Church College 
Corpus Corpus Christi 
Down. Downing College 
Gon. Gonville & Caius College 
Linc. Lincoln College 
Magd. Magdalen College 
Mans. Mansfield College 
Mer. Merton College 
New New College 
Newn. Newnham College 
Oxf. Oxford University 
Sidn. Sidney Sussex College 
Trin. Trinity College 
Univ. Col. University College 
Univ. Of University of 
Wadh. Wadham College 
Worc. Worcester College 
Sources 
I See chapter 3 for an explanation of the different groups membership records 
2 Official headed paper 
3 Official Organ of the Congo Reform Association, October 1906 Committee and supporters list 
4 List in NBP, MS951 c19/1 & Swartz, Union of Democratic Control, 6-7 
5 R. D. Denman Papers, 
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Appendix 3: Pro-Boer Candidates 
1. Pro-Boer Candidates in 1900 General Election 
Candidate Elected Unsuccessfully contested List 
Robert Andrew Allison s 1885-1900 Eskdale, Cumberland 
LAAtherley-Jones 1885-1914 NW Durham TPAR 
Fred Barnes 1895-1900 Faversham, Kent 
1892 NE Dcrb shire; 1906 & 
Jan. 1910 Northampton 
Richard Bell 1900-Jan. 1910 Derby 
John Albert Bright $ 
1889-95 Central Birmingham 1900 Montgomery District It (LU); 1906-Jan. 1 910 Oldham 
Sir John Brunner 
1885-86& 1887-Jan. 1910 
T111t Northwich, Cheshire 
John Burns ¢'ý 1892-1918 Battersea 1885 W Nottingham (SDP) TPAR 
Thomas Burt ßW 1874(b)-1918 Morpeth TPAR 
William P Byles 4W 
1892-95 Shipley, Yorks.; 1900 Leeds 
1906-17 N Salford 
Robert Cameron 4 
1895-1913 Houghton-le-Spring 1892(b) Central Division 
TPAR Division Durham Shellield 
Frances A Channing gw 1885-Dec. 1910 E Northants. Tt'Att 
4 1880-85 
N Derbys.; 1905(b)-Jan. 
1885 `C 1892 high Peak, 
1895 D b John F Cheetham 1910 Stalybridge ys.; cr 
Bury; 1900 
Stalybridge 
Richard R Cherry 4W 
1906-1909 Exchange Division, 1900 Kirkdalc, Liverpool 
Liverpool 
Felix T Cobbold 1 
1885-86 Stowmarket, Suffolk; 1900 Woodbridge, Suffolk 
1906 Ipswich 
W Randall Cremer ß 
1885-95 & 1900-08 ltaggerston, 1868 & 1874 Warwick PAIR Shoreditch 
1885-1910 Rushcliffe Division 
John Edward Ellis §Iv Nottinghamshire TPAR 
Samuel T Evans 1890(b)-1910 Mid Glamorgan TI'tt 
1885(b) Woodstock; 1892(b) 
Corrie Grant ß 1900-Jan. 1910 Rugby W Birmingham; 1895(b) 
Rugby; 1899(b) I larrow 
George Greenwood iW 1906-1918 Peterborough 
1886 Peterborough; 1900 
Central 1 lull 
1885 SW Norwich; 1886 
Sir William Brampton Gurdon ßW 1899(b)-Jan. 1910 N Norfolk Rotherhithe; 1888(b) TI`AR 
Colchester 
Keir Hardie 4 
1892-95 West 11am; 1900-1915 1888 Lanarkshire; 1896 E 
Merthyr Tydfil Bradford; 1900 Preston 
Sir John Jardine 9 1906-1918 Roxburghshire 1900 Roxburghshire 
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1905(b)-Jan. 1910 Appleby, 1892 Westminster; 1895 
Leif Jones ¢ 
Westmorland; Dec. 1910-1918 Central Leeds; 1900 S 
Rushcliffe, Notts.; 1923-24 & Manchester; 1922 Camborne, 
1929-31 Camborne, Cornwall Cornwall 
Dec. 1910-1912 & 1922-1940 1895 Walworth (SDF); 1900 
George Lansbury $ Bow & Bromley Bow & Bromley; 1906 
Middlesbrough 
1859-65 & 1868-85 Carlisle; 
1886-1900 Cockermouth, 
Sir Wilfred Lawson 4W Cumberland; 1903(b)-1906 1857 W Cumberland TAR 
Cambome, Cornwall; 1906-1906 
Cockermouth 
David Lloyd-George 4# 1890-1945 Carnarvon District TPAR 
John W Logan 
1891-1904 & Dec. 1910-1916 
TPAR 
Harborough, Leics. 
Thomas Lough 1892-1918 W Islington 1886 Truro TPAR 
1900-1918 Leicester; 1922-1929 1895 Southampton; 1900 
James R MacDonald * Aberavon; 1929-1935 Seaham; Leicester, 1921 Woolwich E 1936-1937 Scottish Universities 
1892 & 1895 Central Ilull; 
4W 1897-1900 
Brightside, Sheffield; Dec. 1910 Darlington; 1918 TAR Fred Maddison 1906-Jan. 1910 Burnley IIolderness, E Riding; 1922 S 
Dorset; 1923 Reading 
1906-Jan. 1910 Chester; 1900 Salford; 1923 W 
Alfred Mond 1918-23 W Swansea; 1924-192 8 Sw n ea Carmarthen s a 
Alfred E Pease 
1885-92 York; 1ß97(b)-1902 1895 York TPR Cleveland, Yorks 
Sir RT Reid 4 
1880-85 Hereford; 1886-1905 1885 Dunbartonshire Ti'R 
Dumfries District 
1895 Wenesbury; 1899 
Charles Roberts t 1906-18 Lincoln; 1922-23 Derby 
Osgoldcross, Yorks.; 1900 
Lincoln; 1920(b) S Norfolk; 
1924 Central Nottingham 
J Bryn Roberts 6 
1885-1906 Eifion, T1'AR 
Carnarvonshire 
Charles E Schwarm 4 1886-1918 N Manchester 1885 N Manchester T1'AR 
CP Scott $ 1859-1906 Leigh, Lancs. 
1886,1891 & 1892 NE 
Manchester TPAit 
Robinson Souttar 4w 1895-1900 Dumfrieshire 1892 Oxford TAR 
William C Steadman 
1898-1900 Stepney; 1901-Jan. 1892 Mid Kent; 1895 TAIL 
1910 Central Finsbury Ilammersmith 
1887-1895 Spalding, Lincs; 1885,1886 & 1895 Spalding, 
Halley Stewart a 1906-Jan. 1910 Greenock Lincs.; 1900 Peterborough 
Robert Williams 1895-1922 W Dorset 
Charles Henry Wilson'y 
1874-1885 hull; 1885-19051iull TPR 
West 
Henry J Wilson ßW 
1885-1912 Iiolmfirth division TPAR 
Yorkshire 
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2. Pro-Boers who sat in Parliament before 1900 
Candidate Elected Unsuccessfully contested List 
CF Egerton Allen 
1892-1892 Pembroke & 
Haverfordwest 
Joseph Arch ¢ 1885-1900 NW Norfolk 
E Bayley 0 1892-95 N Camberwell 1886 N Camberwell 
Joseph Bennett ¢ 1885-86 & 1892-95 West Lindsey 
James Howard Brooks 0w9 1885 Altringham, cheshire 
Right Hon. Leonard Courtney 
Misheard, Cornwall; 1885- 
1874 Mishrard y¢ 1900 Bodmin, Cornwall 
JC Durant 1 1885 Stepney, Tower Hamlet 
John Passmore Edwards * 1880-1885 Salisbury 1885(b) Rochester, 1886 Truro 
James Ellis ß 1885-1892 Bosworth, Lcics. 
Robert Lacy Everettf* 
1885-86,1892-1895 & 1906-Jan. 1880 E Suftälk (Farmer's 
1910 Woodbridge, Suffolk Candidate) 
Herbert Paul 
1892-95 S Edinburgh; 1906-Jan. 
1910 Northampton 
Captain D Pirie I fumed SA 1s991900) 1896-1918 N Aberdeen 1895 W Renfrcwshire T'AR 
Joshua Rowntree ¢ 1886-1892 Scarborough 
George WE Russell 
1880-1885 Aylesbury; 1892(b)-1895 
N Bedfordshire 
1885 & 1886(b) Vulhum 
Right Hon. GJ Shaw-Lefevre 4 
1863-1885 Reading; 1886-1895 
Central Bradford 
John Pennington Thomasson IY 1880(b)-1885 Bolton 
Sir William Wedderburn 1893(b)-1900 Banffshire 1892 N Ayrshire 
Joseph Woodhead 
1885-1892 Spen Valley Division 
West Riding Yorkshire 
1893 1luddersfield 
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3. Pro-Boers who unsuccessfully contested elections before 1900 
Candidate Unsucccssfully contcstcd 
Prof. ES Beesly ¢ 1885 Westminster; 1886E Marylebone 
William Bell ¢ 1892 & 1894 Leith District of Burghs 
J Bonham-Carter IW 1892 & 1897(b) Petersfield, Hants 
EW Brooks 4 1892 SE Essex 
Oscar Browning 4 1886 Norwood; 1892 E Worcs.; 1895 W Derby, Liverpool 
PW Clayden ¢ 1885 Norwood; 1886 N Islington 
R Hippisley Cox 0 1895 Chatham; 1900 Kirkcudbrightshirc 
WM Crook ¢ 1892 Wandsworth 
Frank Debenham 4W 1892 Cheltenham 
JA Farrer IW 1892 Kendal; 1895 Skipton, W Riding 
Frederic Harrison 1886 London Universities 
Sir Robert Garnet Head ¢w 1895 Brixton 
Rev. John Page Hopps ß 1886 S Paddington 
Bolton King ß 1901(b) Stratford Upon Avon 
Edmund K Muspratt 1885 Widnes, Lancs. 
Sir Patteson Nickalls 1885 Sevenoaks, Kent; 1895 Dartford, Kent 
Sir JB Phear 4W 1885 Honiton, Devon; 1886 Tavistock; 1892 Tiverton, Devon 
J Harris Sanders 
1886 Harborough, Leics.; 1886(b) Kings Lynn; 1887(h) Taunton, 1887(h) 
Ramsey, Hunts.; 1892 Wellington, Shrops. 
AG Shiell ¢ 1885 Howdenshire, Yorks 
Frank Smith 
1892 Hammersmith (Lib/Lab); 1894(b) AtterclilTe, Shctricld (ILP); 1895 
Tradeston, Glasgow (ILP); 1909(b) Taunton (Lab); 1909(h) Croydon (Lab); 
Dec. 1910 Chatham (Lab) 
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4. Pro-Boers who were elected after 1900 
Candidate Elected Unsuccessfully contested 
Percy Alden a 
1906-1918 Tottenham(Liberal); 
1923-24 Tottenham North (Labour) 
Rev. FW Aveling *W 1906 Lewisham 
1906-1918 Glasgow, Blackfriars 
George Barnes & Hutchesontown (Labour); 1918- 1895 Rochdale (1L11) 
Glasgow, Gorbals (coalition Labour) 
James Branch 1906-Jan. 1910 Enfield, Middx. Dec. 1910 Enfield, Middx. 
Allan 11 Bright ßW 1904(b)-1906 Oswestry, Shrops. 
1899 & 1900 Exeter; 1901(h) Us%scstry, 
Shrops ; Jun & Dec. 1910 Stalyhridge 
J Annan Bryce fW 1906-1918 Inverness Burghs 
Stanley OBuckmaster ¢ 
1906-Jan. 1910 Cambridge; 1911(b)- Dec. 191O Cambridge 1915 Keighley, W Riding 
llugh Fullerton 
1906-Jan. 1910 Egremont, 
Cumberland 1918 Royton. Lancs. 
GP Gooch 1906-Jan. 1910 Bath Dec. 1910 Feuding 
John George Hancock 
1909(b)-1918 Mid Derbys.; 1918- 
1923 ßelper 
Rudolf C Lehmann 1906-Dec. 191011arborough, Leics. 1885 Chcltcnham; 1892 C'cntral I lull 
Arnold Lupton aW 1906-Jan. 1910 Sleaford, Lincs. 
1918 Plaistow; 1921(h) Westminster 
Ahhcv 
Frederic C Mackarness ßW 1906-Jan. 1910 Newbury 
Dec. 1910-1918 Coventry; 1931- 
1906 & 19_ Tradeston fllas4ow; 1922 - 
David M Mason 14' 1935E Edinburgh 
Chislchurst. Kent. 1923 ttumtbrd. I:. rrcx; 
1929 Barnstaple, Devon 
PAMolteno 1906-1918 Dumfricshirc 1923 Kinross& W I'crshirc 
James O'Grady 1 
1906-1918 E Leeds; 1918-24 SE 
Leeds (Labour) 
John M Robertson 1906-18 Tyneside 1895 Northampton; 19231lodon 
John A Simon 
1906-18 Walthamstow, Essex; 1922- 1919(b) Spcn Valley, Yorks. 1940 Spcn Valley, Yorks. 
Thomas Summerbell ` 1906-Jan. 19 10 Sunderland 
1885 SW Kent; 1886Ilath; 1895 
Frederick William Vcmey +" 1906-Dec. 1910 N Buckinghamshire Norwich; 1900 Exchange Division 
Liverpool 
Henry Harvey Vivian 
1906-Dcc. 1910 Birkenhead; 1923- 1911(b) S Sontctiet; 11)18 Iidmonton; 
1924 Totnes 1922 Northampton 
1906-1918 Stoke-on-Trent; 1918- 
John Ward 4 1929 Stoke Division Stoke-on-Trent 
1906-Dec. 1910 Dunbartonshire, 1923 W hlidJIcshrough; 1924 Central 
James Dundas White 1 1911(b)-1918 Tradeston Division Glasgow Glasgow 
Aneurin Williams 4W 
1910(b)-1918 NW Durham; 1918-22 
1906 I\1edway Kent Consett, Durham , 
William Liewelyn Williams 1 1906-1918 Carmarthen Boroughs 1921 Cardiganshire 
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5. Pro-Boers who unsuccessfully contested elections after 1900 
Candidate Unsuccessfully contested 
Silas Hocking ¢" 1906 Aylesbury; Jan. 1910 Coventry 
A. L. Leon Jan. & Dec. 1910 Croydon 
W. R. Lester 8 Jan. & Dec. 1910 Mid Norfolk 
A. M. S. Methuen I" Jan. 1910 Guildford, Surrey 
Sir Edward O'Malley 1906 S Kensington; Dec. 1910 Lewisham 
Herbert R. Rathbone ß 1902(b) East Toxteth 
Rev. William Riley 1906 S. Hackney (ILP) 
Rev. Harold Rylett Dec. 1910 Burton, Staffs. 
Herbert Spencer a 1918(b) Finsbury East 
Key: 
Symbols 
§ Member of South Africa Conciliation Committee 
yr Member of League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism 
Lists 
T Pro-Boer candidates from The Times, 19 October 1900, 
P Pro-Boer Members 1900, from Price, Richard, An Imperial War and the British 
Working Class (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p250-251 
A Pro-Boer Liberal MPs, 1899-1902, from Auld, John W, 'The Liberal Pro-Boers', The 
Journal of British Studies, 14, no. 2 (May 1975), pl00-01 
R Liberal pro-Boer candidates, 1900, from Readman, P., 'The Liberal Party and 
Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century Britain', Twentieth Century British History, 12, 
no. 3 (2001), p 142-3 
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Appendix 4: Pro-Boer membership sample 
Age 
Published Address in 
1901 
19 Boscombe Road, Shepherd's Congregational Minister 
Rev. Joseph Adams 46 Bush, W. (Hamersmith) 
Rev. JR Aitken 
Dunnington Manse, Alcester, 
Warwickshire 
Mr William Atkinson 57 Carr Street, Darwen 
Tea Dealer & Trade Mason 35 
Secretary 
Rev. Leyland Baldwin Leyland, Preston 
Church of England 63 Clergyman 
Mrs Ball St John's House, S. Giles, Oxford 38 
Mr Kenard Ball 23 Stanley Crescent, Notting Hill, W Solicitor 37 
Mr Basil Barnhill 30 Furnival Street, WC Journalist & author 37 
Mr WH Beeby Hildasay, Thames Ditton Bank Clerk 51 
Mr Alfred Beesly 
53 Warrington Crescent, Maida Vale, Chemist 46 
Lieut-Gen. Sir William Clevedon, Somerset Retired General 72 
Bellairs 
Mrs J Bernard Boanquet The Heath Cottage, Oxshott, Surrey Social worker 41 
Mr James Branch 
24 Fountayne Road, Stoke Boot Manufacturer 56 Newington, N 
Mr WA Brend 6 Argyll Road, Kensington, W Medical Student 29 
Mrs William Brown 182 Croydon Road, Anerley, SE 
Mr George Cadbury Bournville, Birmingham Company Chairman 62 
Miss Julia Cameron 
7 Kensington Studios, Stanford Artist 48 
Road, W 
Mr Alexander Cameron Seathaugh, Blackford, Perthshire 
Mr JF Cheetham 33 Princess Gardens, SW 
Politician & Cotton 
Manufacturer 66 
Mrs WS Clark Mill Field, Street, Somerset 60 
Cheddar, Willingdon Road, 
Rev JP Clarke Eastbourne 
Rev E Clarke Heather-bank, Matlock 
Mr Felix T Cobbold The Lodge, Felixstowe Banker, Liberal MP 59 
Dr Robert J Colenso 91 Cromwell Road, SW Medical Doctor 50 
Lord Coleridge 8 Wetherby Place, SW 
Kings Councillor, Peer of 
Parliament 
49 
Mr Howard Coote The Rookery, Fenstanton, Hunts Farmer 37 
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Mr Thomas Coventry 
3 Liverpool Road, Birkdale, 
Bank Cashier 36 Southport 
Mr HE Dauncey 56 Bayston Road, Stoke Newington Postman 32 
Mr James Davison 
Drimateryl House, Ballynakill, 
Queen's County 
Mr F Lawson Dodd 41 Wimpole Street, W 
Rev. Robert P Douglas 
The Manse, Otterburn, 
Northumberland 
Presbyterian Minister 57 
Mr Warwick H Draper 
19 Old Buildings, Lincoln's Inn, Barrister Solicitor 27 
W. C.; 110 Heath Street, 
Mrs Dockar Drysdale Wick Hall, Radley, Berks Widow (son is a Barrister) 56 
Mr JC Durant South Croydon Stage Carpenter 41 
The Very Rev. George 
William Kitchen 
Durham Cathedral Dean of Durham 74 
Mr Eustace J Eastman National Liberal Club, SW Clerk 45 
Mr William F Everett Etgasa, D' Aubigny Road, Brighton Hatter Shop Keeper 55 
Lady Emma Fitch 13 Leinster Square, W 70 
Mr John Rawlinson Ford Quarrydene, Weetwood, Leeds Solicitor 56 
Professor George Carey 
Foster 
Ladywalk, Rickmansworth 
University Professor of 
Physics 66 
Mr Joseph Sturge Gilpin 88 Parliament Street, Nottingham 
Rev. Stephen Gladstone Hawarden Rectory, Chester Church of England Rector 56 
Mr JP Goodridge 
Petersfield, Beulah Hill, Upper 
Norwood 
Mr James D Grout 22 Buckland Street, N Wire worker 54 
Mr Robert Hall Salisbury 
Mrs Charles Hancock 125 Queen's Gate, SW Barrister's wife 52 
Mr Martin Handon 
Rosemead, Kent House Road, 
Beckenham 
Clerk in music school 27 
Colonel HB Hanna Ashcroft, Petersfield Retired Colonel 61 
Sir Robert Garnet Head 2 Sussex Place, W 56 
Mr CE Hecht 3 Essex Court, Temple 
Rev. Edward Newenham 
Hoare 
The Vicarage, Oakhill Park, 
Liverpool 
Church of England clergyman 59 
Lady Hobhouse 15 Bruton Street, W Peeress 75 
Mrs John A Hobson 
Elmstead, Limpsfield, Surrey; 3 
Gayton Crescent, Hampstead 
Wife of journalist 41 
Rev. R Holman 9 Stanley Terrace, Diss, Norfolk 
Mrs R Holt 54 Ullett Road, Liverpool Wife of Cotton Broker 55 
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Rev. John Page Hopps Sanderstead Hill, South Croydon Baptist Minister 67 
Mr G Inchbould 6 Dorset Street, Fleet-street, EC 
Rev. Thomas Islip Cockington, Torquay Retired Wesleyan Minister 77 
Rev. RW Jackson 
Victoria Villa, Oxford Road, 
Macclesfield 
Congregational Minister 
Rev. WJ Jupp 14A Belvidere Road, Liverpool Unitarian Minister 42 
Mr Frederick Kaye 29 St Michael's Road, Workington Steel Worker 30 
Mr JG Kenyon 
Gillingham Hall, near Beccles, 
Norfolk 
Former Chamberlain to His 
Holiness Pius X 
57 
Mr Reginald Larmuth Norton Lees, Stretford, Manchester 
Mr Hugh Law 3 Grosvenor Road, SW Politician & Barrister 29 
Mr James Crawford Ledlie The Garth, Cobham, Surrey Barrister 40 
Mr Guy Lewis 9 WinchesterRoad, Oxford 
Miss FH Low 25 Grand Parade, St Leonards 
Mrs Lyell 9 Cornwall Gardens, SW 
Mrs GP Macdonell 40 Lansdowne Crescent, W 
Dr RD MacGregor 7 Upper Montague Street, WC Medical doctor 41 
Councillor Robert F 
Martineau 
Birmingham (18 Highfield Rd) Brassfounder 69 
Miss Harriet Cameron 
Mawson 
Ashfield, Low Fell, Gateshead 47 
Miss Mawson Ashfield, Low Fell, Gateshead 57 
Mr James J McSheedy 114 Queen's Road, Walthamstow Clerk Stock exchange 26 
Mrs LC Miall (Emily) 8 Spring Road, Headingley, Leeds 
Wife of University Biology 
professor 
Mr Joseph Miller 159 Gordon Road, Nottingham Engine fitter 44 
Mr Thomas Mills 
Balmoral House, Cleethorpes Boarding House Keeper 49 
Mr [Sir] Alfred Mond 66 Lowndes Square, W Chemical Manufacturer 32 
Mr Felix Moscheles 80 Elm Park Road, Chelsea, SW Artist & peace activist 68 
Rev. AD Mozley Wigginton Rectory, Banbury Church of England Minister 52 
Professor John Henry 
Muirhead 
I York Road, Edgbaston, 
Birmingham 
University Professor 46 
Mr Thomas S Mullard Bank Chambers, 14 Waterloo Street, 
Birmingham 
Chartered Accountant 48 
Mr WE Mullins 
18 Lyndhurst Gardens, Hampstead, 
NW 
Retired Assistant College 
Master 
66 
Mr TP Newman Hazelhurst, Haslemere Licensed Victualler 61 
Rev. AE O'Connor 2 York Terrace, Babbicome, Torquay 
Mr Joseph H Parry 226 Caledonian Road, N Solicitors Manager 43 
Mr Charles Parsons 117 Winstanley Road, Battersea, SW Postman 27 
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Rev. Professor James United Presbyterian College, United Presbyterian Minister So 
Alexander Paterson Edinburgh & Professor 
Mr JE Powell Irvon, Wrexham 
Rev. JJ Poynter Oswestry Congregational Minister 50 
Mr Frank Prentice Bishop's Hill, Ipswich 
Engineer & Gas Works 
Manager 
39 
Rev. Gardner Preston Castle Gardens, Hastings Non-conformist Minister 44 
Rev. Edward S Prout Summerlea, Craven Road, Reading Congregational Minister 64 
Mr Charles Horace 
Radford 
2 Queen's Gate Villas, Plymouth Retired Draper former Mayor 
of Plymouth 
46 
Miss Emily Reid The Mount, Meads Road, Eastbourne 47 
Mr ES Reynolds 13 East Street, Bridport Draper, Shopkeeper 30 
Mr John Richardson South Park, Lincoln Steam Engine Manager 59 
Mr John H Robson Dalton, Huddersfield Textile Manufacturer 69 
Mr GWE Russell 18 Wilton Street, SW former politician, author 48 
Mr Henry S Schwann Merton Cottage, Merton, Surrey Stock Broker Agent 32 
Mrs Isaac Sharp 
38 Forest Drive E, Leytonstone e 
to Recording Clerk 
of the Religious Society of 
Friends 
53 
Mr John W Shorthouse 
59 Wellington Road, Edgbaston, Manufacturing Chemist 64 Birmingham 
Mr Henry Smith 30 Mollart Street, Hanley 
Mr Arthur Spurgeon 
National Press Agency, Carmelite Managing Editor 40 
street, EC 
Mr William Steevens 26 Marlborough Place, Brighton 
Rev. Charles Strong 
St Kilda East, Melbourne, Victoria, Australian Church 57 
Australia 
Lisnagarvey, Chesterfield Road, 
Mrs Louise B Swann Bristol 
Mr Arthur G Symonds 
17 St Leonard's Terrace, Chelsea, Political Secretary & 46 
SW Journalist 
Mr Henry Yates 19 Portman Square, W Barrister, 63 
Thompson 
Mrs Percy Thompson Kippington Rectory, Sevonoaks 
Rev. A Tildsley 
30 Thorngrove Road, Upton Park, E Baptist Minister 34 
Mr George R Tweedie High Street, High Wycombe 
Sir Edmund Verney Claydon House, Winslow, Bucks Barronet 62 
Mr JW [or J M] Wallace Anderton, near Chorley, Manchester Assistant Architect 47 
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Professor George Charles Earl's Terrace, Kensington Road, W University Professor 56 
Winter Warr 
Mr William Watson G1, The Albany, W 
Rev. T Wheatley Woodland Leigh, Torquay Methodist Minister 50 
Mr John Whitburn 20 Bigg Market, Newcastle-on-Tyne Trade Union secretary 38 
Mr SH Whitehouse Radstock, near Bath Miners Agent 52 
Rev. WBR Wilson Dollar, N. B. 
Mr Oliver C Wilson 146 Burngreave Road, Sheffield 
Mr William Yeo 50 Granleigh Road, Leytonstone General Labourer 23 
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